- A6: escape attacker-controlled file paths and the receive root in log lines (file_receive, server, protocol DEBUG) with output_escape() - A8: identity_set_active() returns bool and fails closed when a requested usermap/groupmap cannot be deep-copied; handler refuses the connection - remove the const cast and duplicate super_mode clamp from server_module_gate via an explicit override the handler applies once - release the identity snapshot on the queue_create failure path - refactor identity_parse_copy_as to a single cleanup tail and drop the duplicated group error format specifier
366 lines
12 KiB
C
366 lines
12 KiB
C
#include "test_xattr.h"
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#include "xattr.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "file.h"
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#include "identity.h"
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#include "protocol.h"
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#include "test_utils.h"
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <sys/xattr.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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static void run_recv_helper(int fd) {
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int ok = 0;
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FileXattrList* list = xattr_receive(fd, &ok);
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if (!ok)
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_exit(1);
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if (!list) {
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/* NULL list only on error, already handled above. */
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_exit(1);
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}
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if (list->count != 2)
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_exit(1);
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if (strcmp(list->items[0].name, "user.foo") != 0 || list->items[0].value_len != 3 ||
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memcmp(list->items[0].value, "bar", 3) != 0)
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_exit(1);
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if (strcmp(list->items[1].name, "user.empty") != 0 || list->items[1].value_len != 0)
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_exit(1);
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xattr_list_free(list);
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_exit(0);
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}
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static void test_xattr_wire_roundtrip() {
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/* Round-trip a user.* list incl. an empty value. */
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int p[2];
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
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io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
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io_set_bwlimit(0);
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pid_t pid = fork();
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if (pid == 0) {
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close(p[1]);
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io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
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run_recv_helper(p[0]);
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}
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close(p[0]);
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io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
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FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
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EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.foo", "bar", 3));
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.empty", NULL, 0));
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_send(p[1], list));
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xattr_list_free(list);
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int status;
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waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
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close(p[1]);
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EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
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}
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static void run_recv_must_fail(int fd) {
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int ok = 0;
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FileXattrList* list = xattr_receive(fd, &ok);
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/* A NULL list with ok==0 is the expected rejection. */
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if (ok == 0 && list == NULL)
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_exit(0);
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xattr_list_free(list);
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_exit(1);
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}
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/* A receiver must reject a security.* (privileged-namespace) attribute, never
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* apply it: the send side can be malicious, so only the receiver whitelist
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* matters. */
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static void test_xattr_reject_privileged_namespace() {
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int p[2];
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
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io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
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io_set_bwlimit(0);
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pid_t pid = fork();
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if (pid == 0) {
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close(p[1]);
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io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
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run_recv_must_fail(p[0]);
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}
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close(p[0]);
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io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
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FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
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EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
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/* security.capability must be rejected by the receiver. */
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "security.capability", "\x01\x00", 2));
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xattr_send(p[1], list); /* receiver rejects at the name check and exits */
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xattr_list_free(list);
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int status;
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waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
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close(p[1]);
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EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
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}
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/* An oversized value (beyond XATTR_VALUE_MAX) must be rejected on receive. */
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static void test_xattr_reject_oversized_value() {
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int p[2];
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
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io_set_fds(p[0], p[1]);
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io_set_bwlimit(0);
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pid_t pid = fork();
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if (pid == 0) {
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close(p[1]);
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io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
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run_recv_must_fail(p[0]);
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}
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close(p[0]);
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io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
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FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
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EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
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size_t huge = (size_t)XATTR_VALUE_MAX + 1;
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unsigned char* blob = calloc(1, huge);
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EXPECT_NOT_NULL(blob);
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(list, "user.huge", blob, huge));
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xattr_send(p[1], list); /* send is best-effort; the receiver rejects and exits */
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free(blob);
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xattr_list_free(list);
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int status;
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waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
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close(p[1]);
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EXPECT_TRUE(WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0);
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}
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/* The list append enforces the count bound (defense in depth). */
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static void test_xattr_count_bound() {
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FileXattrList* list = xattr_list_new();
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EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
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bool all_ok = true;
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for (int i = 0; i < XATTR_MAX_COUNT + 1; i++) {
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char name[32];
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snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "user.k%d", i);
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if (!xattr_list_append(list, name, "v", 1))
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all_ok = false;
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}
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EXPECT_FALSE(all_ok);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(list->count, XATTR_MAX_COUNT);
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xattr_list_free(list);
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}
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/* The captured list on a plain file reflects only whitelisted namespaces
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* (Linux only; skipped when the filesystem has no xattr support). */
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static void test_xattr_capture_and_appliable() {
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EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable(NULL));
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EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable(""));
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EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("security.selinux"));
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EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("trusted.blob"));
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_name_appliable("user.foo"));
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/* The reserved fake-super key is receiver-only and never forwarded/applied. */
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EXPECT_FALSE(xattr_name_appliable("user.fastsync.stat"));
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_name_appliable("system.posix_acl_access"));
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_name_appliable("system.posix_acl_default"));
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}
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/* MINOR-2: a --link-dest / -H copy fallback (linkat refused) must still apply
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* the per-file xattrs and --fake-super stat. A DIRECTORY basis forces linkat
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* to fail with EPERM, exercising the byte-copy fallback deterministically.
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* Guarded on filesystem xattr support. */
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static void test_link_copy_fallback_preserves_xattrs() {
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const char* dest = "test_link_xattr_dest.txt";
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const char* basis_dir = "test_link_xattr_basis_dir";
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unlink(dest);
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rmdir(basis_dir);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(basis_dir, 0700), 0);
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/* Probe xattr support on the cwd filesystem using the destination file. */
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int probe = open(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
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bool has_xattr = probe >= 0 && setxattr(dest, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
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if (probe >= 0)
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close(probe);
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if (!has_xattr) {
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removexattr(dest, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
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unlink(dest);
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rmdir(basis_dir);
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return; /* skip silently when the filesystem has no xattr support */
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}
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removexattr(dest, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
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FileXattrList* xattrs = xattr_list_new();
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EXPECT_NOT_NULL(xattrs);
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EXPECT_TRUE(xattr_list_append(xattrs, "user.fallback", "kept", 4));
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FileMetadata m;
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memset(&m, 0, sizeof(m));
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m.mode = 0640;
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m.uid = 1001;
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m.gid = 1002;
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m.mtime_sec = 1234567890;
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m.mtime_nsec = 0;
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m.atime_valid = false;
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m.crtime_valid = false;
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bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_link_attrs(dest, basis_dir, "payload", 7, false, &m, false, false,
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xattrs, true, NULL);
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xattr_list_free(xattrs);
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EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
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/* Content landed (the copy fallback wrote the caller's bytes). */
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int fd = open(dest, O_RDONLY);
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EXPECT_TRUE(fd >= 0);
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char buf[16];
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ssize_t n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
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close(fd);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)strlen("payload"), (int)n);
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if (n == 7)
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EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(buf, "payload", 7) == 0);
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/* Per-file xattr applied on the copy. */
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char vbuf[16];
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ssize_t vlen = getxattr(dest, "user.fallback", vbuf, sizeof(vbuf));
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(4, (int)vlen);
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if (vlen == 4)
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EXPECT_TRUE(memcmp(vbuf, "kept", 4) == 0);
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/* fake-super stat parked by the receiver. */
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EXPECT_TRUE((int)getxattr(dest, FAKESUPER_XATTR, NULL, 0) > 0);
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unlink(dest);
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rmdir(basis_dir);
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}
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/* --fake-super replay: fake_super_store_fd records the source stat into the
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* reserved xattr, and fake_super_restore_fd re-applies mode/mtime (and owner,
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* when the process may) fd-relative. Restore must also be a safe no-op with no
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* xattr present. Guarded on filesystem xattr support. */
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static void test_fake_super_restore() {
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const char* path = "test_fake_super_restore.txt";
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unlink(path);
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int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
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if (fd < 0)
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return;
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bool has_xattr = setxattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
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if (has_xattr)
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removexattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
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if (!has_xattr) {
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close(fd);
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unlink(path);
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return; /* skip silently when the filesystem has no xattr support */
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}
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/* No xattr present yet: restore is a silent no-op (returns false, no crash). */
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EXPECT_FALSE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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fake_super_store_fd(fd, 1001, 1002, 0751, 1700000000, 123456789);
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EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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struct stat st;
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 07777), 0751);
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/* Mode sanitization: the normal metadata path never grants group/other write
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bits, and fake-super replay must not re-add them (a recorded 0666 restores
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as 0644, never as world-writable). */
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fake_super_store_fd(fd, 1001, 1002, 0666, 1700000000, 0);
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EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 0777), 0644);
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/* Restore with a malformed record must skip without failing. */
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time_t before = st.st_mtime;
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int wfd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
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if (wfd >= 0) {
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)fsetxattr(wfd, FAKESUPER_XATTR, "not-a-valid-record", 19, 0), 0);
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close(wfd);
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}
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EXPECT_FALSE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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fstat(fd, &st);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, (int)before);
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close(fd);
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unlink(path);
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}
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/* --fake-super owner replay must honor the super gate and copy-as authority:
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--no-super suppresses the recorded-source-owner chown even for root, and an
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active --copy-as keeps its forced owner (the recorded source owner must never
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override it). Root-gated: only root can observe a chown actually landing. */
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static void test_fake_super_owner_gate() {
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if (geteuid() != 0)
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return; /* non-root cannot observe ownership changes; skip silently */
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const char* path = "test_fake_super_owner_gate.txt";
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unlink(path);
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int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
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if (fd < 0)
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return;
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bool has_xattr = setxattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe", "p", 1, 0) == 0;
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if (has_xattr)
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removexattr(path, "user.fastsync.xprobe");
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if (!has_xattr) {
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close(fd);
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unlink(path);
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return; /* filesystem without xattr support */
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}
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if (fchown(fd, 0, 0) != 0) {
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close(fd);
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unlink(path);
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return;
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}
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fake_super_store_fd(fd, 12345, 12346, 0755, 1700000000, 0);
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Config* c = config_create();
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EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
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/* An explicit ownership policy is required before fake-super replay may
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chown; --fake-super alone only records the source owner (A2). */
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c->numeric_ids = true;
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/* --no-super: the owner leg is skipped even as root. */
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c->super_mode = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
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EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
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EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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struct stat st;
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_uid, 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_gid, 0);
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/* AUTO with an identity policy: the recorded source owner is applied. */
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c->super_mode = SUPER_MODE_AUTO;
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EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
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EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_uid, 12345);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_gid, 12346);
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/* --super / --fake-super with NO explicit identity flag must NOT apply a
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client-chosen owner: super_mode alone never enables ownership. */
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(fchown(fd, 0, 0), 0);
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c->numeric_ids = false;
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c->super_mode = SUPER_MODE_ON;
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EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
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EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_uid, 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_gid, 0);
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/* Active --copy-as is authoritative: the recorded source owner must not
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override it, even with AUTO/ON. */
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c->copy_as_set = true;
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c->copy_as_uid = 777;
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c->copy_as_gid = 778;
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EXPECT_TRUE(identity_set_active(c));
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EXPECT_TRUE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd));
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EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_uid, 0);
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EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_gid, 0);
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identity_clear_active();
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config_delete(c);
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close(fd);
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unlink(path);
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}
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void test_xattr() {
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test_xattr_wire_roundtrip();
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test_xattr_reject_privileged_namespace();
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test_xattr_reject_oversized_value();
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test_xattr_count_bound();
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test_xattr_capture_and_appliable();
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test_link_copy_fallback_preserves_xattrs();
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test_fake_super_restore();
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test_fake_super_owner_gate();
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} |