Add a NULL guard to protocol_release_memory_for_session so it no-ops like
the sibling session setters. Correct the Data.owner doc comment, which
implied a non-zero protocol_charge always has an owner; document that
owner may be NULL for uncharged/ownerless Data, that any such charge
falls back to the bound session, and that a charged Data must not outlive
its owning session. Note the lifetime contract on the release API too.
Extend tests/test_protocol.c to cover destroying a charged Data with no
session bound (the other half of the original bug) and to assert that
data_create/data_create_reserve start with owner == NULL and
protocol_charge == 0.
Document on utils_get_authorized_root_path() that the returned pointer is
borrowed and invalidated by the next authorized-root setter, that the fd
and path are not read atomically (non-reentrant), and that the fd remains
caller-owned. Add a matching single-threaded/set-before-threads note at
the accessor definitions in utils.c.
In server.c, drop the redundant utils_set_authorized_root(-1, NULL) after
a failed utils_set_authorized_root(): the setter already fail-closes the
state on allocation failure. The following close(root_fd) is unchanged.
Every Config field that crosses the wire was declared in up to six places
(struct member, config_set_defaults, send_*, receive_*, and the two CLI
option tables) and could drift silently. Add CONFIG_WIRE_FIELDS in
config.h: one ordered per-segment table where each serialized field is
declared once with its C type, default and wire codec (KIND).
config.h now expands the table to declare the struct members;
config_set_defaults() expands it to assign the defaults; and
config_send_wire_block()/config_receive() expand the per-segment lists to
emit/consume the frame. The per-segment function names, call order and
segment boundaries are preserved exactly.
Fields with genuinely custom logic keep dedicated helpers but are still
declared once in the table: the protocol-version handshake (HEADER), daemon
SCRAM auth (STR_REDACTED_AUTH), the daemon module name (STR_MODULE), the
repeated count+array blocks (BLOCK_SKIP_SUFFIXES/BLOCK_BASIS/BLOCK_IDMAP),
--copy-as presence/ids (COPY_AS_*), and the derived --delta / use_xattrs
bits (DERIVED_DELTA, BOOL_XATTR_DERIVE). The version field remains a
special header (validated before any other field is parsed) and is sent by
config_send_wire_block() explicitly.
No public field is renamed and PROTOCOL_VERSION stays "2.20.0". Because
the struct declaration order is no longer the wire order, the wire order is
now enforced solely by the table and by a byte-exact golden test
(follow-up commit). Add config_send_wire_block() so that test can hash the
frame body without the STATUS_OK handshake.
Wire the shared registry into the accept loop (parent claims a slot before
fork, blocks SIGCHLD across fork+pid publication, and reclaims the dead
child's slot from the SIGCHLD handler so per-module/per-source counts are
released even on SIGKILL). The connection child records the selected module
and normalized peer IP once the config frame names them: an over-cap module
or source is refused at the config gate with an audit log, and a source
that exceeded the auth-failure threshold is refused before a SCRAM
challenge (the counter is shared across children and cleared on success).
The existing global cap and host ACLs are untouched.
Add global keys `max connections per host` (default 0 = unlimited),
`auth lockout threshold` (default 10, 0 disables) and
`auth lockout duration` (default 300 s, 0 disables). Module
`max connections` now accepts 0 as unlimited. Bound the number of
[module] sections (DAEMON_CONF_MAX_MODULES) so the shared registry's
per-module counter array stays fixed-size; absent keys keep their
defaults so old configs still load.
The daemon forks one child per accepted connection, so per-module and
per-source accounting must live in state shared across the children. Add a
fixed-size registry carved from an anonymous shared mapping
(mmap(MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS)) created before the accept loop: a slot
lifecycle (FREE/CLAIMED/REGISTERED) with parent claim/reclaim and a
lock-free, open-addressed per-source table for the per-host occupancy and
the shared auth-failure counter. C11 atomics only; no pthread locks across
fork.
Unit tests cover slot exhaustion, the module/host caps, pid reclaim and
fork-shared visibility.
Data charged against a ProtocolSession kept only the charge amount, so
data_destroy released it from whatever session was thread-locally bound
at destroy time. Destroying a received Data on another thread, after the
session was unbound, or while a different session was bound leaked the
originating session's budget and underflowed the other's.
Add Data.owner, set it whenever protocol_receive_data_limited charges a
session, and have data_destroy release against that owner directly via
the newly-exported protocol_release_memory_for_session. Uncharged Data
(owner NULL) keeps the previous bound-session fallback.
Add a unit test proving a Data acquired on session A is released to A
even when unrelated session B is bound at destroy time.
Type Config.super_mode as SuperMode (a proper C enum) instead of a bare
int. The wire boundary still carries the mode as an int: send casts the
enum explicitly and receive reads a temporary int, validates the
AUTO..OFF range, then casts. Emitted bytes and accepted values are
unchanged. ModuleGateContext.super_mode_override keeps its -1 sentinel
as int with an explicit cast at the apply site.
Behavior preserved.
Deduplicate the repeated directory-time capture gate
(`config->use_metadata && !config->omit_dir_times`) used by the
sender-side (multiprocessing.c) and receiver-side (receiver.c) sinks
into a single predicate declared next to the DirTimeList machinery in
file_receive.h and defined in file_receive.c.
Behavior preserved: identical short-circuit condition and semantics,
no signature or protocol changes.
- server gate: the --allow-unauthenticated loopback allowance now requires
an actual plaintext connection (!gate_ctx->ssl), so a loopback TLS client
whose cert fails the --client-cn check is refused before any SCRAM
challenge instead of falling through the plaintext opt-in. Keep the
invalid-fd guard as belt-and-braces (unreachable after the policy check).
- test: rewrote test_wrong_client_cn_refused_before_auth_challenge to run
deterministically over 127.0.0.1 with --tls + --allow-unauthenticated and
a CA-valid wrong-CN client cert, asserting the gate refusal log and an
unchanged module tree (no skip).
- docs: --client-cn is mandatory with --tls; dummykey sidecar is secret
material; document all transient-fallback reasons; qualify
--allow-unauthenticated in README and --help so it cannot read as
permitting remote plaintext auth.
- credentials.h: drop stale restrictive-umask claim (fchmod forces exact
0600; only create/write/fsync/link/fchmod failure degrades to ephemeral).
- Make the atomic-publish temp name unpredictable by appending 16 random
hex chars to the pid, so a leftover/planted temp cannot be targeted.
- On EEXIST, unlink the stale temp and retry the O_EXCL create once
(bounded), so a crash leftover or reused pid cannot silently defeat
sidecar persistence.
- fchmod the temp fd to 0600 after creation (umask can clear owner bits)
and treat failure as a create failure, so the published sidecar is
always exactly 0600.
- Clarify comments: the sidecar requires exact 0600 while the store and
password files only reject group/other bits.
- Add a unit test that a restrictive umask still yields an exact 0600
sidecar; clean random-suffixed temps in tests.
utils_fd_peer_is_local now returns true only when getpeername SUCCEEDS and the
peer address classifies as loopback. A non-socket descriptor (pipe/socketpair)
or any getpeername error is NOT local, so the daemon auth gate fails closed
instead of treating an untestable --stdio pipe as trusted (daemon auth modules
are --daemon-only and the stdio path never loads a daemon config).
server_module_gate now requires --allow-unauthenticated for the loopback
plaintext auth path: a plaintext loopback connection without the operator
opt-in is refused at the config gate BEFORE server_auth_handshake, so no SCRAM
challenge is sent. Remote peers still require verified TLS regardless of the
flag; the handler keeps its defense-in-depth checks.
Docs state the exact policy (verified TLS with matching --client-cn, or
operator-opted-in loopback plaintext), drop the SSH/stdio auth-transport claim
(they are daemon-only), and add the loopback trust-boundary relay caveat and
the CN-only (no SAN) residual. Adds a unit-test negative for pipe/socketpair
and an integration test where a relay observes no challenge when the flag is
absent.
Address review findings on the persistent dummy-key sidecar:
- Publish atomically: write a private same-directory temp file
(<store>.dummykey.tmp.<pid>, 0600), fsync, then link(2) into place;
fsync the containing directory and drop the temp name. A concurrent
starter can no longer observe a zero/partial sidecar and fail closed.
On EEXIST adopt the winner's sidecar; otherwise warn and use a
transient ephemeral key.
- Harden the read path (initial and EEXIST-adopt) with
O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC: reject planted symlinks
(ELOOP fails closed) and never block on a planted FIFO.
- Require the exact owner-only mode (st_mode & 07777) == 0600 and make
the rejection message truthful.
- Report a clear "short write" instead of a stale strerror(errno) when
write() returns 0.
- Document the artifact and its creation-failure caveat (FIFO store
path, read-only filesystem, missing directory) in README.md and
RSYNC_COMPAT.md.
- Tests: known-key sidecar adoption (dummy salt KAT + reload), symlink
rejection, and the exact-0600 rule (0400 now rejected).
Daemon modules that declare 'auth users' no longer accept credentials over a
remote plaintext connection: server_module_gate refuses at the config gate,
before any SCRAM challenge is sent, unless the connection is verified TLS with
a client certificate matching --client-cn, or a local/SSH transport (loopback
TCP peer or the --stdio pipe). --allow-unauthenticated does not relax this.
The TLS client-CN comparison now uses credentials_secure_equal (S2). Clients
sending --password-file to a non-loopback daemon must use --tls; validate_config
rejects the plaintext case before any network I/O.
Adds utils_sockaddr_is_loopback / utils_fd_peer_is_local / utils_host_is_loopback
helpers with unit tests, a client validation unit test, and integration tests
for the client-side plaintext rejection and the wrong-CN gate refusal.
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