TapTap
423a62e691
Three receiver security fixes from the audit: 1. --temp-dir symlink escape (High): file_open_temp_dir() opened the client-controlled scratch dir with a bare open(), so a symlink planted under the receive root let a peer redirect receiver scratch files outside the authorized root. The opened dir is now judged by the REAL path of its fd (via /proc/self/fd), and any target outside the authorized receive root is refused with a logged error (EACCES). An in-root symlink (the EXDEV cross-filesystem fallback case) still works, and the no-root local batch path is unchanged. 2. setuid/setgid/sticky under SUPER_MODE_OFF (High): the special bits were applied under --perms (and via --chmod) even when the connection forbade super-user activities. FileAttrPolicy gains super_permitted, set by file_attr_policy_from_config() from privilege_super_mode_permitted(); metadata_mode_for_policy(), the symlink path, the special-node creation path, and the deferred directory-mode apply now strip the special bits when it is false. Exact rsync semantics are preserved when permitted. 3. daemon umask (Low): daemonize() forced umask(0), so implied parent directories created without -p were world-writable 0777. Set the conventional daemon umask 022 instead (rsync never forces 0); -p/-a mode preservation is unaffected because it restores modes via fchmod. Tests: new unit tests for file_open_temp_dir confinement and the masked/unmasked special-bit policy (incl. the --chmod path), a daemon world-writable-dir regression test, an integration escape test, and a root-only integration test asserting special bits are masked without --allow-super. The old cross-filesystem test encoded the vulnerable behavior (symlink target outside the root) and is replaced by the escape test; the EXDEV fallback code is retained for in-root links.
1465 lines
71 KiB
C
1465 lines
71 KiB
C
#include "config.h"
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#include "charset.h"
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#include "credentials.h"
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#include "daemon_conf.h"
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#include "daemon_limits.h"
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#include "delay_updates.h"
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#include "file.h"
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#include "identity.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "motd.h"
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#include "protocol.h"
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#include "queue.h"
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#include "receiver.h"
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#include "receiver_pipeline.h"
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#include "server_cli.h"
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#include "transport_tcp.h"
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#include "transport_tls.h"
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#include "utils.h"
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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static bool allow_delete;
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static bool trust_sender;
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static bool allow_unauthenticated;
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/* --no-super operator veto: forces SUPER_MODE_OFF for every connection (even
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* root), so no super-user activity is attempted and any client --copy-as is
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* refused. Set once in main before the accept loop / stdio handler. */
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static bool server_no_super;
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/* --allow-super: locally-launched standalone TCP opt-in that preserves the
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* historical permissive super mode for a root receiver. When false, a
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* privileged standalone receiver forces SUPER_MODE_OFF for every connection
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* (C3), so a client cannot make it create device nodes / write raw devices /
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* apply client-chosen ownership. It is REJECTED for --stdio (the SSH remote
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* argv is composed by the client, so it must never be able to opt a root
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* receiver back into super mode); the --stdio path always keeps the secure
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* default. */
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static bool server_allow_super;
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static const char* required_client_cn;
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/* --iconv CONVERT_SPEC the server was itself started with (borrowed argv
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* pointer). Its LOCAL half may override the local charset the client assumed;
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* see charset_wire_init_receiver. */
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static const char* server_iconv_spec;
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/* Non-NULL exactly when the listener runs in --daemon mode. Loaded once in
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* main before any accept-loop fork, then shared read-only by every forked
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* connection child (and their threads). */
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static DaemonConf* g_daemon_conf = NULL;
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/* Daemon credential store (Wave B), loaded once in main from --password-file /
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* --early-input and shared read-only by every forked connection child. When a
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* module declares `auth users` but no store was configured, the daemon refuses
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* to start (fail closed); the store is never NULL after a successful start when
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* such a module exists. */
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static CredentialStore* g_credentials = NULL;
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/* Cross-process connection registry (per-module and per-source caps plus the
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* shared auth lockout), created once in main BEFORE the accept loop forks and
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* shared read-only-by-pointer with every connection child. NULL outside daemon
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* mode or when the mapping could not be allocated (global cap + ACLs remain). */
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static DaemonLimitRegistry* g_daemon_limits = NULL;
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/* Opaque context threaded through to the config-frame gate: the connection's
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* SSL object (NULL over plaintext) so the gate can warn when a credential
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* exchange is not encrypted, plus the super-mode override the gate decides on.
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* The gate never mutates the received (const) Config; it records a forced
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* SUPER_MODE_OFF here and the handler applies it exactly once after acceptance. */
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typedef struct ModuleGateContext {
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SSL* ssl;
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/* The connection descriptor, so the gate can drive the SCRAM auth handshake
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* while it still owns the config-frame exchange (before the STATUS_OK ack). */
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int fd;
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/* SUPER_MODE_OFF when this connection must not attempt any super-user
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activity (operator --no-super, or a daemon module without the
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`client owner = yes` opt-in); -1 when the config's own mode stands. */
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int super_mode_override;
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/* Numeric peer address (INET6_ADDRSTRLEN is always enough), filled once by
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* server_module_gate. has_peer_ip is false when getpeername/inet_ntop could
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* not classify the peer; an ACL-configured module then fails closed. */
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bool has_peer_ip;
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char peer_ip[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
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/* True when the peer is provably loopback (utils_fd_peer_is_local, fail
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* closed). A trusted local/SSH peer is exempt from the per-host cap and the
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* cross-process auth lockout: every loopback client shares the 127.0.0.1
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* identity, so counting/locking them out would let one local client deny
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* service to (or leak lockout state about) all the others. The per-module and
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* global caps still apply. */
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bool is_local;
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} ModuleGateContext;
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/* Server half of the SCRAM challenge/response (A7 remediation, protocol
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* 2.19.0). Sends STATUS_AUTH_CHALLENGE (iteration count, base64 salt, base64
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* server nonce), expects STATUS_AUTH_RESPONSE (base64 client nonce, base64
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* ClientProof), verifies the proof constant-time and answers STATUS_AUTH_OK
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* with the base64 ServerSignature. On any failure BEFORE the success response
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* it sends exactly one generic STATUS_AUTH_FAILED and returns false; a failure
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* while writing the success signature cannot send a status and just drops an
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* already-broken connection. The verifier for an unknown/off-list
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* user is a dummy (deterministic per-username salt, store-wide iterations, dummy
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* keys, found=false) so the same math runs and no user-enumeration/timing oracle
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* is exposed. */
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static bool server_auth_handshake(int fd, const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module) {
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bool result = false;
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CredentialVerifier verifier;
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memset(&verifier, 0, sizeof(verifier));
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uint8_t snonce[CREDENTIAL_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
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char salt_b64[25] = {0};
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char snonce_b64[45] = {0};
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char* cnonce_b64 = NULL;
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char* proof_b64 = NULL;
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uint8_t cnonce[CREDENTIAL_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
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uint8_t proof[CREDENTIAL_KEY_LEN] = {0};
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uint8_t server_sig[CREDENTIAL_KEY_LEN] = {0};
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char sig_b64[45] = {0};
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size_t cnonce_len = 0;
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size_t proof_len = 0;
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if (!config->auth_user)
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goto fail; /* no username: generic failure, no challenge */
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if (!credentials_get_verifier(g_credentials, config->auth_user,
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(const char* const*)module->auth_users, module->auth_user_count,
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&verifier))
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goto fail; /* a crypto failure still owes the gate a terminal frame */
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if (!(credentials_random_bytes(snonce, sizeof(snonce)) &&
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credentials_b64_encode(verifier.salt, CREDENTIAL_SALT_LEN, salt_b64, sizeof(salt_b64)) &&
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credentials_b64_encode(snonce, sizeof(snonce), snonce_b64, sizeof(snonce_b64))))
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goto fail;
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if (!(send_status(fd, STATUS_AUTH_CHALLENGE) && send_int(fd, (int)verifier.iters) &&
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send_str(fd, salt_b64) && send_str(fd, snonce_b64)))
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goto fail;
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Status status = STATUS_ERROR;
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if (!(receive_status(fd, &status) && status == STATUS_AUTH_RESPONSE))
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goto fail;
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cnonce_b64 = receive_str_redacted(fd);
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proof_b64 = receive_str_redacted(fd);
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if (!(cnonce_b64 && proof_b64 &&
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credentials_b64_decode(cnonce_b64, cnonce, sizeof(cnonce), &cnonce_len) &&
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cnonce_len == CREDENTIAL_NONCE_LEN &&
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credentials_b64_decode(proof_b64, proof, sizeof(proof), &proof_len) &&
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proof_len == CREDENTIAL_KEY_LEN))
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goto fail;
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if (!credentials_verify_response(&verifier, config->auth_user, snonce, cnonce, proof, server_sig))
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goto fail;
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/* Success writes exactly one terminal frame (STATUS_AUTH_OK). A broken pipe
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* while sending the signature just drops the connection; it must never emit a
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* second terminal status. */
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result = credentials_b64_encode(server_sig, sizeof(server_sig), sig_b64, sizeof(sig_b64)) &&
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send_status(fd, STATUS_AUTH_OK) && send_str_redacted(fd, sig_b64);
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goto cleanup;
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fail:
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/* Every failure path writes exactly one generic terminal status, satisfying
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* the gate's CONFIG_VALIDATE_ALREADY_TERMINATED contract. */
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send_status(fd, STATUS_AUTH_FAILED);
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cleanup:
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credentials_burn(cnonce_b64, cnonce_b64 ? strlen(cnonce_b64) : 0);
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credentials_burn(proof_b64, proof_b64 ? strlen(proof_b64) : 0);
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free(cnonce_b64);
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free(proof_b64);
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credentials_burn((char*)snonce, sizeof(snonce));
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credentials_burn(salt_b64, sizeof(salt_b64));
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credentials_burn(snonce_b64, sizeof(snonce_b64));
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credentials_burn((char*)cnonce, sizeof(cnonce));
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credentials_burn((char*)proof, sizeof(proof));
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credentials_burn((char*)server_sig, sizeof(server_sig));
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credentials_burn(sig_b64, sizeof(sig_b64));
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credentials_burn((char*)verifier.salt, sizeof(verifier.salt));
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credentials_burn((char*)verifier.stored_key, sizeof(verifier.stored_key));
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credentials_burn((char*)verifier.server_key, sizeof(verifier.server_key));
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return result;
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}
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/* Aggregate payload bytes the multithreaded receiver may buffer ahead of the
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slow disk writer. Receiving one more chunk adds up to ~2 * MAX_CHUNK_SIZE
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of transient wire/decompression buffers on top of the queued payloads, so
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this ceiling keeps total per-connection receive memory (decompressed and
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per-file copied chunk buffers included) within MAX_CONNECTION_MEMORY. */
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#define RECEIVER_QUEUE_MAX_BYTES (MAX_CONNECTION_MEMORY - 2 * MAX_CHUNK_SIZE)
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static bool tls_client_identity_allowed(SSL* ssl) {
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if (!ssl || !required_client_cn)
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return false;
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X509* certificate = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(ssl);
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if (!certificate)
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return false;
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size_t required_length = strlen(required_client_cn);
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bool allowed = false;
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X509_NAME* subject = X509_get_subject_name(certificate);
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int index = subject ? X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject, NID_commonName, -1) : -1;
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if (index >= 0) {
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X509_NAME_ENTRY* entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, index);
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ASN1_STRING* data = entry ? X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry) : NULL;
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/* Convert the CN to UTF-8 to get its FULL byte length: unlike
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* X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (which truncates an over-long CN to the buffer
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* and reports the truncated length), ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 never truncates, so
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* an exactly-required-length CN is accepted while an over-long one cannot be
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* prefix-matched by a shorter required name. */
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unsigned char* utf8 = NULL;
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int cn_length = data ? ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8, data) : -1;
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if (cn_length >= 0 && (size_t)cn_length == required_length)
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allowed = credentials_secure_equal((const char*)utf8, required_client_cn, required_length);
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if (utf8)
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OPENSSL_free(utf8);
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}
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X509_free(certificate);
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return allowed;
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}
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static void release_authorization(void) {
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int root_fd = utils_get_authorized_root_fd();
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utils_set_authorized_root(-1, NULL);
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if (root_fd >= 0)
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close(root_fd);
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}
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static bool path_is_within(const char* root, const char* path) {
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size_t n = strlen(root);
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return strncmp(root, path, n) == 0 && (path[n] == '\0' || path[n] == '/');
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}
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/* --mkpath contract: when the client's destination root directory does not
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exist yet on the server side, --mkpath tells the server to create it (and
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any missing leading components) below the authorized root at connection
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start. Without --mkpath the destination root must already exist: a missing
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root is rejected up front instead of being silently invented by a later
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write. Both paths are confined to the authorized root by the secure file
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helpers. */
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/* Existence-only half of the precondition: the destination root must already
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resolve to a directory below the authorized root. Never creates anything, so
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a server-contacting --dry-run can apply the exact same fail-closed check a
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real run would without mutating the tree. */
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static bool receive_root_exists(const Config* config) {
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if (!config || !config->receive_root_directory)
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return false;
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return file_directory_exists_secure(config->receive_root_directory);
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}
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/* Full precondition for a real run: --mkpath creates the root (and missing
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leading components), otherwise it must already exist as a directory. */
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static bool ensure_receive_root(const Config* config) {
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if (!config || !config->receive_root_directory)
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return false;
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if (config->mkpath)
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return file_ensure_directory_secure(config->receive_root_directory);
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return receive_root_exists(config);
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}
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static bool configure_authorization(const char* root) {
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char resolved[PATH_MAX];
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if (!root) {
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utils_set_authorized_root(-1, NULL);
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return false;
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}
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int root_fd = open(root, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
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if (root_fd < 0) {
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utils_set_authorized_root(-1, NULL);
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return false;
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}
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char fd_path[64];
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int fd_path_length = snprintf(fd_path, sizeof(fd_path), "/proc/self/fd/%d", root_fd);
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if (fd_path_length < 0 || (size_t)fd_path_length >= sizeof(fd_path) ||
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!realpath(fd_path, resolved)) {
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close(root_fd);
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utils_set_authorized_root(-1, NULL);
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return false;
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}
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if (!utils_set_authorized_root(root_fd, resolved)) {
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/* The setter already cleared the fd/path state on allocation failure. */
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close(root_fd);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/* Discriminates the outcome of the A7 auth gate so the dispatcher can map it
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* back to the config_receive_with_validate contract: accepted (including
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* "module needs no auth"), a config-level refusal carrying an error string, or
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* a handshake that already wrote its own terminal status frame. */
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typedef enum {
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MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED = 0,
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MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED,
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MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED,
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} ModuleAuthResult;
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/* Looks up the daemon module selected by the client's config frame and rejects
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* a `read only` one for a real write transfer. A server-contacting --dry-run
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* IS a read-only wire operation (it reports what would transfer/skip and
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* mutates nothing), so a `read only` module is the safest possible dry-run
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* target and is accepted. Returns the module, or NULL with *error set to the
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* caller-facing rejection message. */
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static const DaemonModule* module_gate_lookup_module(const Config* config, const char** error) {
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const DaemonModule* module = daemon_conf_find_module(g_daemon_conf, config->module);
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if (module == NULL) {
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char* escaped_module = output_escape(config->module, config->eight_bit_output);
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log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "unknown daemon module '%s' requested",
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escaped_module ? escaped_module : "<allocation failed>");
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free(escaped_module);
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*error = "requested daemon module does not exist";
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return NULL;
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}
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if (module->read_only && !config->dry_run) {
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log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s' is read only; refusing write transfer",
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config->module);
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*error = "requested daemon module is read only";
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return NULL;
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}
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return module;
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}
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/* Index of `module` within the loaded config's module array (the registry's
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* per-module counter key). Returns -1 when it cannot be resolved. */
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static int daemon_module_index(const DaemonModule* module) {
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if (!g_daemon_conf || !module || module < g_daemon_conf->modules ||
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module >= g_daemon_conf->modules + g_daemon_conf->module_count)
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return -1;
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return (int)(module - g_daemon_conf->modules);
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}
|
|
|
|
/* Shared-registry admission: reserve this connection's slot for the selected
|
|
* module and the peer source IP. Enforces the per-module `max connections` and
|
|
* the global `max connections per host` across every forked child. Runs before
|
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* auth/ownership so a client that is over a cap is refused before any work.
|
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* The per-source cap is skipped when the peer cannot be classified (host ACLs
|
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* fail closed separately); the module cap still applies. A missing registry
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* (allocation failure / non-fork path) fails open -- the global cap and ACLs
|
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* still bound the listener. */
|
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static const char* module_gate_check_limits(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module,
|
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ModuleGateContext* gate_ctx) {
|
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if (!g_daemon_limits)
|
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return NULL;
|
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int slot = transport_tcp_current_slot();
|
|
if (slot < 0)
|
|
return NULL; /* not on the forked accept-loop path (e.g. --stdio) */
|
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int module_index = daemon_module_index(module);
|
|
if (module_index < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* A trusted loopback peer is exempt from the per-source cap: pass an
|
|
* unparseable peer so the registry skips per-source tracking, while the
|
|
* per-module cap below is still enforced. Remote peers are tracked normally. */
|
|
const char* peer =
|
|
(!gate_ctx || gate_ctx->is_local || !gate_ctx->has_peer_ip) ? "" : gate_ctx->peer_ip;
|
|
DaemonLimitResult result =
|
|
daemon_limits_register(g_daemon_limits, slot, module_index, peer, module->max_connections);
|
|
switch (result) {
|
|
case DAEMON_LIMIT_OK:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
case DAEMON_LIMIT_MODULE_FULL:
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': 'max connections' cap (%d) reached; refusing %s",
|
|
config->module, module->max_connections, peer[0] ? peer : "peer");
|
|
return "requested daemon module is at its connection limit";
|
|
case DAEMON_LIMIT_HOST_FULL:
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"daemon: 'max connections per host' cap (%d) reached for %s; refusing module '%s'",
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.max_connections_per_host, peer[0] ? peer : "peer",
|
|
config->module);
|
|
return "too many concurrent connections from this host";
|
|
case DAEMON_LIMIT_UNAVAILABLE:
|
|
default:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Per-module client-chosen ownership / super-user policy (P7 Wave E hardening):
|
|
* a daemon module refuses EVERY ownership-affecting request (--numeric-ids,
|
|
* --chown, --usermap/--groupmap, --fake-super, --copy-as, explicit --super)
|
|
* unless the operator opted THIS module in with `client owner = yes`.
|
|
* Otherwise any client could force arbitrary ownership inside the module root.
|
|
* The ownership check is evaluated against the ORIGINAL config so an explicit
|
|
* --super is refused even when an operator --no-super veto already forced the
|
|
* effective copy to OFF (the veto must not silently convert a refusal into an
|
|
* accept); when no ownership flag is present, super-user DEVICE activities are
|
|
* forced off for this connection instead. Returns an error string on refusal,
|
|
* NULL on acceptance. */
|
|
static const char* module_gate_check_ownership(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module,
|
|
ModuleGateContext* gate_ctx) {
|
|
if (module->client_owner)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Ownership: refuse the whole transfer up front (a clear failure) for a
|
|
* client-CHOSEN owner/group request. A plain -o/-g/-a preserve-source
|
|
* request is deliberately not in this narrow set: it falls through to the
|
|
* super-mode override below, which forces all ownership activity off for this
|
|
* connection so no chown happens (the transfer itself still succeeds). */
|
|
if (identity_explicit_ownership_requested(config)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"daemon module '%s' refuses client-chosen ownership/super-user activities "
|
|
"(no `client owner = yes` opt-in); refusing",
|
|
config->module);
|
|
return "client-chosen ownership is not permitted by this daemon module";
|
|
}
|
|
/* Super-user DEVICE activities (char/block mknod and --write-devices) are
|
|
permitted under the default AUTO mode, so without this override a root
|
|
daemon would still let a non-opted module create arbitrary device nodes
|
|
and write raw devices. Force them off for this connection: those entries
|
|
are skipped (never mknod'ed) while an ordinary `-a` push still succeeds
|
|
without device nodes, matching the operator's least-privilege choice.
|
|
The operator-level --no-super veto is already folded into this. */
|
|
if (gate_ctx)
|
|
gate_ctx->super_mode_override = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Online-guessing throttle: sleep the configured `auth failure delay`
|
|
* milliseconds after a failed authentication. Runs in the per-connection
|
|
* forked child, so it never blocks the accept loop or another connection. 0
|
|
* disables it; the parser already caps it at DAEMON_CONF_MAX_AUTH_FAILURE_DELAY_MS.
|
|
* Resumes after EINTR so a signal cannot cut the delay short. */
|
|
static void daemon_auth_failure_delay(void) {
|
|
if (!g_daemon_conf || g_daemon_conf->global.auth_failure_delay_ms <= 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
int ms = g_daemon_conf->global.auth_failure_delay_ms;
|
|
struct timespec delay;
|
|
delay.tv_sec = ms / 1000;
|
|
delay.tv_nsec = (long)(ms % 1000) * 1000000L;
|
|
while (nanosleep(&delay, &delay) != 0 && errno == EINTR)
|
|
;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Host access control (global then per-module). A configured list makes an
|
|
* unprovable peer fail closed. Deny always takes precedence over allow, and a
|
|
* non-empty allow list rejects a peer that matches none of its entries. The
|
|
* audit line names the peer, the module and the outcome. Returns an
|
|
* error string on refusal, NULL on acceptance. */
|
|
static const char* module_gate_check_hosts(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module,
|
|
ModuleGateContext* gate_ctx) {
|
|
bool global_restricted = daemon_hosts_restricted(
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_allow, g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_allow_count,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_deny, g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_deny_count);
|
|
bool module_restricted = daemon_hosts_restricted(module->hosts_allow, module->hosts_allow_count,
|
|
module->hosts_deny, module->hosts_deny_count);
|
|
if (!global_restricted && !module_restricted)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (!gate_ctx || !gate_ctx->has_peer_ip) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': cannot determine peer address with host ACLs configured; "
|
|
"refusing (fail closed)",
|
|
config->module);
|
|
return "cannot verify the client host against host access controls";
|
|
}
|
|
const char* peer = gate_ctx->peer_ip;
|
|
if (global_restricted && !daemon_hosts_allowed(peer, g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_allow,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_allow_count,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_deny,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.hosts_deny_count)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': peer %s denied by global 'hosts allow'/'hosts deny'; "
|
|
"refusing",
|
|
config->module, peer);
|
|
return "client host is not permitted by this daemon";
|
|
}
|
|
if (module_restricted &&
|
|
!daemon_hosts_allowed(peer, module->hosts_allow, module->hosts_allow_count,
|
|
module->hosts_deny, module->hosts_deny_count)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': peer %s denied by module 'hosts allow'/'hosts deny'; "
|
|
"refusing",
|
|
config->module, peer);
|
|
return "client host is not permitted by this daemon module";
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* A7 auth gate: runs the SCRAM challenge/response for an auth-required module
|
|
* BEFORE the module root is installed and before any data moves. Returns
|
|
* MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED when the module needs no auth or the handshake succeeds,
|
|
* MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED with *error set on a config-level rejection, or
|
|
* MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED when the handshake already wrote a terminal status. */
|
|
static ModuleAuthResult module_gate_authenticate(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module,
|
|
ModuleGateContext* gate_ctx, const char** error) {
|
|
if (module->auth_user_count == 0)
|
|
return MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED;
|
|
/* Cross-process lockout: a source that failed too many authentications is
|
|
* refused before the challenge is sent (the counter lives in the shared
|
|
* registry, so it spans every forked child and survives a child exit). A
|
|
* trusted loopback peer is exempt: all local clients share the 127.0.0.1
|
|
* identity, so a lockout would let one deny the others. */
|
|
if (g_daemon_limits && gate_ctx && gate_ctx->has_peer_ip && !gate_ctx->is_local) {
|
|
int remaining = 0;
|
|
if (daemon_limits_auth_locked(g_daemon_limits, gate_ctx->peer_ip, &remaining)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': source %s is locked out after repeated authentication "
|
|
"failures (%d s remaining); refusing",
|
|
config->module, gate_ctx->peer_ip, remaining);
|
|
*error = "too many failed authentication attempts from this host; try again later";
|
|
return MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fail closed: no store -> refuse (server misconfiguration, STATUS_ERROR). */
|
|
if (g_credentials == NULL) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"daemon module '%s' requires authentication but no credential store is "
|
|
"configured (--password-file/--early-input); refusing",
|
|
config->module);
|
|
*error = "requested daemon module requires authentication and no credential "
|
|
"store is configured";
|
|
return MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Transport policy (A7-3/S1): an auth-required module only accepts
|
|
* credentials over (a) an encrypted, verified TLS connection whose client
|
|
* certificate matches --client-cn, or (b) an actual PLAINTEXT connection
|
|
* from a loopback peer that the operator explicitly opted into with
|
|
* --allow-unauthenticated. A remote plaintext peer, an un-flagged loopback
|
|
* plaintext peer, and a loopback TLS peer whose certificate does not match
|
|
* --client-cn are all refused HERE, before the challenge is sent, so an
|
|
* unverified client never receives a nonce: the loopback allowance requires
|
|
* !gate_ctx->ssl, so --tls + --allow-unauthenticated can never be used to
|
|
* bypass the client-CN check. The operator flag never permits REMOTE
|
|
* plaintext auth: remote peers still require verified TLS regardless. */
|
|
bool tls_ok = gate_ctx && gate_ctx->ssl && SSL_get_verify_result(gate_ctx->ssl) == X509_V_OK &&
|
|
tls_client_identity_allowed(gate_ctx->ssl);
|
|
bool local_ok = allow_unauthenticated && gate_ctx && !gate_ctx->ssl && gate_ctx->fd >= 0 &&
|
|
utils_fd_peer_is_local(gate_ctx->fd);
|
|
if (!tls_ok && !local_ok) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"daemon module '%s' requires authentication over an encrypted, verified TLS "
|
|
"connection (or an opted-in loopback plaintext transport); refusing",
|
|
config->module);
|
|
*error = "daemon module requires authentication over an encrypted, verified TLS "
|
|
"connection";
|
|
return MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Belt-and-braces: the transport policy above already guarantees a context
|
|
* with a usable socket (verified TLS implies a live SSL object and loopback
|
|
* allowance requires gate_ctx->fd >= 0), so this is unreachable today; keep
|
|
* the guard so the handshake can never be driven over an invalid fd. */
|
|
if (!gate_ctx || gate_ctx->fd < 0) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s': no auth transport available", config->module);
|
|
*error = "authentication failed for the requested daemon module";
|
|
return MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED;
|
|
}
|
|
/* The handshake writes exactly one terminal status on failure and signals so
|
|
* via MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED; the username may be logged (never the password
|
|
* or any derived proof). */
|
|
if (!server_auth_handshake(gate_ctx->fd, config, module)) {
|
|
const char* peer = gate_ctx->has_peer_ip ? gate_ctx->peer_ip : "unknown";
|
|
char* escaped_user =
|
|
config->auth_user ? output_escape(config->auth_user, config->eight_bit_output) : NULL;
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': authentication failed for user '%s' from %s; refusing",
|
|
config->module, escaped_user ? escaped_user : "(none)", peer);
|
|
free(escaped_user);
|
|
/* Count the failure in the shared registry (locks the source out once the
|
|
* configured threshold is reached) and rate-limit online guessing per
|
|
* connection (no delay on success). A loopback peer is exempt from the
|
|
* shared counter. */
|
|
if (g_daemon_limits && gate_ctx->has_peer_ip && !gate_ctx->is_local)
|
|
daemon_limits_auth_record_failure(g_daemon_limits, gate_ctx->peer_ip);
|
|
daemon_auth_failure_delay();
|
|
return MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (g_daemon_limits && gate_ctx->has_peer_ip && !gate_ctx->is_local)
|
|
daemon_limits_auth_record_success(g_daemon_limits, gate_ctx->peer_ip);
|
|
char* escaped_user = output_escape(config->auth_user, config->eight_bit_output);
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "daemon module '%s': user '%s' from %s authenticated", config->module,
|
|
escaped_user ? escaped_user : "<allocation failed>",
|
|
gate_ctx->has_peer_ip ? gate_ctx->peer_ip : "unknown");
|
|
free(escaped_user);
|
|
return MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Installs the module's configured path as the connection's authorized root.
|
|
* Returns an error string when the root is unusable, NULL on success. */
|
|
static const char* module_gate_install_root(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module) {
|
|
if (!configure_authorization(module->path)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s' path '%s' is not usable", config->module,
|
|
module->path ? module->path : "(null)");
|
|
return "requested daemon module root is not usable";
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Config-frame gate (runs inside config_receive_with_validate, BEFORE the
|
|
* STATUS_OK ack, so a rejected connection is refused at the config handshake
|
|
* and no file data is ever exchanged).
|
|
*
|
|
* Plain mode: a connection that carries a daemon module name is refused (the
|
|
* standalone server simply does not offer modules; honouring one would silently
|
|
* change what the destination means). Empty module -> accept.
|
|
*
|
|
* Daemon mode: the client MUST select a module (host::module/path). The
|
|
* requested module is looked up in the daemon config and its configured `path`
|
|
* becomes the authorized root via configure_authorization -- exactly the same
|
|
* root confinement the standalone server applies to its single
|
|
* --destination-root, but per-module and NEVER client-chosen. The module is
|
|
* refused (with a clear log) when it is unknown, when it is `read only` for a
|
|
* real write transfer (a server-contacting --dry-run is a read-only wire
|
|
* operation and may target a `read only` module), when it requests
|
|
* client-chosen ownership without the module's
|
|
* `client owner = yes` opt-in (P7 Wave E hardening), or when the presented
|
|
* daemon credentials fail for a module that declares `auth users`. Wave A
|
|
* refused every auth-required module (auth was not yet implemented); Wave B
|
|
* authenticates the client instead (see below). */
|
|
static const char* server_module_gate(const Config* config, void* context) {
|
|
ModuleGateContext* gate_ctx = (ModuleGateContext*)context;
|
|
if (!config)
|
|
return "missing config frame";
|
|
/* Operator veto: --no-super forces SUPER_MODE_OFF for this connection before
|
|
the copy-as gate is evaluated. The received config is const, so the gates
|
|
below evaluate a shallow effective copy (only super_mode differs); the
|
|
handler applies the recorded override to the accepted config exactly once. */
|
|
Config effective = *config;
|
|
if (server_no_super) {
|
|
effective.super_mode = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
|
|
if (gate_ctx)
|
|
gate_ctx->super_mode_override = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
|
|
}
|
|
/* C3: a privileged (root) STANDALONE receiver defaults to SUPER_MODE_OFF.
|
|
* Without this a client --devices/--write-devices/--super would let a root
|
|
* server create arbitrary device nodes and write raw devices, and
|
|
* client-chosen ownership (--numeric-ids/--chown/--usermap/--groupmap) would
|
|
* be applied, with no operator opt-in. The operator must pass --allow-super
|
|
* to restore the historical permissive behavior; the flag is rejected for
|
|
* --stdio, whose client-composed argv must never defeat this default (an
|
|
* operator exposing `fastsync-server --stdio` over SSH needs a forced command
|
|
* to keep the permissive behavior). An unprivileged receiver is unaffected
|
|
* (the kernel refuses the confined attempts) and the daemon path keeps its
|
|
* per-module `client owner = yes` gate. */
|
|
if (g_daemon_conf == NULL && geteuid() == 0 && !server_allow_super) {
|
|
effective.super_mode = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
|
|
if (gate_ctx)
|
|
gate_ctx->super_mode_override = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
|
|
}
|
|
/* --copy-as (P7 Wave E, protocol 2.18.0): FastSync's safe subset forces the
|
|
ownership of every written entry to the requested ids, which needs a
|
|
privileged (root) receiver. An unprivileged receiver REFUSES the whole
|
|
transfer here, at the config handshake and BEFORE the STATUS_OK ack, so no
|
|
file data is exchanged and there is never a silent wrong-ownership result.
|
|
The daemon's per-module client-chosen-ownership refusal is enforced after
|
|
the module lookup below (it needs the module's opt-in) and covers --copy-as
|
|
like every other ownership flag. */
|
|
if (identity_copy_as_refused(&effective)) {
|
|
if (geteuid() != 0)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as requires a privileged receiver (root); refusing");
|
|
else
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"--copy-as refused: super-user activities are disabled by the server "
|
|
"(--no-super); refusing");
|
|
return "cannot perform --copy-as on this receiver";
|
|
}
|
|
/* --iconv (protocol 2.16.0): the receiver's exact conversion direction (the
|
|
client spec's wire charset into this server's local charset, including a
|
|
server-side --iconv override) must be usable BEFORE the STATUS_OK ack, so
|
|
an impossible conversion is refused at the handshake instead of failing
|
|
the first file mid-transfer. The client spec itself was already sanity
|
|
checked by validate_received_config. */
|
|
if (config->iconv_spec &&
|
|
!charset_wire_receiver_spec_valid(config->iconv_spec, server_iconv_spec))
|
|
return "client --iconv conversion cannot be honored by this server";
|
|
bool is_daemon = g_daemon_conf != NULL;
|
|
bool has_module = config->module != NULL && config->module[0] != '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (!is_daemon) {
|
|
if (has_module)
|
|
return "client requested a daemon module but this server is not running "
|
|
"with --daemon";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!has_module)
|
|
return "daemon connection did not select a module (expected a "
|
|
"host::module/path destination)";
|
|
|
|
const char* error = NULL;
|
|
const DaemonModule* module = module_gate_lookup_module(config, &error);
|
|
if (!module)
|
|
return error;
|
|
/* Resolve the peer once, before any auth or ownership work, so the host ACL
|
|
* and the audit lines all use the same address. A module with ACLs fails
|
|
* closed when the peer cannot be classified; an ACL-free module continues
|
|
* (the accept loop still logged the address). */
|
|
if (gate_ctx) {
|
|
gate_ctx->has_peer_ip =
|
|
utils_fd_peer_ip(gate_ctx->fd, gate_ctx->peer_ip, sizeof(gate_ctx->peer_ip));
|
|
if (!gate_ctx->has_peer_ip)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "daemon module '%s': peer address unavailable", config->module);
|
|
/* utils_fd_peer_is_local is fail-closed (getpeername must succeed and report
|
|
* a loopback peer), so "cannot tell" is never treated as trusted. */
|
|
gate_ctx->is_local = utils_fd_peer_is_local(gate_ctx->fd);
|
|
}
|
|
error = module_gate_check_hosts(config, module, gate_ctx);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
error = module_gate_check_limits(config, module, gate_ctx);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
error = module_gate_check_ownership(config, module, gate_ctx);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return error;
|
|
switch (module_gate_authenticate(config, module, gate_ctx, &error)) {
|
|
case MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED:
|
|
return error;
|
|
case MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED:
|
|
return CONFIG_VALIDATE_ALREADY_TERMINATED;
|
|
case MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* accepted; the authorized root is now the module's path */
|
|
return module_gate_install_root(config, module);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void handler(int file_descriptor) {
|
|
SSL* ssl = io_get_ssl();
|
|
ProtocolSession session;
|
|
protocol_session_init(&session, file_descriptor, file_descriptor);
|
|
protocol_session_set_ssl(&session, ssl);
|
|
protocol_session_bind(&session);
|
|
ModuleGateContext gate_ctx;
|
|
gate_ctx.ssl = ssl;
|
|
gate_ctx.fd = file_descriptor;
|
|
gate_ctx.super_mode_override = -1;
|
|
gate_ctx.has_peer_ip = false;
|
|
gate_ctx.peer_ip[0] = '\0';
|
|
gate_ctx.is_local = false;
|
|
/* All teardown state starts empty so the single `done` epilogue is safe to
|
|
* reach from any error path (including before the config frame arrives). */
|
|
Config* config = NULL;
|
|
PipelineContextReceiver* context = NULL;
|
|
char* joined_destination = NULL;
|
|
bool charset_ready = false;
|
|
config = config_receive_with_validate(file_descriptor, server_module_gate, &gate_ctx);
|
|
if (config == NULL) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to receive config");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Apply the super-mode veto the gate decided on (operator --no-super, or a
|
|
* daemon module without the `client owner = yes` opt-in) exactly once, so
|
|
* every downstream gate (identity_apply_ownership via privilege_super_permitted,
|
|
* device-node creation) sees SUPER_MODE_OFF. The gate never mutated the
|
|
* received config. */
|
|
if (gate_ctx.super_mode_override != -1)
|
|
config->super_mode = (SuperMode)gate_ctx.super_mode_override;
|
|
/* Install the codec this connection negotiated before the receiver/writer
|
|
* threads start (the server forks per connection, so the process-global
|
|
* codec is private to this session). */
|
|
compression_set_algo((CompressionAlgo)config->compression_algo);
|
|
/* If the client requested ownership but the effective super mode forbids it
|
|
* (operator --no-super, a privileged standalone receiver's secure default, or
|
|
* a daemon module without `client owner = yes`), say so ONCE per connection so
|
|
* a successful -a/-o/-g transfer is not mistaken for preserved ownership. */
|
|
if (config->super_mode == SUPER_MODE_OFF && identity_ownership_requested(config))
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"requested ownership will NOT be applied: super-user activities are disabled "
|
|
"for this connection (operator veto, or module without `client owner = yes`)");
|
|
protocol_set_8_bit_output(config->eight_bit_output);
|
|
/* Server-side per-message protocol deadline for every frame from here on.
|
|
* `timeout` is not serialized, so this is the server's own config (the server
|
|
* has no --timeout CLI and defaults it to 0). A client's --timeout tightens
|
|
* only that client's own protocol I/O; the server floors its own deadline at
|
|
* SERVER_IO_TIMEOUT_SEC so a silent peer can never hold a session slot
|
|
* forever (the socket layer gets the same floor at startup). */
|
|
protocol_session_set_io_timeout(&session, protocol_server_io_timeout_sec(config->timeout));
|
|
const char* authorized_root = utils_get_authorized_root_path();
|
|
if (!authorized_root) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "No server-side destination root configured");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!allow_unauthenticated && ssl == NULL) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected unauthenticated plaintext connection");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl && required_client_cn && !tls_client_identity_allowed(ssl)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected TLS client with unauthorized identity");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Daemon mode: the module's root is the authorized root (installed by
|
|
server_module_gate), and the client's destination is a MODULE-RELATIVE
|
|
path. Reject an absolute destination up front so the module-relative
|
|
confinement contract is never eroded by a client that tries to address the
|
|
module root by absolute path. */
|
|
if (g_daemon_conf && config->receive_root_directory && config->receive_root_directory[0] == '/') {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected absolute daemon destination (must be relative to the "
|
|
"selected module root)");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
char* destination = config->receive_root_directory;
|
|
if (destination && destination[0] != '/')
|
|
joined_destination = path_cat(authorized_root, destination);
|
|
if (joined_destination)
|
|
destination = joined_destination;
|
|
if (!destination || has_path_traversal(destination) ||
|
|
!path_is_within(authorized_root, destination)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected destination outside authorized root");
|
|
free(joined_destination);
|
|
joined_destination = NULL;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (joined_destination) {
|
|
free(config->receive_root_directory);
|
|
config->receive_root_directory = joined_destination;
|
|
joined_destination = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!config->receive_root_directory) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
config->use_delete = config->use_delete && allow_delete;
|
|
/* --force (receiver-side) is deletion authority too: it lets an incoming
|
|
* regular file recursively remove a non-empty destination directory tree, and
|
|
* lets --delete-missing-args remove a non-empty directory mirror. Without
|
|
* the operator's --allow-delete it must be inert, exactly like --delete and
|
|
* --delete-missing-args, so a client cannot use --force to bypass the delete
|
|
* policy. */
|
|
config->force_delete = config->force_delete && allow_delete;
|
|
/* --iconv (protocol 2.16.0): install the receiver-side wire->local conversion
|
|
now that the client's full CONVERT_SPEC has been received and validated,
|
|
before any received file name is decoded. The server's own --iconv (if
|
|
any) may override the local charset; a spec the client is known to have
|
|
validated cannot fail here unless the server's override names an
|
|
unsupported charset. */
|
|
if (config->iconv_spec) {
|
|
if (!charset_wire_init_receiver(config->iconv_spec, server_iconv_spec)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
|
|
"--iconv: unsupported charset conversion requested (LOCAL[,REMOTE])");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
charset_ready = true;
|
|
}
|
|
/* --delete-missing-args deletes destination mirrors receiver-side, so it is
|
|
deletion and stays gated by the same --allow-delete server policy. When
|
|
the server policy is off the flag is inert (the missing entries are still
|
|
skipped via its implied --ignore-missing-args, but nothing is deleted). */
|
|
config->delete_missing_args = config->delete_missing_args && allow_delete;
|
|
/* --mkpath: create the destination root (and its missing leading components)
|
|
* before anything else; without it the root must pre-exist. The precondition
|
|
* is UNCONDITIONAL: a server-contacting --dry-run must reject exactly the
|
|
* root a real session would reject, so a client cannot set the wire dry_run
|
|
* bit to relax it. Dry-run only runs the existence/directory check (never
|
|
* --mkpath) so it creates nothing while still failing closed. A failure here
|
|
* aborts the connection cleanly before any file data is exchanged. */
|
|
bool root_ok = config->dry_run ? receive_root_exists(config) : ensure_receive_root(config);
|
|
if (!root_ok) {
|
|
char* escaped_root = output_escape(config->receive_root_directory, log_get_8_bit_output());
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "destination root is not available: %s",
|
|
escaped_root ? escaped_root : "<allocation failed>");
|
|
free(escaped_root);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* A --delay-updates transfer stages under a private 0700 directory inside
|
|
the receive root. Create it up front (wiping leftovers of any previously
|
|
interrupted delayed transfer) so a fully-skipped run also starts clean.
|
|
A dry-run stages nothing, so the staging tree is never created. */
|
|
if (config->delay_updates && !config->dry_run) {
|
|
config->delay_context = delay_updates_context_create(config->receive_root_directory);
|
|
if (!config->delay_context || !delay_updates_prepare(config->delay_context)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to initialize --delay-updates staging area");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Preserve the negotiated identity policy for the fd-relative ownership
|
|
apply path. Each connection is its own forked process, so this
|
|
per-process snapshot never races another connection. A failed deep copy
|
|
(allocation failure) leaves the snapshot cleared, so refuse the connection
|
|
rather than silently applying the wrong ownership policy. */
|
|
if (!identity_set_active(config)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to activate identity policy");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Persist the negotiated --keep-dirlinks policy once, here at config-accept,
|
|
before any multithreaded receiver/writer threads are spawned, so the
|
|
fd-walk reads a stable value during the whole transfer (and never bleeds
|
|
across the per-connection forked processes). */
|
|
file_set_keep_dirlinks(config->keep_dirlinks);
|
|
/* --trust-sender is a LOCAL receiver policy: it never crosses the wire (so a
|
|
wire peer can never enable it). The standalone server only honours it when
|
|
its own CLI was started with --trust-sender (the client forwards that switch
|
|
into the remote argv via --remote-option=--trust-sender; the server then
|
|
parses it here and applies the policy below). Set before any multithreaded
|
|
receiver/writer threads are spawned so the fd-walk reads a stable value
|
|
during the whole transfer, and never bleeds across the per-connection
|
|
forked processes. Off by default. */
|
|
file_set_trust_sender(trust_sender);
|
|
/* Wave C MOTD: on the daemon listener path only, once the module gate + auth
|
|
have accepted and every destination check has passed, send the configured
|
|
`motd file` as the first server->client frame before any transfer data
|
|
(rsync sends its MOTD as the first thing from the server on a daemon
|
|
connection). Every daemon connection gets the frame -- an unset or
|
|
unreadable motd file sends an empty string -- so the client's read is
|
|
deterministic and an absent file is never an error. The --stdio SSH path
|
|
has no MOTD (g_daemon_conf is NULL there). No PROTOCOL_VERSION bump: the
|
|
frame is symmetric server->client in every 2.15.0 daemon build (see the
|
|
Wave C note in config.h). */
|
|
if (g_daemon_conf) {
|
|
char* motd = motd_read_file(g_daemon_conf->global.motd_file);
|
|
if (!motd_send(file_descriptor, motd ? motd : "")) {
|
|
free(motd);
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to send daemon MOTD");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
free(motd);
|
|
}
|
|
if (config->use_multithreading) {
|
|
Queue* q = queue_create(100, file_destroy);
|
|
if (q == NULL)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
context = pipeline_context_receiver_create(config, q, file_descriptor, ssl);
|
|
if (context == NULL) {
|
|
queue_destroy(q);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
protocol_session_set_max_alloc(&context->session, config->max_alloc);
|
|
protocol_session_set_io_timeout(&context->session,
|
|
protocol_server_io_timeout_sec(config->timeout));
|
|
atomic_store(&context->session.total_allocated_bytes,
|
|
atomic_load(&session.total_allocated_bytes));
|
|
pipeline_context_receiver_set_queue_byte_limit(context, RECEIVER_QUEUE_MAX_BYTES);
|
|
thrd_t receiver = {0};
|
|
thrd_t writer = {0};
|
|
bool receiver_created = thrd_create(&receiver, receive_thread, context) == thrd_success;
|
|
bool writer_created = false;
|
|
if (receiver_created)
|
|
writer_created = thrd_create(&writer, write_thread, context) == thrd_success;
|
|
if (!receiver_created || !writer_created) {
|
|
log_perror("Error creating Threads");
|
|
if (receiver_created) {
|
|
mtx_lock(&context->mutex);
|
|
atomic_store(&context->cancelled, true);
|
|
cnd_broadcast(&context->condition_not_full);
|
|
cnd_broadcast(&context->condition_not_empty);
|
|
mtx_unlock(&context->mutex);
|
|
/* Unblock a worker parked in socket I/O without closing the fd (the
|
|
* child owns the single close). shutdown() only affects sockets; for
|
|
* the --stdio pipe the receiver's per-message poll timeout still
|
|
* bounds the join, so do nothing there rather than close a descriptor
|
|
* another thread may still be using. */
|
|
struct stat fd_stat;
|
|
if (fstat(file_descriptor, &fd_stat) == 0 && S_ISSOCK(fd_stat.st_mode))
|
|
shutdown(file_descriptor, SHUT_RDWR);
|
|
thrd_join(receiver, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
if (writer_created)
|
|
thrd_join(writer, NULL);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
int receiver_result;
|
|
int writer_result;
|
|
thrd_join(receiver, &receiver_result);
|
|
thrd_join(writer, &writer_result);
|
|
bool transfer_ok = receiver_result == thrd_success && writer_result == thrd_success;
|
|
if (transfer_ok && !config->dry_run) {
|
|
/* Commit-style (late) deletion: receive_thread handed the keep-set
|
|
manifest here instead of deleting while write_thread might still be
|
|
draining, so by now every file is on disk and the whole transfer is
|
|
known to have succeeded. Remove the extras before publishing a
|
|
--delay-updates run; the walker skips the staging directory. A
|
|
server-contacting --dry-run deletes nothing (no manifest is sent). */
|
|
if (context->deferred_manifest) {
|
|
size_t deleted = 0;
|
|
DeletePathObserver observer = config->report_deletes ? receiver_record_deleted_path : NULL;
|
|
DeleteCommitResult deletion = manifest_delete_all_observed(
|
|
config, context->deferred_manifest, &deleted, observer, (void*)context->deleted_paths);
|
|
context->stats.deleted_files += deleted;
|
|
if (deletion == DELETE_COMMIT_ERROR) {
|
|
transfer_ok = false;
|
|
} else if (deletion == DELETE_COMMIT_LIMIT_REACHED) {
|
|
/* The transfer still succeeds; the terminal frame reports the capped
|
|
deletion so the sender exits 25 like rsync. */
|
|
context->delete_limit_reached = true;
|
|
}
|
|
delete_manifest_free(context->deferred_manifest);
|
|
context->deferred_manifest = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* --delete-delay: receive_thread snapshotted each plan's extras as it
|
|
arrived; with the disk writer drained, commit the deferred removals.
|
|
--delete-during already applied its plans on the receive thread. */
|
|
if (context->deferred_plans) {
|
|
/* Defence in depth (the enclosing block already excludes dry-run): a
|
|
-n run never commits a deletion. */
|
|
if (config->report_deletes)
|
|
delete_plan_session_set_delete_observer(
|
|
context->deferred_plans, receiver_record_deleted_path, (void*)context->deleted_paths);
|
|
DeleteCommitResult deletion =
|
|
config->dry_run ? DELETE_COMMIT_OK
|
|
: delete_plan_session_commit(context->deferred_plans, config);
|
|
context->stats.deleted_files += delete_plan_session_deleted(context->deferred_plans);
|
|
if (deletion == DELETE_COMMIT_ERROR) {
|
|
transfer_ok = false;
|
|
} else if (deletion == DELETE_COMMIT_LIMIT_REACHED) {
|
|
context->delete_limit_reached = true;
|
|
}
|
|
delete_plan_session_destroy(context->deferred_plans);
|
|
context->deferred_plans = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (transfer_ok && !config->dry_run) {
|
|
/* --delay-updates: receive_thread has finished the whole protocol stream
|
|
(including manifest/delete handling) and write_thread has drained its
|
|
queue, so every staged file is complete. Publish atomically before the
|
|
success/outcome frame so a --remove-source-files sender only learns of
|
|
files that were actually installed. */
|
|
if (config->delay_updates && config->delay_context &&
|
|
!delay_updates_publish(config->delay_context, config)) {
|
|
transfer_ok = false;
|
|
}
|
|
/* P7 Wave D: all writers have joined and the late deletion (and
|
|
--delay-updates publication) has committed above, so it is finally safe
|
|
to stamp directory times; a directory's mtime must not be clobbered by
|
|
its children or by an extra removal. */
|
|
if (transfer_ok)
|
|
dir_metadata_list_apply(&context->dir_times, config->receive_root_directory, config);
|
|
}
|
|
if (transfer_ok) {
|
|
Status final_status = context->delete_limit_reached ? STATUS_DELETE_LIMIT : STATUS_OK;
|
|
/* Emit the optional wire-stats record first (protocol 2.25.0), then the
|
|
success/outcome frame, exactly like the single-threaded receiver. */
|
|
if (!receiver_send_stats_frame(file_descriptor, config, &context->stats,
|
|
context->would_delete, context->deleted_paths) ||
|
|
!receiver_send_final_success(file_descriptor, config, &context->outcomes, final_status))
|
|
transfer_ok = false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
send_error_detail(file_descriptor, "transfer failed on receiver");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!transfer_ok)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Transfer failed");
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (receiver_receive_files(config, file_descriptor) != 0)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Transfer failed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
/* Single cleanup epilogue: every error path jumps here, so the iconv
|
|
* receiver conversion is released, the identity snapshot cleared, the
|
|
* protocol session unbound and the config freed exactly once. The
|
|
* connection fd is deliberately NOT closed here -- the child functions own
|
|
* its single close (plain_child_fn / tls_child_fn), and the --stdio call
|
|
* site must leave stdin/stdout open. */
|
|
if (charset_ready)
|
|
charset_wire_free();
|
|
/* The delay-updates staging tree is released by config_delete (which the
|
|
branch below always reaches), so it is cleaned exactly once. */
|
|
identity_clear_active();
|
|
protocol_session_unbind();
|
|
if (context != NULL) {
|
|
/* context owns both the config and the queue it was created with. */
|
|
pipeline_context_receiver_destroy(context);
|
|
context = NULL;
|
|
config = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
config_delete(config);
|
|
config = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
free(joined_destination);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FASTSYNC_SERVER_AS_LIB
|
|
static Server* g_server = NULL;
|
|
|
|
static void cleanup(int sig) {
|
|
(void)sig;
|
|
if (g_server)
|
|
server_delete(&g_server);
|
|
daemon_conf_free(g_daemon_conf);
|
|
g_daemon_conf = NULL;
|
|
credentials_free(g_credentials);
|
|
g_credentials = NULL;
|
|
_exit(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void print_server_usage(void) {
|
|
printf("FastSync Server\n");
|
|
printf("Usage: fastsync-server [options]\n\n");
|
|
printf("Options:\n");
|
|
printf(" --stdio Run in stdio mode (SSH transport)\n");
|
|
printf(" --daemon Run as a persistent daemon listener using a module\n");
|
|
printf(" config file (-p/config port; default 873)\n");
|
|
printf(" --config=FILE Daemon config file (default: ~/.config/fastsync/\n");
|
|
printf(" fastsyncd.conf, else /etc/fastsyncd.conf)\n");
|
|
printf(" --dparam=KEY=VALUE Override one global config key on the command line\n");
|
|
printf(" (port, motd file, address, max connections,\n");
|
|
printf(" max connections per host, auth failure delay,\n");
|
|
printf(" auth lockout threshold, auth lockout duration,\n");
|
|
printf(" hosts allow, hosts deny)\n");
|
|
printf(" --no-detach Stay in the foreground (default detaches to\n");
|
|
printf(" background when running --daemon)\n");
|
|
printf(" --password-file=FILE FastSync-native SCRAM/PBKDF2 credential store (NOT\n");
|
|
printf(" rsync's auth scheme) for modules that declare 'auth\n");
|
|
printf(" users' (line format:\n");
|
|
printf(" user:$fastsync$1$pbkdf2-sha256$iters$salt$stored$server,\n");
|
|
printf(" generated by --hash-credentials). Legacy\n");
|
|
printf(" user:SHA256HEX lines are rejected. Requires\n");
|
|
printf(" --daemon; an auth-required module with no store\n");
|
|
printf(" refuses to start\n");
|
|
printf(" --early-input=FILE Second credential store layered over\n");
|
|
printf(" --password-file (same format); usually a secrets-\n");
|
|
printf(" manager/process-substitution file. Requires --daemon\n");
|
|
printf(" -p, --port <port> TCP port (default: 8080, range: 1-65535)\n");
|
|
printf(" --tls Enable TLS encryption\n");
|
|
printf(" --cert <path> TLS certificate file (PEM)\n");
|
|
printf(" --key <path> TLS private key file (PEM)\n");
|
|
printf(" --ca <path> TLS CA certificate file (PEM)\n");
|
|
printf(" --client-cn <name> TLS client certificate CN (mandatory with --tls)\n");
|
|
printf(" --destination-root <path> Authorized destination root (default: .)\n");
|
|
printf(" --address <addr> Bind the listening socket to this address\n");
|
|
printf(" -4, --ipv4 Bind an IPv4 socket (default)\n");
|
|
printf(" -6, --ipv6 Bind an IPv6 socket\n");
|
|
printf(" --allow-delete Permit manifest deletion\n");
|
|
printf(" --trust-sender Trust the remote sender's file list (receiver-local;\n");
|
|
printf(" this server-side flag is the only one that matters -- a\n");
|
|
printf(" client --trust-sender is never sent to the server)\n");
|
|
printf(" --no-super Operator veto: never attempt super-user activities\n");
|
|
printf(" (ownership, device nodes) even as root, and refuse\n");
|
|
printf(" any client --copy-as/--super request\n");
|
|
printf(" --allow-super Standalone TCP listener only: keep super-user\n");
|
|
printf(" activities enabled for a root receiver. Without it a\n");
|
|
printf(" root standalone server forces SUPER_MODE_OFF, so client\n");
|
|
printf(" --devices/--write-devices/--super and ownership\n");
|
|
printf(" requests are refused/skipped. Never honored with\n");
|
|
printf(" --stdio (the SSH remote argv is client-composed, so\n");
|
|
printf(" super stays off there); no effect when not root\n");
|
|
printf(" --iconv=LOCAL[,REMOTE] Declare this server's LOCAL charset for file-name\n");
|
|
printf(" conversion: received names are translated to this\n");
|
|
printf(" charset (the wire charset still comes from the\n");
|
|
printf(" client's CONVERT_SPEC). A name that cannot be\n");
|
|
printf(" represented fails the run cleanly\n");
|
|
printf(" --allow-unauthenticated Allow plaintext/anonymous network clients\n");
|
|
printf(" (an auth-required module still accepts only opted-in\n");
|
|
printf(" loopback plaintext; remote auth requires verified TLS)\n");
|
|
printf(" --hash-credentials <file> Read <file>'s user:password lines and print\n");
|
|
printf(" PBKDF2 credential-store lines to stdout, then exit.\n");
|
|
printf(" Use the output as --password-file for --daemon;\n");
|
|
printf(" redirect it to an owner-only (0600) file\n");
|
|
printf(" --iterations N PBKDF2 iteration count for --hash-credentials\n");
|
|
printf(" (default %u, range %u-%u)\n", CREDENTIAL_DEFAULT_ITERS,
|
|
CREDENTIAL_MIN_ITERS, CREDENTIAL_MAX_ITERS);
|
|
printf(" -v, --verbose Enable debug logging\n");
|
|
printf(" --help Show this help\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Resolve the daemon config default: ~/.config/fastsync/fastsyncd.conf when it
|
|
* exists (or when HOME is set), otherwise /etc/fastsyncd.conf. Returns a
|
|
* pointer to a static buffer (never NULL). */
|
|
static const char* default_daemon_config_path(void) {
|
|
const char* home = getenv("HOME");
|
|
if (home && *home) {
|
|
static char user_path[PATH_MAX];
|
|
int n = snprintf(user_path, sizeof(user_path), "%s/.config/fastsync/fastsyncd.conf", home);
|
|
if (n > 0 && (size_t)n < sizeof(user_path) && access(user_path, R_OK) == 0)
|
|
return user_path;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fall back to the traditional system path. */
|
|
return "/etc/fastsyncd.conf";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Detach from the controlling terminal: fork, exit the parent, and make the
|
|
* surviving child a session leader (setsid) with stdio redirected to
|
|
* /dev/null. The listening socket is already open (bound in main before this
|
|
* runs), so it is inherited by the background daemon. Returns true on
|
|
* success (in the daemon's own process). */
|
|
static bool daemonize(void) {
|
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
|
if (pid < 0)
|
|
return false;
|
|
if (pid > 0)
|
|
_exit(0);
|
|
if (setsid() < 0)
|
|
return false;
|
|
pid = fork();
|
|
if (pid < 0)
|
|
return false;
|
|
if (pid > 0)
|
|
_exit(0);
|
|
int devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
|
|
if (devnull >= 0) {
|
|
dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
|
|
dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO);
|
|
dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO);
|
|
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
|
|
close(devnull);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Do not pin the launch CWD (module-relative 'path' entries would resolve
|
|
* against an unstable working directory). Set a conservative daemon umask
|
|
* of 022 (the conventional service default): rsync never forces umask 0 --
|
|
* it reads and restores the inherited umask and creates new entries as
|
|
* 0777 & ~umask / source & ~umask without -p. Forcing 0 here made every
|
|
* implied parent directory world-writable (0777) whenever -p metadata was not
|
|
* applied. 022 gives 0755 directories and source&~022 files, matching rsync
|
|
* under a normal daemon umask; -p/-a still restore the exact source mode via
|
|
* fchmod, which is unaffected by the umask. */
|
|
if (chdir("/") != 0)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "daemon: chdir to / failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
umask(022);
|
|
/* Refresh the cached umask: main() captured the launch umask before this
|
|
* (single-threaded) umask(022), and file_mode_base() must see the daemon's
|
|
* actual umask. */
|
|
file_umask_capture();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
|
|
/* Capture the process umask now, while still single-threaded: the cached
|
|
* value is what file_mode_base() uses, and reading it later would race with
|
|
* receiver threads creating files. */
|
|
file_umask_capture();
|
|
ServerCliOptions opts;
|
|
char cli_err[512];
|
|
int parse_result = server_cli_parse(argc, argv, &opts, cli_err, sizeof(cli_err));
|
|
if (parse_result == 1) {
|
|
print_server_usage();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (parse_result < 0) {
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", cli_err);
|
|
print_server_usage();
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* --hash-credentials: standalone offline tool; read user:password lines and
|
|
* emit new-format credential-store lines, then exit. */
|
|
if (opts.hash_credentials_file) {
|
|
uint32_t iters = opts.hash_iterations_set ? opts.hash_iterations : CREDENTIAL_DEFAULT_ITERS;
|
|
/* The output is secret material: if it is redirected to a regular file,
|
|
* warn when that file is group/other-accessible (the store must be 0600). */
|
|
struct stat out_st;
|
|
if (fstat(STDOUT_FILENO, &out_st) == 0 && S_ISREG(out_st.st_mode) &&
|
|
(out_st.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) != 0)
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"Warning: credential-store output is a group/other-accessible file; restrict it to "
|
|
"mode 0600 (chmod 600)\n");
|
|
char hash_err[512];
|
|
if (credentials_hash_file(opts.hash_credentials_file, iters, stdout, hash_err,
|
|
sizeof(hash_err)) != 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", hash_err);
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int exit_code = 0;
|
|
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
|
|
if (opts.verbose) {
|
|
set_log_level(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG);
|
|
set_log_debug_flags(LOG_DEBUG_ALL);
|
|
}
|
|
if (opts.tls_ca && !opts.use_tls)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "--ca has no effect without --tls");
|
|
/* Persist the parsed server policies into the process-global policy state
|
|
* BEFORE the stdio branch: an SSH-launched `--stdio` server (whose argv came
|
|
* from the client via --remote-option and friends) must honor --allow-delete,
|
|
* --trust-sender and --client-cn exactly like the standalone listener. */
|
|
required_client_cn = opts.client_cn;
|
|
allow_delete = opts.allow_delete;
|
|
trust_sender = opts.trust_sender;
|
|
allow_unauthenticated = opts.allow_unauthenticated;
|
|
server_no_super = opts.no_super;
|
|
/* --stdio rejects --allow-super at parse time; force it off here as well so
|
|
* this process-global policy cannot be re-enabled by a future caller. */
|
|
server_allow_super = opts.allow_super && !opts.stdio_mode;
|
|
server_iconv_spec = opts.iconv_spec;
|
|
signal(SIGINT, cleanup);
|
|
signal(SIGTERM, cleanup);
|
|
/* Server-owned socket deadline floor: the client default --timeout=0 would
|
|
* otherwise leave accepted sockets without SO_RCVTIMEO/SO_SNDTIMEO and let a
|
|
* silent peer hold a connection (and its process slot) forever. */
|
|
tcp_set_timeouts(SERVER_IO_TIMEOUT_SEC, SERVER_IO_TIMEOUT_SEC);
|
|
|
|
if (opts.stdio_mode) {
|
|
/* SSH authenticates the stdio transport outside of FastSync. */
|
|
allow_unauthenticated = true;
|
|
if (!configure_authorization(opts.destination_root)) {
|
|
char* escaped = output_escape(opts.destination_root, false);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid destination root '%s'\n",
|
|
escaped ? escaped : "<allocation failed>");
|
|
free(escaped);
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
io_set_fds(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
|
|
/* handler() does not own the stdio fds: it never closes its descriptor
|
|
* argument, so STDIN/STDOUT stay open for this (single-shot) SSH session
|
|
* and are released by process exit. */
|
|
handler(STDIN_FILENO);
|
|
release_authorization();
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int port = opts.port;
|
|
int bind_family = opts.bind_family;
|
|
const char* bind_address = opts.bind_address;
|
|
|
|
if (opts.daemon_mode) {
|
|
const char* config_path = opts.config_path ? opts.config_path : default_daemon_config_path();
|
|
g_daemon_conf = daemon_conf_load(config_path, cli_err, sizeof(cli_err));
|
|
if (!g_daemon_conf) {
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", cli_err);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < opts.dparam_count; i++) {
|
|
if (daemon_conf_apply_dparam(g_daemon_conf, opts.dparams[i], cli_err, sizeof(cli_err)) != 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: --dparam: %s\n", cli_err);
|
|
exit_code = 1;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Effective port: -p (highest) > --dparam port > config port (default 873). */
|
|
if (!opts.port_set)
|
|
port = g_daemon_conf->global.port;
|
|
if (!bind_address)
|
|
bind_address = g_daemon_conf->global.address;
|
|
if (g_daemon_conf->module_count == 0)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon config has no modules; every connection will be refused");
|
|
/* Surface the operator's client-chosen-ownership opt-in prominently: an
|
|
opted-in module lets its clients request arbitrary owner ids inside that
|
|
module root. */
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < g_daemon_conf->module_count; i++) {
|
|
if (g_daemon_conf->modules[i].client_owner)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon module '%s' allows client-chosen ownership and super-user device "
|
|
"activities (`client owner = yes`); clients may request arbitrary owner ids "
|
|
"and device nodes within that module root -- pair it with `auth users` "
|
|
"unless the module is intentionally open to the network",
|
|
g_daemon_conf->modules[i].name);
|
|
if (g_daemon_conf->modules[i].max_connections > 0)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_INFO,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': per-module 'max connections' cap = %d (enforced "
|
|
"across all connection children)",
|
|
g_daemon_conf->modules[i].name, g_daemon_conf->modules[i].max_connections);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Daemon credential store (Wave B). --password-file and --early-input
|
|
* feed the same store, loaded BEFORE the listener forks so every
|
|
* connection child shares one read-only store. Fail closed at startup: a
|
|
* module that declares `auth users` without a store (or with an empty
|
|
* store) refuses to start rather than serving a module whose credentials
|
|
* can never be verified. */
|
|
g_credentials =
|
|
credentials_load(opts.password_file, opts.early_input_file, cli_err, sizeof(cli_err));
|
|
if (!g_credentials) {
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", cli_err);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
bool credential_source_given = opts.password_file != NULL || opts.early_input_file != NULL;
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < g_daemon_conf->module_count; i++) {
|
|
const DaemonModule* module = &g_daemon_conf->modules[i];
|
|
if (module->auth_user_count == 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!credential_source_given) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"Error: module '%s' declares 'auth users' but no credential store was given "
|
|
"(--password-file or --early-input); refusing to start (fail closed)\n",
|
|
module->name);
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (credentials_store_size(g_credentials) == 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"Error: module '%s' declares 'auth users' but the credential store is empty; "
|
|
"refusing to start (fail closed)\n",
|
|
module->name);
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
for (int j = 0; j < module->auth_user_count; j++) {
|
|
if (!credentials_store_has(g_credentials, module->auth_users[j]))
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon module '%s': auth user '%s' has no credential store entry; that "
|
|
"user can never authenticate",
|
|
module->name, module->auth_users[j]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Shared cross-process registry for the per-module / per-source caps and
|
|
* the auth lockout. Created HERE in the parent before any accept-loop
|
|
* fork; every connection child inherits the mapping. A failure degrades to
|
|
* "registry disabled" (the global cap and host ACLs still apply) rather
|
|
* than refusing to start. */
|
|
g_daemon_limits = daemon_limits_create((int)g_daemon_conf->global.max_connections,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->module_count,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.max_connections_per_host,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.auth_lockout_threshold,
|
|
g_daemon_conf->global.auth_lockout_duration_sec);
|
|
if (!g_daemon_limits)
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
|
|
"daemon: could not allocate the shared connection registry; per-module / "
|
|
"per-host caps and the cross-process auth lockout are disabled (the global "
|
|
"'max connections' cap and host ACLs still apply)");
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!configure_authorization(opts.destination_root)) {
|
|
char* escaped = output_escape(opts.destination_root, false);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid destination root '%s'\n",
|
|
escaped ? escaped : "<allocation failed>");
|
|
free(escaped);
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ServerBindOptions bind_opts;
|
|
bind_opts.bind_address = bind_address;
|
|
bind_opts.family = bind_family;
|
|
g_server = server_create_ex(port, &bind_opts);
|
|
if (!g_server) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to create server");
|
|
release_authorization();
|
|
exit_code = 1;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
if (g_daemon_conf)
|
|
server_set_max_connections(g_server, (unsigned int)g_daemon_conf->global.max_connections);
|
|
if (g_daemon_limits)
|
|
server_set_limit_registry(g_server, g_daemon_limits);
|
|
if (opts.use_tls) {
|
|
if (!opts.tls_cert || !opts.tls_key || !opts.tls_ca || !opts.client_cn) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Error: --tls requires --cert, --key, --ca, and --client-cn\n");
|
|
server_delete(&g_server);
|
|
release_authorization();
|
|
exit_code = 1;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
tls_global_init();
|
|
if (!server_create_tls(g_server, opts.tls_cert, opts.tls_key, opts.tls_ca)) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to set up TLS");
|
|
server_delete(&g_server);
|
|
release_authorization();
|
|
exit_code = 1;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Detach after the listening socket (and TLS context) exist so the
|
|
* background daemon inherits a fully-bound listener. --no-detach runs in
|
|
* the foreground, which is how tests drive the daemon. */
|
|
if (opts.daemon_mode && !opts.no_detach) {
|
|
if (!daemonize()) {
|
|
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to daemonize");
|
|
server_delete(&g_server);
|
|
release_authorization();
|
|
exit_code = 1;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (opts.use_tls)
|
|
server_listen_tls(g_server, handler);
|
|
else
|
|
server_listen(g_server, handler);
|
|
server_delete(&g_server);
|
|
release_authorization();
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
daemon_limits_destroy(g_daemon_limits);
|
|
g_daemon_limits = NULL;
|
|
daemon_conf_free(g_daemon_conf);
|
|
g_daemon_conf = NULL;
|
|
credentials_free(g_credentials);
|
|
g_credentials = NULL;
|
|
server_cli_options_free(&opts);
|
|
return exit_code;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|