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FastSync/tests/test_xattr.c
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#include "test_xattr.h"
#include "xattr.h"
#include "charset.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "file.h"
#include "file_receive.h"
#include "file_save.h"
#include "identity.h"
#include "metadata.h"
#include "protocol.h"
#include "test_utils.h"
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void run_recv_helper(int fd) {
int ok = 0;
FileXattrList* list = xattr_receive(fd, &ok, false);
if (!ok)
_exit(1);
if (!list) {
/* NULL list only on error, already handled above. */
_exit(1);
}
if (list->count != 2)
_exit(1);
if (strcmp(list->items[0].name, "user.foo") != 0 || list->items[0].value_len != 3 ||
memcmp(list->items[0].value, "bar", 3) != 0)
_exit(1);
if (strcmp(list->items[1].name, "user.empty") != 0 || list->items[1].value_len != 0)
_exit(1);
xattr_list_free(list);
_exit(0);
}
static void test_xattr_wire_roundtrip() {
/* Round-trip a user.* list incl. an empty value. */
int p[2];
EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
io_set_bwlimit(0);
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[1]);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
run_recv_helper(p[0]);
}
close(p[0]);
io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.foo", "bar", 3));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.empty", NULL, 0));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_send(p[1], list));
xattr_list_free(list);
int status;
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
close(p[1]);
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
}
static void run_recv_must_fail(int fd) {
int ok = 0;
FileXattrList* list = xattr_receive(fd, &ok, false);
/* A NULL list with ok==0 is the expected rejection. */
if (ok == 0 && list == NULL)
_exit(0);
xattr_list_free(list);
_exit(1);
}
/* A receiver must reject a security.* (privileged-namespace) attribute, never
* apply it: the send side can be malicious, so only the receiver whitelist
* matters. */
static void test_xattr_reject_privileged_namespace() {
int p[2];
EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
io_set_bwlimit(0);
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[1]);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
run_recv_must_fail(p[0]);
}
close(p[0]);
io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
/* security.capability must be rejected by the receiver. */
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "security.capability", "\x01\x00", 2));
xattr_send(p[1], list); /* receiver rejects at the name check and exits */
xattr_list_free(list);
int status;
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
close(p[1]);
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
}
/* An oversized value (beyond XATTR_VALUE_MAX) must be rejected on receive. */
static void test_xattr_reject_oversized_value() {
int p[2];
EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
io_set_bwlimit(0);
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[1]);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
run_recv_must_fail(p[0]);
}
close(p[0]);
io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
size_t huge = (size_t)XATTR_VALUE_MAX + 1;
unsigned char* blob = calloc(1, huge);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(blob);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.huge", blob, huge));
xattr_send(p[1], list); /* send is best-effort; the receiver rejects and exits */
free(blob);
xattr_list_free(list);
int status;
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
close(p[1]);
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
}
/* The list append enforces the count bound (defense in depth). */
static void test_xattr_count_bound() {
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
bool all_ok = true;
for (int i = 0; i < XATTR_MAX_COUNT + 1; i++) {
char name[32];
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "user.k%d", i);
if (!xattr_list_append(list, name, "v", 1))
all_ok = false;
}
EXPECT_FALSE(all_ok);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(list->count, XATTR_MAX_COUNT);
xattr_list_free(list);
}
/* The captured list on a plain file reflects only whitelisted namespaces
* (Linux only; skipped when the filesystem has no xattr support). */
static void test_xattr_capture_and_appliable() {
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable(NULL, false));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("", false));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("security.selinux", false));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("trusted.blob", false));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_name_appliable("user.foo", false));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_name_appliable("user.foo", true));
/* The reserved fake-super key is receiver-only and never forwarded/applied. */
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("user.rsync.%stat", false));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("user.rsync.%stat", true));
/* B4: the ACL names require --acls; -X alone must not authorize them. */
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("system.posix_acl_access", false));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("system.posix_acl_default", false));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_name_appliable("system.posix_acl_access", true));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_name_appliable("system.posix_acl_default", true));
}
/* B4: a `-X`-only receiver (preserve_acls false) must NOT apply an incoming
* ACL xattr, while a user.* attribute in the same block still survives. The
* ACL entry is dropped, not applied (and the -X transfer is not failed). */
static void run_recv_drops_acl_keeps_user(int fd) {
int ok = 0;
FileXattrList* list = xattr_receive(fd, &ok, false);
if (!ok || list == NULL)
_exit(1);
bool saw_user = false;
for (int i = 0; i < list->count; i++) {
if (strcmp(list->items[i].name, "system.posix_acl_access") == 0)
_exit(1); /* ACL must have been dropped */
if (strcmp(list->items[i].name, "user.keep") == 0)
saw_user = true;
}
xattr_list_free(list);
_exit(saw_user ? 0 : 1);
}
static void test_xattr_receive_drops_acl_without_preserve_acls() {
int p[2];
EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
io_set_bwlimit(0);
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[1]);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
run_recv_drops_acl_keeps_user(p[0]);
}
close(p[0]);
io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "system.posix_acl_access", "\x02\x00\x00\x00", 4));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.keep", "yes", 3));
xattr_send(p[1], list);
xattr_list_free(list);
int status;
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
close(p[1]);
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
}
/* MINOR-2: a --link-dest / -H copy fallback (linkat refused) must still apply
* the per-file xattrs and --fake-super stat. A DIRECTORY basis forces linkat
* to fail with EPERM, exercising the byte-copy fallback deterministically (the
* basis is not a regular file, so the fallback uses the caller's bytes).
* Guarded on filesystem xattr support. */
static void test_link_copy_fallback_preserves_xattrs() {
const char* dest = "test_link_xattr_dest.txt";
const char* basis_dir = "test_link_xattr_basis_dir";
unlink(dest);
rmdir(basis_dir);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(basis_dir, 0700), 0);
/* Probe xattr support on the cwd filesystem using the destination file. */
int probe = open(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
bool has_xattr = probe >= 0 && setxattr(dest, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
if (probe >= 0)
close(probe);
if (!has_xattr) {
removexattr(dest, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
unlink(dest);
rmdir(basis_dir);
return; /* skip silently when the filesystem has no xattr support */
}
removexattr(dest, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
FileXattrList* xattrs = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(xattrs);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(xattrs, "user.fallback", "kept", 4));
FileMetadata m;
memset(&m, 0, sizeof(m));
m.mode = 0640;
m.uid = 1001;
m.gid = 1002;
m.mtime_sec = 1234567890;
m.mtime_nsec = 0;
m.atime_valid = false;
m.crtime_valid = false;
bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_link_attrs(dest, basis_dir, "payload", 7, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false, true}, false,
xattrs, true, NULL);
xattr_list_free(xattrs);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
/* Content landed (the copy fallback wrote the caller's bytes). */
int fd = open(dest, O_RDONLY);
EXPECT_TRUE(fd >= 0);
char buf[16];
ssize_t n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
close(fd);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)strlen("payload"), (int)n);
if (n == 7)
EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(buf, "payload", 7) == 0);
/* Per-file xattr applied on the copy. */
char vbuf[16];
ssize_t vlen = getxattr(dest, "user.fallback", vbuf, sizeof(vbuf));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(4, (int)vlen);
if (vlen == 4)
EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(vbuf, "kept", 4) == 0);
/* fake-super stat parked by the receiver. */
EXPECT_TRUE((int)getxattr(dest, FAKESUPER_XATTR, NULL, 0) > 0);
unlink(dest);
rmdir(basis_dir);
}
/* Capture must honor --acls: xattr_capture_path(path, false) (plain -X) must
* never return the POSIX ACL names, while xattr_capture_path(path, true) (-A)
* does; user.* is captured either way. This is the capture-side counterpart of
* the receiver's --acls gate and must not depend on the caller having checked
* the flag. Guarded on filesystem/ACL support. */
static void test_xattr_capture_filters_acls() {
const char* path = "test_xattr_capture_acls.txt";
unlink(path);
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
return;
bool has_xattr = setxattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
if (has_xattr)
removexattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
if (!has_xattr) {
close(fd);
unlink(path);
return; /* filesystem without xattr support */
}
if (setxattr(path, "user.keep", "yes", 3, 0) != 0) {
close(fd);
unlink(path);
return;
}
/* Synthesize a valid non-trivial POSIX access ACL blob (little-endian):
version 2 followed by USER_OBJ/USER/GROUP_OBJ/MASK/OTHER entries. */
uint32_t acl_uid = geteuid() == 0 ? 65534u : (uint32_t)geteuid();
unsigned char blob[4 + 5 * 8];
uint32_t version = 2;
memcpy(blob, &version, 4);
const uint16_t tags[5] = {0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x10, 0x20}; /* OBJ/USER/GROUP/MASK/OTHER */
const uint16_t perms[5] = {0x04, 0x04, 0x04, 0x04, 0x00};
const uint32_t ids[5] = {0xFFFFFFFFu, acl_uid, 0xFFFFFFFFu, 0xFFFFFFFFu, 0xFFFFFFFFu};
size_t off = 4;
for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
memcpy(blob + off, &tags[i], sizeof(tags[i]));
off += sizeof(tags[i]);
memcpy(blob + off, &perms[i], sizeof(perms[i]));
off += sizeof(perms[i]);
memcpy(blob + off, &ids[i], sizeof(ids[i]));
off += sizeof(ids[i]);
}
if (setxattr(path, "system.posix_acl_access", blob, off, 0) != 0) {
close(fd);
unlink(path);
return; /* no unprivileged ACL support: skip silently */
}
close(fd);
FileXattrList* plain = xattr_capture_path(path, false);
FileXattrList* with_acls = xattr_capture_path(path, true);
bool plain_user = false, plain_acl = false, acl_user = false, acl_acl = false;
for (int i = 0; plain && i < plain->count; i++) {
if (strcmp(plain->items[i].name, "user.keep") == 0)
plain_user = true;
if (strcmp(plain->items[i].name, "system.posix_acl_access") == 0)
plain_acl = true;
}
for (int i = 0; with_acls && i < with_acls->count; i++) {
if (strcmp(with_acls->items[i].name, "user.keep") == 0)
acl_user = true;
if (strcmp(with_acls->items[i].name, "system.posix_acl_access") == 0)
acl_acl = true;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(plain_user);
EXPECT_FALSE(plain_acl);
EXPECT_TRUE(acl_user);
EXPECT_TRUE(acl_acl);
xattr_list_free(plain);
xattr_list_free(with_acls);
unlink(path);
}
/* --fake-super replay: fake_super_store_fd records the source stat into the
* reserved xattr, and fake_super_restore_fd re-applies the permission bits
* fd-relative (mtime travels through the normal metadata path; the owner is
* never chowned). Restore must also be a safe no-op with no xattr present.
* Guarded on filesystem xattr support. */
static void test_fake_super_restore() {
const char* path = "test_fake_super_restore.txt";
unlink(path);
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
return;
bool has_xattr = setxattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
if (has_xattr)
removexattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
if (!has_xattr) {
close(fd);
unlink(path);
return; /* skip silently when the filesystem has no xattr support */
}
/* No xattr present yet: restore is a silent no-op (returns false, no crash). */
FileAttrPolicy policy = {true, true, false, false, true};
EXPECT_FALSE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
fake_super_store_fd(fd, 1001, 1002, S_IFREG | 0751, 0, 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 07777), 0751);
/* Strict rsync parity: -p restores the recorded mode exactly, including
group/other write (a recorded 0666 restores as 0666). */
fake_super_store_fd(fd, 1001, 1002, S_IFREG | 0666, 0, 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 0777), 0666);
/* Restore with a malformed record must skip without failing. */
time_t before = st.st_mtime;
int wfd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
if (wfd >= 0) {
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)fsetxattr(wfd, FAKESUPER_XATTR, "not-a-valid-record", 19, 0), 0);
close(wfd);
}
EXPECT_FALSE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
fstat(fd, &st);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, (int)before);
close(fd);
unlink(path);
}
/* The stored record is rsync 3.4.1's exact grammar
* "<octal st_mode with S_IFMT> <rdev_major>,<rdev_minor> <uid>:<gid>"
* so a fake-super tree is readable by rsync. Also pins two rsync parity
* rules: the special bits are stored in the record but NOT applied to the real
* file, and a device record's rdev round-trips through the parser. Guarded on
* filesystem xattr support. */
static void test_fake_super_rsync_format() {
const char* path = "test_fake_super_format.txt";
unlink(path);
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
return;
bool has_xattr = setxattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
if (has_xattr)
removexattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
if (!has_xattr) {
close(fd);
unlink(path);
return; /* skip silently when the filesystem has no xattr support */
}
/* A setuid regular file: the full st_mode (with S_IFMT + special bits) is
recorded, rdev is 0,0, and the owner is uid:gid. */
fake_super_store_fd(fd, 1234, 5678, S_IFREG | 04711, 0, 0);
char value[128];
ssize_t got = fgetxattr(fd, FAKESUPER_XATTR, value, sizeof(value));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)got, 20);
EXPECT_TRUE(got == 20 && memcmp(value, "104711 0,0 1234:5678", 20) == 0);
/* The special bits in the record are NOT installed on the real file. */
FileAttrPolicy policy = {true, true, false, false, true};
EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 07777), 0711);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX)), 0);
/* A device record (char 1,3, uid 111, gid 222) parses without error and
still never real-chowns or installs the device's mode bits verbatim. */
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)fsetxattr(fd, FAKESUPER_XATTR, "20644 1,3 111:222", 17, 0), 0);
struct stat before;
fstat(fd, &before);
EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
fstat(fd, &st);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 0777), 0644);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_uid, (int)before.st_uid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_gid, (int)before.st_gid);
/* Hardened parser: an out-of-range field (previously UB via sscanf("%u")),
a missing field, or trailing garbage is rejected cleanly instead of being
silently accepted. */
const char* malformed[] = {
"20644 65536,3 111:222", /* major > 0xffff */
"20644 1,16777216 111:222", /* minor > 0xffffff */
"20644 1,3 111:222 trailing", /* trailing garbage */
"20644 1,3 111", /* missing gid */
"20644 1,3 4294967296:222", /* uid > UINT_MAX */
"20644 1,3 111:4294967296", /* gid > UINT_MAX */
"99999999999999999999 1,3 0:0", /* mode overflow */
"", /* empty record */
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(malformed) / sizeof(malformed[0]); i++) {
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)fsetxattr(fd, FAKESUPER_XATTR, malformed[i], strlen(malformed[i]), 0), 0);
EXPECT_FALSE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
}
close(fd);
unlink(path);
}
/* --fake-super must NEVER perform a real chown: fake_super_restore_fd applies
* only mode/mtime and leaves the entry's uid/gid exactly as they were, even
* when an explicit ownership policy is active and super_mode permits it. This
* is observable unprivileged (the file's owner is simply unchanged). */
static void test_fake_super_no_real_chown() {
const char* path = "test_fake_super_nochown.txt";
unlink(path);
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
return;
bool has_xattr = setxattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
if (has_xattr)
removexattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
if (!has_xattr) {
close(fd);
unlink(path);
return;
}
struct stat before;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &before), 0);
fake_super_store_fd(fd, 12345, 12346, S_IFREG | 0755, 0, 0);
Config* c = config_create();
FileAttrPolicy policy = {true, true, false, false, true};
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
/* The strongest ownership request available plus permitted super mode. */
c->preserve_owner = true;
c->preserve_group = true;
c->chown_uid_set = true;
c->chown_uid = 12345;
c->chown_gid_set = true;
c->chown_gid = 12346;
c->super_mode = SUPER_MODE_ON;
c->fake_super = true;
EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
struct stat after;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &after), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)after.st_uid, (int)before.st_uid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)after.st_gid, (int)before.st_gid);
/* Mode is still replayed (policy-gated). */
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(after.st_mode & 0777), 0755);
identity_clear_active();
config_delete(c);
close(fd);
unlink(path);
}
/* identity_resolve_storage_ids() is what --fake-super RECORDS: the resolved
* mapping for a requested side, and the source's own id for a side never
* requested. Also pins the #286 rule that --numeric-ids alone never activates
* ownership (it is only a mapping modifier). */
static void test_fake_super_storage_resolution() {
uint32_t uid = 0, gid = 0;
/* --numeric-ids alone is INERT: no ownership request, storage unchanged. */
Config* c = config_create();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
c->numeric_ids = true;
EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
EXPECT_FALSE(identity_active_enabled());
EXPECT_FALSE(identity_owner_requested());
EXPECT_FALSE(identity_group_requested());
identity_resolve_storage_ids(12345, 6789, &uid, &gid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)uid, 12345);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)gid, 6789);
config_delete(c);
/* --fake-super with no ownership request records the raw source ids. */
c = config_create();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
c->fake_super = true;
EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
identity_resolve_storage_ids(12345, 6789, &uid, &gid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)uid, 12345);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)gid, 6789);
/* -o + --numeric-ids: raw owner, un-requested group stays the source gid. */
c->preserve_owner = true;
c->numeric_ids = true;
EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
identity_resolve_storage_ids(12345, 6789, &uid, &gid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)uid, 12345);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)gid, 6789);
/* --chown overrides both sides. */
c->chown_uid_set = true;
c->chown_uid = 777;
c->chown_gid_set = true;
c->chown_gid = 778;
EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
identity_resolve_storage_ids(12345, 6789, &uid, &gid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)uid, 777);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)gid, 778);
/* A usermap match beats --chown on the owner side only. */
c->usermap_count = 1;
c->usermap = calloc(1, sizeof(IdentityMap));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c->usermap);
c->usermap[0].from = IDENTITY_MATCH_ANY;
c->usermap[0].to = 999;
EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
identity_resolve_storage_ids(12345, 6789, &uid, &gid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)uid, 999);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)gid, 778);
/* --copy-as is authoritative for both sides. */
c->copy_as_set = true;
c->copy_as_uid = 111;
c->copy_as_gid = 222;
EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
identity_resolve_storage_ids(12345, 6789, &uid, &gid);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)uid, 111);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)gid, 222);
identity_clear_active();
config_delete(c);
}
/* xattr_list_clone deep-copies names/values (used by the deferred directory
* metadata accumulator), so the clone stays valid after the original is freed. */
static void test_xattr_list_clone() {
EXPECT_NULL(xattr_list_clone(NULL));
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.a", "1", 1));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.b", "22", 2));
FileXattrList* clone = xattr_list_clone(list);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(clone);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(clone->count, 2);
EXPECT_EQ_STR(clone->items[0].name, "user.a");
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)clone->items[1].value_len, 2);
EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(clone->items[1].value, "22", 2) == 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(clone->items[0].name != list->items[0].name);
xattr_list_free(list);
EXPECT_EQ_STR(clone->items[0].name, "user.a");
xattr_list_free(clone);
}
/* #286.3: an explicit directory entry (--dirs, STATUS_MKDIR) that carries a
* captured user.* xattr must have it applied fd-relative by the directory
* install path itself -- not only by the receiver's deferred DirTimeList, which
* a direct file_save_to_disk_full() caller does not use. */
static void test_file_save_directory_applies_xattrs() {
const char* root = "test_save_dir_xattr_tmp";
const char* leaf = "subdir";
const char* path = "test_save_dir_xattr_tmp/subdir";
rmdir(path);
rmdir(root);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(root, 0700), 0);
/* The working directory may be a filesystem without user xattrs (e.g. some
tmpfs mounts): skip cleanly rather than fail the suite. */
if (setxattr(root, "user.fastsync-dirprobe", "p", 1, 0) != 0) {
rmdir(root);
return;
}
removexattr(root, "user.fastsync-dirprobe");
File* dir = file_create(leaf);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(dir);
dir->is_dir = true;
FileXattrList* xattrs = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(xattrs);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(xattrs, "user.dirxattr", "dirvalue", 8));
dir->xattrs = xattrs;
Config* config = config_create();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(config);
config->use_metadata = true;
config->use_xattrs = true;
config->preserve_xattrs = true;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(file_save_to_disk_full(root, dir, config), FILE_SAVE_WRITTEN);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(access(path, F_OK), 0);
char value[32];
ssize_t got = getxattr(path, "user.dirxattr", value, sizeof(value));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)got, 8);
EXPECT_TRUE(got == 8 && memcmp(value, "dirvalue", 8) == 0);
file_destroy(dir);
config_delete(config);
removexattr(path, "user.dirxattr");
rmdir(path);
rmdir(root);
}
/* Symlink xattrs (protocol 2.29.0): the no-follow capture must read the LINK's
* OWN attributes and never the REFERENT's. Linux's VFS refuses to associate
* xattrs with a symlink at all, so the nofollow capture returns NULL while the
* path-following capture sees the referent's attribute -- which is exactly the
* bug the no-follow variant exists to prevent (a symlink entry must not carry
* its target's attributes). Guarded on filesystem xattr support. */
static void test_xattr_capture_symlink_nofollow() {
const char* target = "test_symlink_xattr_capture_target";
const char* link = "test_symlink_xattr_capture_link";
unlink(link);
unlink(target);
int fd = open(target, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
return;
bool has_xattr = setxattr(target, "user.symref", "referent", 8, 0) == 0;
close(fd);
if (!has_xattr) {
unlink(target);
return; /* filesystem without xattr support */
}
if (symlink(target, link) != 0) {
unlink(target);
return;
}
/* The no-follow capture must never pick up the referent's attributes. */
FileXattrList* nofollow = xattr_capture_path_nofollow(link, false);
EXPECT_NULL(nofollow);
/* The path-following capture does, proving the referent really carries one
and that the no-follow variant differs. */
FileXattrList* follow = xattr_capture_path(link, false);
bool saw = false;
for (int i = 0; follow && i < follow->count; i++) {
if (strcmp(follow->items[i].name, "user.symref") == 0)
saw = true;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(saw);
xattr_list_free(follow);
xattr_list_free(nofollow);
unlink(link);
unlink(target);
}
/* Symlink xattrs (protocol 2.29.0): the no-follow apply must target the LINK,
* never its referent. On Linux the LSETXATTR is refused (the VFS does not
* allow symlink xattrs), but the critical guarantee is observable: the
* referent's attributes are UNCHANGED. A regression from lsetxattr to the
* path-following setxattr would rewrite the referent here and fail this test. */
static void test_xattr_apply_path_nofollow_does_not_follow() {
const char* root = "test_symlink_xattr_apply_tmp";
const char* target = "test_symlink_xattr_apply_tmp/target";
const char* link = "test_symlink_xattr_apply_tmp/link";
unlink(link);
unlink(target);
rmdir(root);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(root, 0700), 0);
int tfd = open(target, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (tfd < 0) {
rmdir(root);
return;
}
bool has_xattr = setxattr(target, "user.orig", "orig", 4, 0) == 0;
close(tfd);
if (!has_xattr) {
unlink(target);
rmdir(root);
return; /* filesystem without xattr support */
}
EXPECT_EQ_INT(symlink("target", link), 0);
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.orig", "hacked", 6));
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.added", "x", 1));
/* Invalid anchors are refused before any syscall (no fd/leaf/list). */
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_apply_path_nofollow(-1, "link", list));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_apply_path_nofollow(0, "", list));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_apply_path_nofollow(0, "a/b", list));
EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_apply_path_nofollow(0, "link", NULL));
/* The confined parent directory is the anchor; the final component is the
link. Best-effort: returns true even when the kernel refuses. */
int dir_fd = open(root, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
EXPECT_TRUE(dir_fd >= 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_apply_path_nofollow(dir_fd, "link", list));
close(dir_fd);
/* The referent must be untouched: a following apply would have set user.orig
to "hacked" and created user.added on the target. */
char buf[16];
ssize_t got = getxattr(target, "user.orig", buf, sizeof(buf));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(4, (int)got);
if (got == 4)
EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(buf, "orig", 4) == 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(getxattr(target, "user.added", buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0);
/* If the platform DOES support symlink xattrs, they must have landed on the
link itself; on Linux the VFS refuses them, so the link stays empty. */
if (llistxattr(link, NULL, 0) > 0) {
ssize_t n = lgetxattr(link, "user.added", buf, sizeof(buf));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(1, (int)n);
if (n == 1)
EXPECT_TRUE(buf[0] == 'x');
}
xattr_list_free(list);
unlink(link);
unlink(target);
rmdir(root);
}
/* Protocol 2.29.0: a STATUS_SYMLINK frame followed by an -X/-A xattr block is
* decoded by file_receive_symlink() with the block attached to the File. This
* is the wire round-trip for the new trailing symlink xattr block. */
static void run_recv_symlink_with_xattrs(int fd) {
/* Stack-allocated so the forked child leaks nothing at _exit() (a
config_create() in the parent would be inherited and never freed here). */
Config config;
memset(&config, 0, sizeof(config));
config.use_metadata = true;
config.use_xattrs = true;
config.preserve_xattrs = true;
File* file = file_receive_symlink(fd, &config);
if (!file)
_exit(1);
bool ok = file->is_symlink && file->symlink_target != NULL &&
strcmp(file->symlink_target, "target") == 0;
ok = ok && file->xattrs != NULL && file->xattrs->count == 1 &&
strcmp(file->xattrs->items[0].name, "user.sym") == 0 &&
file->xattrs->items[0].value_len == 3 && memcmp(file->xattrs->items[0].value, "sym", 3) == 0;
file_destroy(file);
_exit(ok ? 0 : 1);
}
static void test_symlink_frame_carries_xattrs() {
int p[2];
EXPECT_EQ_INT(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, p), 0);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
io_set_bwlimit(0);
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[1]);
io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
io_set_bwlimit(0);
run_recv_symlink_with_xattrs(p[0]);
}
close(p[0]);
io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
io_set_bwlimit(0);
FileMetadata m;
memset(&m, 0, sizeof(m));
m.mode = S_IFLNK | 0777;
m.uid = (uint32_t)geteuid();
m.gid = (uint32_t)getegid();
m.mtime_sec = 1700000000;
FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.sym", "sym", 3));
/* Exactly the sender's order: path, target, metadata, xattr block. */
bool wrote = send_wire_str(p[1], "link") && send_wire_str(p[1], "target") &&
metadata_send(p[1], &m) && xattr_send(p[1], list);
xattr_list_free(list);
close(p[1]);
int status = 0;
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(wrote);
EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
}
void test_xattr() {
test_xattr_list_clone();
test_xattr_capture_symlink_nofollow();
test_xattr_apply_path_nofollow_does_not_follow();
test_symlink_frame_carries_xattrs();
test_xattr_wire_roundtrip();
test_xattr_reject_privileged_namespace();
test_xattr_reject_oversized_value();
test_xattr_count_bound();
test_xattr_capture_and_appliable();
test_xattr_capture_filters_acls();
test_xattr_receive_drops_acl_without_preserve_acls();
test_link_copy_fallback_preserves_xattrs();
test_fake_super_restore();
test_fake_super_rsync_format();
test_fake_super_no_real_chown();
test_fake_super_storage_resolution();
test_file_save_directory_applies_xattrs();
}
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