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accd34ad603a047fc20cb5ad7cf8884c2e73e5a9
FastSync/tests/test_credentials.c
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TapTap accd34ad60 fix(d5-daemon-auth): address auth review findings (Wave B) 
- test_credentials.c: NUL-terminate the overlong-line stack buffer before
  make_tmp_file's strlen() (was a stack-buffer-overflow READ under ASan);
  still exercises the overlong-rejection path.
- Add redacted protocol string variants (protocol_send_str_redacted /
  receive + fd send_str_redacted/receive_str_redacted) and use them for the
  daemon auth username/digest so --verbose / LOG_DEBUG_ALL never logs a
  replayable credential while other protocol strings keep their debug trace.
- credentials_verify/gate: replace byte-wise-short-circuiting strcmp with a
  fixed-length constant-time username compare (closes user-enumeration oracle);
  update doc comment to match.
- read_secret_file: preserve password exact bytes (only strip trailing CR/LF)
  and burn the stack line buffer; document the whitespace behavior.
- test_server_cli.c: note the parser zero-inits opts on failure.
- Add debug-level daemon test asserting the digest never appears under --verbose.

PROTOCOL_VERSION stays 2.15.0.
2026-09-10 13:20:42 +02:00

380 lines
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C
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#include "test_credentials.h"
#include "credentials.h"
#include "test_utils.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/* Known SHA-256 vectors pin the digest derivation to real SHA-256 so a change
* in the hashing (or a wire/store format change) is observable. */
#define SHA256_EMPTY "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855"
#define SHA256_SECRET "2bb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b"
#define SHA256_ALICE_PASS "9b90e524e94995ee4aeae2ee3c428a53405d1e8db147f44facc46797d0caf4c3"
static int g_file_counter = 0;
/* Write `contents` to a uniquely-named temp file and return a malloc'd path
* (the caller frees it; the file is removed at the end of the test process or
* on request via rm_temp). */
static char* make_tmp_file(const char* contents) {
char path[256];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/tmp/fs_cred_test_%d_%d", (int)getpid(), g_file_counter++);
FILE* fp = fopen(path, "w");
if (!fp)
return NULL;
size_t n = strlen(contents);
if (n > 0 && fwrite(contents, 1, n, fp) != n) {
fclose(fp);
unlink(path);
return NULL;
}
fclose(fp);
return strdup(path);
}
static void rm_temp(const char* path) {
if (path)
unlink(path);
}
static void test_credentials_hash_vectors() {
char out[CREDENTIAL_HASH_HEX_LEN + 1];
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_hash_password("", out));
EXPECT_EQ_STR(out, SHA256_EMPTY);
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_hash_password("secret", out));
EXPECT_EQ_STR(out, SHA256_SECRET);
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_hash_password("alice-pass", out));
EXPECT_EQ_STR(out, SHA256_ALICE_PASS);
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_hash_password(NULL, out));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_hash_password("x", NULL));
}
static void test_credentials_hash_valid() {
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_hash_valid(SHA256_SECRET));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_hash_valid(NULL));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_hash_valid(""));
/* Wrong length. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_hash_valid("abc"));
EXPECT_FALSE(
credentials_hash_valid("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"));
EXPECT_FALSE(
credentials_hash_valid("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"));
/* Uppercase hex and non-hex are rejected. */
EXPECT_FALSE(
credentials_hash_valid("2BB80D537B1DA3E38BD30361AA855686BDE0EACD7162FEF6A25FE97BF527A25B"));
EXPECT_FALSE(
credentials_hash_valid("gbb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b"));
}
static void test_credentials_secure_equal() {
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_secure_equal("abc", "abc", 3));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_secure_equal("", "", 0));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_secure_equal("abc", "abd", 3));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_secure_equal("abc", "ab", 2));
/* Same prefix, difference at the very last byte must still be detected. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_secure_equal(SHA256_SECRET, SHA256_ALICE_PASS, CREDENTIAL_HASH_HEX_LEN));
}
static void test_credentials_store_parse_valid() {
char* path = make_tmp_file(
"# server credential store\n"
"; another comment style\n"
"\n"
"alice:9b90e524e94995ee4aeae2ee3c428a53405d1e8db147f44facc46797d0caf4c3\n"
" bob : 2bb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b \n"
"carol:e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855\r\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
char err[512];
CredentialStore* store = credentials_load(path, NULL, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_store_size(store), 3);
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_store_has(store, "alice"));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_store_has(store, "bob"));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_store_has(store, "carol"));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_store_has(store, "mallory"));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_store_has(store, "ALICE"));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_verify(store, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_verify(store, "bob", SHA256_SECRET));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_verify(store, "carol", SHA256_EMPTY));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_verify(store, "alice", SHA256_SECRET));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_verify(store, "mallory", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
credentials_free(store);
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
}
static void test_credentials_store_parse_rejects_malformed() {
const char* cases[] = {
/* no colon */
"alice\n",
/* empty user */
":9b90e524e94995ee4aeae2ee3c428a53405d1e8db147f44facc46797d0caf4c3\n",
/* empty secret */
"alice:\n",
/* secret too short */
"alice:8ce9c8b52c5\n",
/* secret not hex */
"alice:zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz\n",
/* uppercase hex rejected (strict) */
"alice:2BB80D537B1DA3E38BD30361AA855686BDE0EACD7162FEF6A25FE97BF527A25B\n",
/* whitespace inside the username */
"ali ce:2bb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b\n",
/* duplicate user within one file */
"alice:9b90e524e94995ee4aeae2ee3c428a53405d1e8db147f44facc46797d0caf4c3\n"
"alice:2bb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b\n",
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
char* path = make_tmp_file(cases[i]);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
char err[512];
const CredentialStore* store = credentials_load(path, NULL, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_TRUE(err[0] != '\0');
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
}
}
static void test_credentials_store_parse_missing_file() {
char err[512];
const CredentialStore* store =
credentials_load("/nonexistent/cred-file-xyz", NULL, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "cannot open") != NULL);
}
static void test_credentials_store_empty_and_null() {
char err[512];
/* A NULL path is a valid (empty) store: no module can authenticate, which is
* the fail-closed state the startup check turns into a refusal to start. */
CredentialStore* store = credentials_load(NULL, NULL, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_store_size(store), 0);
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_verify(store, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
credentials_free(store);
/* A blank/comment-only file is an empty store too (not an error). */
char* path = make_tmp_file("# nothing here\n; nor here\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
store = credentials_load(path, NULL, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_store_size(store), 0);
credentials_free(store);
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
}
static void test_credentials_store_overlong_line_rejected() {
/* A line longer than CREDENTIAL_MAX_LINE must be rejected. Fill the buffer
* fully so the line really is overlong, but keep both a trailing newline and
* a NUL terminator at known indices: make_tmp_file does strlen(contents), so
* an unterminated stack buffer would be an out-of-bounds read (ASan). */
char big[CREDENTIAL_MAX_LINE + 80];
int n = snprintf(big, sizeof(big), "alice:%s", SHA256_SECRET);
memset(big + n, 'a', sizeof(big) - (size_t)n - 1);
big[sizeof(big) - 2] = '\n';
big[sizeof(big) - 1] = '\0';
char* path = make_tmp_file(big);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
char err[512];
const CredentialStore* store = credentials_load(path, NULL, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NULL(store);
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
}
static void test_credentials_early_input_merge() {
char* pw =
make_tmp_file("alice:9b90e524e94995ee4aeae2ee3c428a53405d1e8db147f44facc46797d0caf4c3\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(pw);
char err[512];
/* A second file adds a new user. */
char* early =
make_tmp_file("bob:2bb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(early);
CredentialStore* store = credentials_load(pw, early, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_store_size(store), 2);
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_verify(store, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_verify(store, "bob", SHA256_SECRET));
credentials_free(store);
/* The same user with the SAME secret dedupes. */
char* early_same =
make_tmp_file("alice:9b90e524e94995ee4aeae2ee3c428a53405d1e8db147f44facc46797d0caf4c3\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(early_same);
store = credentials_load(pw, early_same, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_store_size(store), 1);
credentials_free(store);
/* The same user with a DIFFERENT secret fails closed (ambiguous). */
char* early_diff =
make_tmp_file("alice:2bb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(early_diff);
store = credentials_load(pw, early_diff, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NULL(store);
EXPECT_TRUE(err[0] != '\0');
rm_temp(pw);
rm_temp(early);
rm_temp(early_same);
rm_temp(early_diff);
free(pw);
free(early);
free(early_same);
free(early_diff);
}
static void test_credentials_read_secret_file() {
char err[512];
char* user = NULL;
char* password = NULL;
/* Leading comments/blanks skipped; first real line wins. */
char* path = make_tmp_file("# password file\n"
"\n"
"alice:correct horse battery staple\n"
"ignored:second line\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_read_secret_file(path, &user, &password, err, sizeof(err)), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_STR(user, "alice");
EXPECT_EQ_STR(password, "correct horse battery staple");
free(user);
free(password);
user = password = NULL;
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
/* CRLF is tolerated; the username is trimmed but the password's exact bytes
* (edge spaces included) are preserved so a whitespace password stays usable. */
path = make_tmp_file(" bob : s3cret \r\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_read_secret_file(path, &user, &password, err, sizeof(err)), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_STR(user, "bob");
EXPECT_EQ_STR(password, " s3cret ");
free(user);
free(password);
user = password = NULL;
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
/* A whitespace-only password (no characters) is still a real password and is
* preserved exactly, not mistaken for an empty line. */
path = make_tmp_file("carol: \n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_read_secret_file(path, &user, &password, err, sizeof(err)), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_STR(user, "carol");
EXPECT_EQ_STR(password, " ");
free(user);
free(password);
user = password = NULL;
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
/* Empty file / comment-only file rejected. */
path = make_tmp_file("");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_read_secret_file(path, &user, &password, err, sizeof(err)), -1);
EXPECT_NULL(user);
EXPECT_NULL(password);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "no 'user:password'") != NULL);
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
}
static void test_credentials_read_secret_file_bad() {
char err[512];
const char* cases[] = {
/* no colon */
"alicepassword\n",
/* empty user */
":password\n",
/* empty password */
"alice:\n",
/* empty password after CR-only line ending */
"alice:\r\n",
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
char* path = make_tmp_file(cases[i]);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
char* user = (char*)1;
char* password = (char*)1;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_read_secret_file(path, &user, &password, err, sizeof(err)), -1);
EXPECT_NULL(user);
EXPECT_NULL(password);
EXPECT_TRUE(err[0] != '\0');
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
}
char* missing = "/nonexistent/password-file-xyz";
EXPECT_EQ_INT(credentials_read_secret_file(missing, NULL, NULL, err, sizeof(err)), -1);
}
static void test_credentials_gate_allows() {
char* path =
make_tmp_file("alice:9b90e524e94995ee4aeae2ee3c428a53405d1e8db147f44facc46797d0caf4c3\n"
"bob:2bb80d537b1da3e38bd30361aa855686bde0eacd7162fef6a25fe97bf527a25b\n");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
char err[512];
CredentialStore* store = credentials_load(path, NULL, err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(store);
const char* module_users[] = {"alice", "bob"};
/* Matching user + digest passes. */
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 2, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 2, "bob", SHA256_SECRET));
/* Wrong digest for a listed user fails. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 2, "alice", SHA256_SECRET));
/* A store user that is not on the module's list fails. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 2, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS) &&
credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 1, "bob", SHA256_SECRET));
EXPECT_TRUE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 1, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 1, "bob", SHA256_SECRET));
/* No credentials presented fails. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 2, NULL, NULL));
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 2, "alice", NULL));
/* Unknown user fails. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(store, module_users, 2, "mallory", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
/* Fail closed: a NULL store refuses even with correct credentials. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(NULL, module_users, 2, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
/* An empty module list refuses everyone. */
EXPECT_FALSE(credentials_gate_allows(store, NULL, 0, "alice", SHA256_ALICE_PASS));
credentials_free(store);
rm_temp(path);
free(path);
}
static void test_credentials_burn() {
char secret[32];
memcpy(secret, "supersecretvalue", 17);
credentials_burn(secret, 16);
for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++)
EXPECT_EQ_INT(secret[i], 0);
credentials_burn(NULL, 0); /* must not crash */
}
void test_credentials(void) {
test_credentials_hash_vectors();
test_credentials_hash_valid();
test_credentials_secure_equal();
test_credentials_store_parse_valid();
test_credentials_store_parse_rejects_malformed();
test_credentials_store_parse_missing_file();
test_credentials_store_empty_and_null();
test_credentials_store_overlong_line_rejected();
test_credentials_early_input_merge();
test_credentials_read_secret_file();
test_credentials_read_secret_file_bad();
test_credentials_gate_allows();
test_credentials_burn();
}
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