FastSync/src/shared/utils.h

#ifndef UTILS_H
#define UTILS_H

#include "array_list.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>

/* Small open-addressing string hash set used to turn quadratic membership
 * scans into O(path length) exact-match lookups (the --delete keep-set and the
 * --files-from allow-set).  Keys are hashed with xxHash64 (seed 0); collisions
 * are resolved by linear probing over a power-of-two table that grows at 75%
 * load.  Keys are always borrowed from the caller and must outlive the set; the
 * set never copies or owns keys, so indexing M entries costs O(M) memory.  The
 * set is not thread-safe for mutation, but a fully built set supports
 * concurrent read-only lookups. */
typedef struct {
  const char* key; /* NULL marks an empty slot */
} StrHashSetSlot;

typedef struct {
  StrHashSetSlot* slots;
  size_t capacity; /* power of two, zero before init */
  size_t size;
} StrHashSet;

/* Initialize an empty set sized for roughly `hint` entries.  Returns false on
 * allocation failure. */
bool str_hash_set_init(StrHashSet* set, size_t hint);
void str_hash_set_free(StrHashSet* set);
/* Insert a borrowed key (must outlive the set).  A duplicate is ignored.
 * Returns false on allocation failure. */
bool str_hash_set_insert_ref(StrHashSet* set, const char* key);
/* Look up a NUL-terminated key / a key of `len` bytes. */
bool str_hash_set_lookup(const StrHashSet* set, const char* key);
bool str_hash_set_lookup_n(const StrHashSet* set, const char* key, size_t len);

/* Sorted, non-owning view of NUL-terminated strings.  Built from borrowed
 * pointers (qsort), so indexing M entries costs O(M) memory and O(M log M)
 * time; exact membership and ancestor-prefix existence are binary searches
 * that never materialize a prefix copy. */
typedef struct {
  const char** items; /* sorted with strcmp; borrowed, never freed */
  size_t count;
} StrSortedArray;

/* Build `array` over the borrowed `items`.  Only the pointer array is copied,
 * never the strings.  Returns false on allocation failure. */
bool str_sorted_array_build(StrSortedArray* array, const char* const* items, size_t count);
void str_sorted_array_free(StrSortedArray* array);
/* True when some item equals `key`. */
bool str_sorted_array_contains(const StrSortedArray* array, const char* key);
/* True when some item starts with `key` followed by '/' (i.e. `key` is a proper
 * ancestor directory of an item).  Allocates nothing. */
bool str_sorted_array_has_child_prefix(const StrSortedArray* array, const char* key);

/* Read-only membership index over exact relative paths.  `exact` answers
 * O(path length) equality; `sorted` answers whether any indexed path lies
 * strictly below a query directory.  Both borrow their keys from the caller and
 * no ancestor prefix is stored as a separate string, so an index over M entries
 * is O(M) memory regardless of path depth.  Not thread-safe to build, but safe
 * for concurrent read-only queries once built. */
typedef struct {
  StrHashSet exact;
  StrSortedArray sorted;
} PathIndex;

/* Build an index borrowing `entries` (which must outlive the index).  Returns
 * false on allocation failure, freeing any partial state. */
bool path_index_build(PathIndex* index, const char* const* entries, size_t count);
void path_index_free(PathIndex* index);
/* True when `path` is an indexed entry. */
bool path_index_contains(const PathIndex* index, const char* path);
/* Length-bounded form of path_index_contains (`path` need not be terminated). */
bool path_index_contains_n(const PathIndex* index, const char* path, size_t len);
/* True when some indexed entry lies strictly below `path` (starts with
 * `path` + '/'). */
bool path_index_has_descendant(const PathIndex* index, const char* path);

char* str_dup(const char* string);
char* output_escape(const char* string, bool eight_bit_output);
/* Upper bound on one line/token read from a local list file (--files-from,
 * --exclude-from/--include-from, .rsync-filter).  Mirrors MAX_STRING_SIZE and
 * stops a hostile multi-gigabyte line from forcing unbounded allocation. */
#define UTILS_MAX_LINE_LEN (64 * 1024)
/* Read one `delim`-terminated record from `stream` into *line (grown as needed
 * and NUL-terminated), refusing to consume/allocate more than `max_len` bytes
 * of content.  Returns the number of bytes stored (delimiter included, matching
 * getdelim), 0 at end of file, or -1 on error (errno is EFBIG when the record
 * exceeds `max_len`, ENOMEM on allocation failure).  *line and *cap are updated
 * as the buffer grows and the caller owns *line. */
ssize_t utils_getdelim_bounded(FILE* stream, char** line, size_t* cap, int delim, size_t max_len);
char* path_cat(const char* path1, const char* path2);
bool glob_match(const char* pattern, const char* str);
/* Result of a bounded extra-file deletion run. */
typedef enum {
  /* Every extra entry was removed (or there were none). */
  DELETE_WALK_OK = 0,
  /* The numeric cap for this run was reached before every extra was removed.
     The walker removed exactly the entries the cap allowed and skipped (without
     removing) the rest, matching rsync's partial --max-delete behavior. */
  DELETE_WALK_LIMIT_REACHED,
  /* A traversal or unlink failure aborted the deletion (partial removal is
     possible, mirroring the delete pass). */
  DELETE_WALK_ERROR
} DeleteWalkResult;
/* One protected entry for the delete walker.  When top_level_only is true the
   prefix is skipped only as a DIRECT child of dest_root (the --delay-updates
   staging directory, which must not hide genuine extras inside a nested
   destination directory that happens to share the staging name); otherwise the
   prefix is skipped at any depth (the --compare-dest/--copy-dest/--link-dest
   basis trees, and the sender-side protected filter-excluded prefixes, which
   are never destination content). */
typedef struct {
  const char* prefix;
  bool top_level_only;
} DeleteSkipEntry;
/* True when child_rel is, or lies below, one of the protected entries (a prefix
   "a" protects "a" and "a/b/c" but not "ab"; top_level_only entries protect
   only DIRECT children of the destination root, i.e. child_rel has no '/'). */
bool path_under_skip_prefix(const char* child_rel, bool at_root, const DeleteSkipEntry* skips,
                            int skip_count);
/* Remove files/dirs/symlinks under dest_root that are not listed in manifest
   without ever descending into a protected prefix (see DeleteSkipEntry).  When
   `synced_dirs` is non-NULL, extras are only removed directly inside a directory
   whose destination-relative path is an exact entry in that list (the receive
   root is the "." sentinel); directories outside the synchronized set are still
   descended into so kept content below a listed directory is preserved, but
   nothing in them is removed.  A NULL `synced_dirs` keeps the legacy behavior of
   treating the whole destination tree as deletable.  `max_delete` caps the
   number of removed entries (SIZE_MAX = unlimited): the walker removes up to the
   cap and returns DELETE_WALK_LIMIT_REACHED when more extras remained.
   `deleted_out`/`skipped_out` optionally receive the number of entries removed
   and the number skipped because of the cap. */
DeleteWalkResult delete_extras_limited(const char* dest_root, const ArrayList* manifest,
                                       const ArrayList* synced_dirs, size_t max_delete,
                                       const DeleteSkipEntry* skips, int skip_count,
                                       size_t* deleted_out, size_t* skipped_out);
/* Read-only companion to delete_extras_limited: walk the destination exactly as
   the delete pass would and APPEND (strdup'd) destination-relative paths that
   WOULD be removed, without touching disk.  Used for -n/--dry-run --delete
   would-delete reporting.  Returns true on a clean walk; the caller owns the
   strings appended to `out` and receives their count in *count_out. */
bool delete_extras_list(const char* dest_root, const ArrayList* manifest,
                        const ArrayList* synced_dirs, const DeleteSkipEntry* skips, int skip_count,
                        ArrayList* out, size_t* count_out);
bool delete_extras(const char* dest_root, const ArrayList* manifest);
/* Open the existing destination directory at `dest_root`, confined to the
   authorized root with an O_NOFOLLOW component walk (the same confinement the
   deletion walker uses for its root).  Returns a new fd the caller owns, or -1
   on error (including a destination that does not exist). */
int utils_open_authorized_destination(const char* dest_root);
bool utils_set_authorized_root(int fd, const char* canonical_path);
/* The fd-only compatibility form is fail-closed for path-based operations;
 * callers should use utils_set_authorized_root with the canonical identity. */
void utils_set_authorized_root_fd(int fd);
/* Read accessors for the process-wide authorized root, so every secure-walk
 * site consumes the single shared state instead of keeping its own copy.  The
 * fd is caller-owned (see the setters): it is returned verbatim, never dup'd,
 * and the caller that opened it is responsible for closing it.  With no root
 * configured the fd accessor returns -1 and the path accessor returns NULL.
 *
 * The pointer returned by utils_get_authorized_root_path() is borrowed into
 * process-global state and is invalidated by the next
 * utils_set_authorized_root() / utils_set_authorized_root_fd() call.  The fd
 * and path are stored separately and read independently, so the pair is NOT
 * observed atomically together; the accessors are non-reentrant and callers
 * must serialize configuration (the server installs the root before any worker
 * threads spawn; see utils.c). */
int utils_get_authorized_root_fd(void);
const char* utils_get_authorized_root_path(void);
/* True when `path` is `root` itself or lies directly beneath it: a lexical
 * prefix test requiring the byte after `root` to be '\0' or '/'.  Both `root`
 * and `path` must be absolute canonical paths free of "."/".." components (the
 * callers guarantee this); this is containment by string, not by resolved
 * symlinks.  Shared by the utils and file secure-walk root confinement. */
bool path_is_within_root(const char* root, const char* path);
/* True when `path` contains a ".." component.  This is a purely lexical
 * dot-dot check: an absolute path is NOT rejected here, because default
 * (non-relative) transfers legitimately put the sender's absolute source path
 * on the wire and the receiver re-roots it under the destination with
 * path_cat().  Callers that accept a strictly relative path (e.g. batch paths)
 * must reject a leading '/' themselves (see utils_valid_batch_path). */
bool has_path_traversal(const char* path);
bool utils_valid_batch_path(const char* path);
bool format_human_bytes(unsigned long long bytes, char* buffer, size_t buffer_size);
/* --append / --append-verify tail-resume math (pure).  A resume is eligible only
   when an existing destination file is SHORTER than the source; the tail length
   is then the difference.  append_resume_eligible answers whether the shorter
   file makes a resume possible; append_tail_length additionally returns that
   tail length, refusing (false) the degenerate old_size >= check_size case. */
bool append_resume_eligible(unsigned long long old_size, unsigned long long check_size);
bool append_tail_length(unsigned long long old_size, unsigned long long check_size,
                        unsigned long long* tail_out);
/* Loopback / local-transport classification for the daemon auth gate and the
   client credential rule.  utils_sockaddr_is_loopback accepts 127.0.0.0/8,
   IPv6 ::1 and IPv4-mapped ::ffff:127.x.x.x; utils_host_is_loopback additionally
   accepts the literal "localhost".  utils_fd_peer_is_local is fail-closed: it is
   true only when getpeername SUCCEEDS and reports a loopback peer -- a non-socket
   descriptor (pipe/socketpair) or any getpeername error yields false.  See
   utils.c for the exact accepted forms. */
bool utils_sockaddr_is_loopback(const struct sockaddr* addr);
bool utils_fd_peer_is_local(int fd);
bool utils_host_is_loopback(const char* host);
/* Numeric peer address of a connected fd (INET6_ADDRSTRLEN is always enough).
 * Returns false and leaves buf empty when the fd is not a connected INET socket
 * or getpeername/inet_ntop fails.  Used by the daemon host-access gate; a false
 * return is "cannot tell" and must be treated as fail-closed when ACLs apply. */
bool utils_fd_peer_ip(int fd, char* buf, size_t len);
/* Format a sockaddr as "ip:port" (IPv4) or "[ip]:port" (IPv6) for logging.
 * Returns false (buf emptied) for a non-INET family or a formatting failure. */
bool utils_sockaddr_to_string(const struct sockaddr* addr, char* buf, size_t len);

#endif