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The agent and skill definitions had drifted badly from the current codebase and tooling, repeating the same class of bug as the benchmark tool (references to nonexistent scripts and invented flags): - Replace the removed `python3 test.py` with the real integration command (`python3 -m pytest tests/integration/ -n 4 --dist=load -m "not setpriv"`) across agents and skills. - Fix `feature-scout`'s fabricated CLI flag list (--host, --server-mode, --use-* etc.) using the authoritative src/client/usage.c flags. - Fix `perf-analyst` benchmark flags (-m -c -> -j -z) and point at benchmark/bench.py instead of stale numbers. - Correct `code-explainer` (no getopt_long; --sendfile not -f) and version drift in the release skill (1.1.0 -> 2.20.0). - Replace GitHub/`gh` workflows with Gitea/`tea` (PRs target dev; issues via tea; branch strategy updated in all agents). - Use the built-in `-DSANITIZER=address|thread` CMake option instead of hand-rolled -fsanitize flags. - Add `-p 8080 --allow-unauthenticated` to plain-TCP server examples. - Merge the redundant security-screener into security-auditor; drop the duplicate (16 agents remain). Repo hygiene: gitignore `root/` and `test_partial_install_tmp/`, remove the empty leftover trees, delete the tracked scratch scripts tmux.sh and to_one_file.py, and note the compile_commands.json symlink in README.
116 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
116 lines
3.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: security-audit
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description: Performs a security audit of FastSync — checks TLS config, input validation, buffer safety, crypto hygiene, and network attack surface. Use when the user says "security audit", "check security", "harden", or wants a security review.
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---
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# Security Audit Skill
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Read-only security review of the FastSync codebase or specific modules. Produces a report — does NOT edit files.
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Scope the Audit
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Determine what to audit:
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- Full codebase audit
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- Specific module (e.g., `transport_tls.c`, `protocol.c`)
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- Specific vulnerability class (e.g., buffer overflows, TLS misconfig)
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### Step 2: Identify Attack Surface
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Network input points:
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```
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src/server/server.c — TCP accept, per-connection handling
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src/shared/protocol.c — all wire protocol parsing
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src/shared/config.c — config deserialization
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src/shared/chunk.c — chunk deserialization
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src/shared/transport_tls.c — TLS handshake and data
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src/shared/transport_ssh.c — SSH data via stdio
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```
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### Step 3: Read All Relevant Files
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Read every file in scope completely. Focus on:
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- All `receive_*` calls and their validation
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- All `malloc`/`calloc` calls and their size calculations
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- All string operations (`strcpy`, `sprintf`, `snprintf`)
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- All path operations (filename handling, directory creation)
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- All TLS/SSL operations and error handling
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### Step 4: Apply Security Checklist
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#### Input Validation
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- [ ] All `receive_*` return values checked
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- [ ] Received size fields validated against bounds
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- [ ] Path traversal prevention (`..` in filenames)
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- [ ] Null bytes in filenames handled
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- [ ] Chunk/file counts validated before allocation
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#### Buffer Safety
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- [ ] No `strcpy` — use `snprintf`
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- [ ] `malloc` size calculations don't overflow
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- [ ] No fixed-size stack buffers for unbounded input
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- [ ] Off-by-one in path concatenation
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#### TLS/SSL
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- [ ] TLS 1.2 minimum enforced
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- [ ] Certificate verification when CA provided
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- [ ] SSL error codes checked after `SSL_read`/`SSL_write`
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- [ ] No hardcoded certificates/keys
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- [ ] Strong cipher suites only
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#### Memory Safety in Error Paths
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- [ ] All error paths free allocated resources
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- [ ] No use-after-free on error paths
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- [ ] Partial reads handled
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#### Denial of Service
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- [ ] Bounded memory allocation
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- [ ] Timeout on connections
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- [ ] Malformed messages handled gracefully
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### Step 5: Check for Common Vulnerabilities
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```bash
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# Grep for dangerous patterns
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grep -rn "strcpy\|strcat\|sprintf" src/
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grep -rn "malloc.*\*" src/ # potential integer overflow in size calc
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grep -rn "receive_n_data" src/ # check all return values
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grep -rn "NULL" src/ | grep -v "//" # check null handling
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```
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### Step 6: Output Report
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```
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=== SECURITY AUDIT SUMMARY ===
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Scope: <what was audited>
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Files reviewed: <count>
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Critical: <count>
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High: <count>
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Medium: <count>
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Low: <count>
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Informational: <count>
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=== FINDINGS ===
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[1] <file:line> — CRITICAL (<category>)
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Description: <what's wrong>
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Exploit scenario: <how it could be triggered>
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Fix: <concrete code change>
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...
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=== VERDICT ===
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[PASS] No critical/high-severity issues found
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— or —
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[FAIL] <N> critical/high-severity issues must be fixed
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```
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## Rules
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- Do NOT edit any source files
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- Do NOT run builds or tests
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- Report ALL issues — don't filter or minimize
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- Be specific about line numbers and fix suggestions
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- Consider both remote and local attack vectors
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