TapTap
47de05d215
- write_all_sparse: skips all-zero runs >= 4096 bytes via lseek(SEEK_CUR) and ftruncates the final size, wired into the atomic temp+rename and --inplace paths with no wire change (full image already in memory). - --partial retention: on a save failure after the temp held data, rename the already-written temp to the destination path (best-effort; falls through to unlink; never retains when --partial is off) so --append/--append-verify can resume; tested by forcing futimens EINVAL with an out-of-range nsec. - --block-size aliases --delta-block; verified config->delta_block_size is honored by the delta engine end-to-end (unit + integration tests). - fake_super_restore_fd: parses and re-applies user.fastsync.stat fd-relative (fchown best-effort/non-root skipped, fchmod, futimens); a save under --fake-super now both records and re-applies. - -N/--crtimes and --stderr=client promoted to a new 'Impossible/Divergence' status bucket (Summary: 136/2/4/3/2 = 147). - cppcheck/clang-format clean; unit 37/37; integration 407 passed.
145 lines
8.6 KiB
C
145 lines
8.6 KiB
C
#ifndef FILE_H
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#define FILE_H
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#include "file_send.h"
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#include "file_receive.h"
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#include "file_types.h"
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#include "checksum.h"
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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/* File/FileMetadata lifecycle, local disk helpers, and secure filesystem
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primitives shared by the send/receive pipelines. */
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File* file_create(const char* path);
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void file_destroy(void* item);
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bool file_load_data(File* file);
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/* Compute the whole-file content digest of `file` with the negotiated
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* --checksum-choice algorithm and --checksum-seed. Writes the digest into
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* `out` (capacity `out_capacity`) and its length into `*out_len`. Returns
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* false on read/allocation failure or when the digest would not fit. */
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bool file_checksum(File* file, ChecksumAlgo algo, uint64_t seed, uint8_t* out, size_t out_capacity,
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size_t* out_len);
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size_t file_content_to_buffer(File* file);
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FileMetadata* file_metadata_create(const char* path, const struct stat* stats, bool capture_atime,
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bool capture_crtime);
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void file_metadata_destroy(void* metadata);
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/* --open-noatime process-wide sender policy; see file.c. */
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void file_set_open_noatime(bool enable);
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bool file_get_open_noatime(void);
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/* Open `path` read-only for transfer, honouring --open-noatime when set. */
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int file_open_for_read(const char* path);
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bool file_write_to_disk(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
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bool inplace, bool sparse);
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/* Symlink trust-boundary helpers (Phase 4, symlink wave). --munge-links
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* sender-side marker: every transmitted symlink target is prefixed with this
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* while the flag is on; the receiver strips it to restore the real target. */
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#define SYMLINK_MUNGE_PREFIX "#SYMLINK/"
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char* file_symlink_munge(const char* target);
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/* True when a lexical target is relative and contains no ".." component, so it
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* can never escape the receive root once created beneath it. */
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bool file_symlink_target_contained(const char* target);
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/* Strip a leading SYMLINK_MUNGE_PREFIX from `target` (mutable, in place);
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* returns true when a marker was removed. */
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bool file_symlink_unmunge(char* target);
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/* Create a symlink at `path` -> `target`, confined below the authorized root
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* (O_NOFOLLOW parent walk, symlinkat; the target is never followed). Returns
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* false when a directory already occupies `path`. */
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bool file_symlink_at_secure(const char* path, const char* target);
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/* --keep-dirlinks (-K) receiver process-wide policy: allow an in-root existing
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* symlink-to-directory to be followed as a directory. */
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void file_set_keep_dirlinks(bool enable);
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bool file_get_keep_dirlinks(void);
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/* --trust-sender receiver process-wide policy (Phase 5). When set, the
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* receiver trusts that the sender already produced a clean file list and skips
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* its own redundant up-front re-validation of incoming paths (the empty/".."
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* rejection and the escaping-symlink-target containment). The low-level
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* fd-relative confinement primitives below are deliberately NOT disabled by
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* this flag, so a hostile sender still cannot escape the authorized root. */
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void file_set_trust_sender(bool enable);
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bool file_get_trust_sender(void);
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/* A configured fd without a canonical identity deliberately rejects paths. */
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bool file_set_authorized_root(int fd, const char* canonical_path);
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/* Secure path/filesystem primitives (symlink-safe, O_NOFOLLOW, root-confined). */
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bool file_path_exists_secure(const char* path);
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bool file_stat_secure(const char* path, struct stat* st);
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bool file_destination_is_newer_secure(const char* path, const FileMetadata* metadata);
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int file_open_secure_parent(const char* path, char** leaf_out, bool create_dirs);
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bool file_ensure_directory_secure(const char* path);
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bool file_directory_exists_secure(const char* path);
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bool file_rename_secure(const char* old_path, const char* new_path);
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/* Remove the whole directory tree at `path` (confined, symlink-safe). Used by
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--force to clear a non-empty destination directory that blocks an incoming
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regular file. See the .c for the exact success semantics. */
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bool file_remove_tree_secure(const char* path);
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/* Open a private 0700 directory (creating it on demand) that must live below
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the authorized root. Used for the --temp-dir scratch directory and the
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--delay-updates staging directory. */
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int file_open_private_dir(const char* dir_path);
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/* The file_to_disk_secure* variants write a temporary copy in the destination
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directory and atomically rename it over `path`. temp_dir is an absolute,
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root-confined scratch directory (already validated by the caller): when it
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is non-NULL the temporary copy is instead created there (with a name unique
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across the whole scratch directory) and atomically renamed into the
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destination directory once fully written and fsynced. A rename across
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filesystems (EXDEV) fails the write with an error; the file is never
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silently copied into place. Pass NULL for the historical same-directory
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behavior. --inplace writes never use temp_dir. */
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bool file_to_disk_secure(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
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bool inplace, bool sparse, bool preallocate, const FileMetadata* metadata,
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bool preserve_executability, const char* temp_dir);
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bool file_to_disk_secure_with_fsync(const char* path, const void* data,
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unsigned long long data_size, bool inplace, bool sparse,
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bool preallocate, const FileMetadata* metadata,
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bool preserve_executability, bool use_fsync,
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const char* temp_dir);
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/* With update enabled, an existing newer destination is left untouched. The
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check is descriptor-based for inplace writes; atomic replacement still has
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an unavoidable final rename race without filesystem locking. */
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bool file_to_disk_secure_update(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
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bool inplace, bool sparse, bool preallocate,
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const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
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const char* temp_dir);
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bool file_to_disk_secure_no_replace(const char* path, const void* data,
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unsigned long long data_size, bool sparse, bool preallocate,
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const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
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const char* temp_dir);
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/* Receiver write-path variant that also applies per-file xattrs (-X/-A) and the
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* --fake-super stat xattr fd-relative before the final rename. `update` /
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* `no_replace` / `use_fsync` mirror the plain wrappers above; `keep_partial`
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* enables --partial best-effort retention of a failed write's temp. */
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bool file_to_disk_secure_attrs(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
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bool inplace, bool sparse, bool preallocate,
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const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
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bool update, bool no_replace, bool use_fsync,
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const FileXattrList* xattrs, bool fake_super, bool keep_partial,
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const char* temp_dir);
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/* Atomic --link-dest install: replace `path` with a hard link to `basis_path`
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(via a temp name + rename); fall back to a byte-identical local copy from
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`data` when the link is impossible (EXDEV/EPERM/unsupported filesystem).
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`metadata` is applied only on the copy fallback. `preallocate` applies to
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that copy fallback only (a hard-linked file shares the basis inode and is
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never re-allocated). */
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bool file_to_disk_secure_link(const char* path, const char* basis_path, const void* data,
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unsigned long long data_size, bool preallocate,
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const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
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bool use_fsync, const char* temp_dir);
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/* Like file_to_disk_secure_link, but the byte-copy fallback also applies the
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* per-file xattrs (-X/-A) and --fake-super stat xattr (fd-relative). On a
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* successful hard link no attributes are applied (the shared inode already
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* carries the basis's). */
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bool file_to_disk_secure_link_attrs(const char* path, const char* basis_path, const void* data,
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unsigned long long data_size, bool preallocate,
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const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
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bool use_fsync, const FileXattrList* xattrs, bool fake_super,
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const char* temp_dir);
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#endif
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