#ifndef FILE_H
#define FILE_H

#include "file_send.h"
#include "file_receive.h"
#include "file_types.h"
#include "checksum.h"
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

/* File/FileMetadata lifecycle, local disk helpers, and secure filesystem
   primitives shared by the send/receive pipelines. */

File* file_create(const char* path);
void file_destroy(void* item);
bool file_load_data(File* file);
/* Compute the whole-file content digest of `file` with the negotiated
 * --checksum-choice algorithm and --checksum-seed.  Writes the digest into
 * `out` (capacity `out_capacity`) and its length into `*out_len`.  Returns
 * false on read/allocation failure or when the digest would not fit. */
bool file_checksum(File* file, ChecksumAlgo algo, uint64_t seed, uint8_t* out, size_t out_capacity,
                   size_t* out_len);
size_t file_content_to_buffer(File* file);
FileMetadata* file_metadata_create(const char* path, const struct stat* stats, bool capture_atime,
                                   bool capture_crtime);
void file_metadata_destroy(void* metadata);
/* --open-noatime process-wide sender policy; see file.c. */
void file_set_open_noatime(bool enable);
bool file_get_open_noatime(void);
/* Open `path` read-only for transfer, honouring --open-noatime when set. */
int file_open_for_read(const char* path);
bool file_write_to_disk(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
                        bool inplace, bool sparse);

/* A configured fd without a canonical identity deliberately rejects paths. */
bool file_set_authorized_root(int fd, const char* canonical_path);

/* Secure path/filesystem primitives (symlink-safe, O_NOFOLLOW, root-confined). */
bool file_path_exists_secure(const char* path);
bool file_stat_secure(const char* path, struct stat* st);
bool file_destination_is_newer_secure(const char* path, const FileMetadata* metadata);
int file_open_secure_parent(const char* path, char** leaf_out, bool create_dirs);
bool file_ensure_directory_secure(const char* path);
bool file_directory_exists_secure(const char* path);
bool file_rename_secure(const char* old_path, const char* new_path);
/* Remove the whole directory tree at `path` (confined, symlink-safe).  Used by
   --force to clear a non-empty destination directory that blocks an incoming
   regular file.  See the .c for the exact success semantics. */
bool file_remove_tree_secure(const char* path);
/* Open a private 0700 directory (creating it on demand) that must live below
   the authorized root.  Used for the --temp-dir scratch directory and the
   --delay-updates staging directory. */
int file_open_private_dir(const char* dir_path);

/* The file_to_disk_secure* variants write a temporary copy in the destination
   directory and atomically rename it over `path`.  temp_dir is an absolute,
   root-confined scratch directory (already validated by the caller): when it
   is non-NULL the temporary copy is instead created there (with a name unique
   across the whole scratch directory) and atomically renamed into the
   destination directory once fully written and fsynced.  A rename across
   filesystems (EXDEV) fails the write with an error; the file is never
   silently copied into place.  Pass NULL for the historical same-directory
   behavior.  --inplace writes never use temp_dir. */
bool file_to_disk_secure(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
                         bool inplace, bool sparse, bool preallocate, const FileMetadata* metadata,
                         bool preserve_executability, const char* temp_dir);
bool file_to_disk_secure_with_fsync(const char* path, const void* data,
                                    unsigned long long data_size, bool inplace, bool sparse,
                                    bool preallocate, const FileMetadata* metadata,
                                    bool preserve_executability, bool use_fsync,
                                    const char* temp_dir);
/* With update enabled, an existing newer destination is left untouched.  The
   check is descriptor-based for inplace writes; atomic replacement still has
   an unavoidable final rename race without filesystem locking. */
bool file_to_disk_secure_update(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
                                bool inplace, bool sparse, bool preallocate,
                                const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
                                const char* temp_dir);
bool file_to_disk_secure_no_replace(const char* path, const void* data,
                                    unsigned long long data_size, bool sparse, bool preallocate,
                                    const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
                                    const char* temp_dir);
/* Receiver write-path variant that also applies per-file xattrs (-X/-A) and the
 * --fake-super stat xattr fd-relative before the final rename.  `update` /
 * `no_replace` / `use_fsync` mirror the plain wrappers above. */
bool file_to_disk_secure_attrs(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
                               bool inplace, bool sparse, bool preallocate,
                               const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
                               bool update, bool no_replace, bool use_fsync,
                               const FileXattrList* xattrs, bool fake_super, const char* temp_dir);
/* Atomic --link-dest install: replace `path` with a hard link to `basis_path`
   (via a temp name + rename); fall back to a byte-identical local copy from
   `data` when the link is impossible (EXDEV/EPERM/unsupported filesystem).
   `metadata` is applied only on the copy fallback.  `preallocate` applies to
   that copy fallback only (a hard-linked file shares the basis inode and is
   never re-allocated). */
bool file_to_disk_secure_link(const char* path, const char* basis_path, const void* data,
                              unsigned long long data_size, bool preallocate,
                              const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
                              bool use_fsync, const char* temp_dir);
/* Like file_to_disk_secure_link, but the byte-copy fallback also applies the
 * per-file xattrs (-X/-A) and --fake-super stat xattr (fd-relative).  On a
 * successful hard link no attributes are applied (the shared inode already
 * carries the basis's). */
bool file_to_disk_secure_link_attrs(const char* path, const char* basis_path, const void* data,
                                    unsigned long long data_size, bool preallocate,
                                    const FileMetadata* metadata, bool preserve_executability,
                                    bool use_fsync, const FileXattrList* xattrs, bool fake_super,
                                    const char* temp_dir);

#endif