fix(audit): security, correctness, refactors, docs (no wire change) #306

Merged
TapTap merged 44 commits from fix/audit-cycle into dev 2026-09-21 22:23:33 +02:00
11 changed files with 309 additions and 98 deletions
Showing only changes of commit 423a62e691 - Show all commits
+10 -4
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@@ -1178,13 +1178,19 @@ static bool daemonize(void) {
close(devnull);
}
/* Do not pin the launch CWD (module-relative 'path' entries would resolve
* against an unstable working directory) and drop the restrictive host umask
* so modules can create files/dirs with the modes the config requests. */
* against an unstable working directory). Set a conservative daemon umask
* of 022 (the conventional service default): rsync never forces umask 0 --
* it reads and restores the inherited umask and creates new entries as
* 0777 & ~umask / source & ~umask without -p. Forcing 0 here made every
* implied parent directory world-writable (0777) whenever -p metadata was not
* applied. 022 gives 0755 directories and source&~022 files, matching rsync
* under a normal daemon umask; -p/-a still restore the exact source mode via
* fchmod, which is unaffected by the umask. */
if (chdir("/") != 0)
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "daemon: chdir to / failed: %s", strerror(errno));
umask(0);
umask(022);
/* Refresh the cached umask: main() captured the launch umask before this
* (single-threaded) umask(0), and file_mode_base() must see the daemon's
* (single-threaded) umask(022), and file_mode_base() must see the daemon's
* actual umask. */
file_umask_capture();
return true;
+43 -9
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@@ -1136,17 +1136,51 @@ int file_open_private_dir(const char* dir_path) {
return fd;
}
/* Open a --temp-dir scratch directory exactly as rsync does: the directory must
* already exist and is used as given (an absolute path is used verbatim, a
* relative one was already resolved against the destination root by the
* caller). Unlike file_open_private_dir this neither creates it nor confines
* it below the receive root, because rsync accepts any temp dir -- including
* one outside the destination tree or on another filesystem. Returns an
* O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC fd, or -1 on error. */
/* Open a --temp-dir scratch directory. The directory must already exist (rsync
* never creates it); a relative path was already resolved against the
* destination root by the caller. Unlike file_open_private_dir this neither
* creates it nor requires it to be a direct child of the receive root, because
* rsync permits a scratch dir that (via a symlink) lands on another filesystem
* -- but it MUST resolve inside the authorized receive root. The directory is
* opened following symlinks and then judged by the REAL path of the opened fd
* (through /proc/self/fd), so a client-planted symlink under the receive root
* can never redirect receiver scratch files outside the sandbox while an
* in-root link to another filesystem (the EXDEV fallback case) still works.
* Returns an O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC fd, or -1 on error (errno set; an escaping
* target is reported as EACCES with a logged reason). */
int file_open_temp_dir(const char* dir_path) {
if (!dir_path)
return -1;
return open(dir_path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
int fd = open(dir_path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
const char* root = utils_get_authorized_root_path();
if (!root) {
/* No authorized root (e.g. a local batch apply): nothing to confine
against, so preserve the historical open-as-given behavior. */
return fd;
}
char fd_path[64];
int fd_path_length = snprintf(fd_path, sizeof(fd_path), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
char resolved[PATH_MAX];
if (fd_path_length < 0 || (size_t)fd_path_length >= sizeof(fd_path) ||
!realpath(fd_path, resolved)) {
int saved_errno = errno;
close(fd);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (!path_is_within_root(root, resolved)) {
char* escaped = output_escape(dir_path, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
"--temp-dir '%s' resolves outside the authorized receive root; refusing",
escaped ? escaped : "<allocation failed>");
free(escaped);
close(fd);
errno = EACCES;
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
/* After the content and mode/times are restored on the just-written file, apply
@@ -1859,6 +1893,6 @@ bool file_write_to_disk(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long d
bool inplace, bool sparse) {
if (!path || (!data && data_size != 0) || has_path_traversal(path))
return false;
FileAttrPolicy policy = {false, false, false, false};
FileAttrPolicy policy = {0};
return file_to_disk_secure(path, data, data_size, inplace, sparse, false, NULL, policy, NULL);
}
+6 -2
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@@ -103,8 +103,12 @@ bool file_remove_tree_secure(const char* path);
the authorized root. Used for the --delay-updates staging directory. */
int file_open_private_dir(const char* dir_path);
/* Open an existing --temp-dir scratch directory as-is (absolute or relative;
no creation, no root confinement), matching rsync's --temp-dir handling. */
/* Open an existing --temp-dir scratch directory (relative or absolute; no
creation). When an authorized receive root is configured the directory's
REAL path (symlinks resolved) must lie within it, so a client-planted
symlink cannot redirect receiver scratch files outside the sandbox; an
in-root symlink to another filesystem is still allowed for rsync's EXDEV
fallback. */
int file_open_temp_dir(const char* dir_path);
/* The file_to_disk_secure* variants write a temporary copy in the destination
+6
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@@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ typedef struct FileAttrPolicy {
bool times; /* config->preserve_times: apply the source mtime */
bool atimes; /* config->preserve_atimes (-U): apply the source atime */
bool executability; /* config->use_executability (-E): exec-bits-only mode */
/* privilege_super_mode_permitted(): when false (SUPER_MODE_OFF / --no-super,
or a daemon that did not grant `client owner = yes`), the setuid/setgid/
sticky bits are stripped from every applied mode (source mode and any
--chmod result) even under --perms. When true, rsync's exact semantics are
preserved: -p copies the special bits and the kernel decides. */
bool super_permitted;
} FileAttrPolicy;
/* Build the per-attribute policy from a connection's Config. A NULL config
+10 -2
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@@ -474,9 +474,13 @@ static FileSaveResult file_save_special_to_disk(const char* root_directory, cons
/* Under -p/--perms rsync copies the source's permission and special bits; a
* kernel that denies setuid/setgid/sticky reports the failure rather than
* having them masked here. Without -p the node is created like any other new
* entry: source_mode & 0777 & ~umask. */
* entry: source_mode & 0777 & ~umask. When super-user activities are
* forbidden, the special bits are stripped even under -p (they are
* super-user activities just like device-node creation). */
mode_t perms = config->preserve_perms ? (mode & (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0777))
: (mode & 0777 & ~(mode_t)file_process_umask());
if (!privilege_super_mode_permitted(config->super_mode))
perms &= ~(mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX);
int rc = is_fifo ? mkfifoat(parent_fd, leaf, perms)
: mknodat(parent_fd, leaf, create_mode | perms, rdev);
@@ -2949,8 +2953,12 @@ void dir_metadata_list_apply(const DirTimeList* list, const char* root_directory
}
if (mode_ready) {
/* rsync -p copies the source directory mode exactly, including
* group/other write and the setgid/sticky bits. */
* group/other write and the setgid/sticky bits. Setuid/setgid/sticky
* are super-user activities: when the connection forbade them
* (SUPER_MODE_OFF / --no-super), strip them even under -p. */
mode_t safe_mode = dir_mode & (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0777);
if (!privilege_super_mode_permitted(config->super_mode))
safe_mode &= ~(mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX);
if (dir_fd < 0) {
char* escaped_path = output_escape(dir_path, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "Failed to open directory %s to set its mode: %s",
+20 -5
View File
@@ -211,13 +211,22 @@ FileMetadata* metadata_receive(int file_descriptor, int* ok) {
bool metadata_mode_for_policy(mode_t source_mode, mode_t current_mode, FileAttrPolicy policy,
mode_t* out_mode) {
const mode_t special_bits = (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX);
const mode_t execute_bits = S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH;
if (policy.perms) {
/* rsync --perms copies the source's permission and special bits exactly,
* including group/other write and setuid/setgid/sticky. The kernel may
* still clear setgid when the receiver is not in the file's group; the
* caller logs a failed chmod rather than silently masking the bits here. */
*out_mode = source_mode & (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0777);
* caller logs a failed chmod rather than silently masking the bits here.
* Setuid/setgid/sticky are super-user activities: when the connection did
* not permit them (SUPER_MODE_OFF / --no-super) they are stripped, so a
* client can never install a privileged bit on a receiver that forbade
* super-user activities. This also covers bits introduced by --chmod,
* whose result is fed in as source_mode. */
mode_t bits = source_mode & (mode_t)(special_bits | 0777);
if (!policy.super_permitted)
bits &= ~special_bits;
*out_mode = bits;
return true;
}
if (policy.executability) {
@@ -227,8 +236,11 @@ bool metadata_mode_for_policy(mode_t source_mode, mode_t current_mode, FileAttrP
* execute); otherwise clear every execute bit. This runs on the
* destination-derived base (pre-existing dest mode, or source&~umask for a
* new file), and leaves the special bits untouched. --perms wins when both
* are set (handled above). */
mode_t base = current_mode & (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0777);
* are set (handled above). The destination's own special bits survive
* unless super-user activities are forbidden. */
mode_t base = current_mode & (mode_t)(special_bits | 0777);
if (!policy.super_permitted)
base &= ~special_bits;
if (source_mode & 0111)
*out_mode = base | ((base & 0444) >> 2);
else
@@ -240,12 +252,13 @@ bool metadata_mode_for_policy(mode_t source_mode, mode_t current_mode, FileAttrP
}
FileAttrPolicy file_attr_policy_from_config(const Config* config) {
FileAttrPolicy policy = {false, false, false, false};
FileAttrPolicy policy = {0};
if (config) {
policy.perms = config->preserve_perms;
policy.times = config->preserve_times;
policy.atimes = config->preserve_atimes;
policy.executability = config->use_executability;
policy.super_permitted = privilege_super_mode_permitted(config->super_mode);
}
return policy;
}
@@ -314,6 +327,8 @@ bool file_restore_symlink_metadata(const char* path, const FileMetadata* metadat
transfer never fails over it. */
if (policy.perms) {
mode_t link_mode = metadata->mode & (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0777);
if (!policy.super_permitted)
link_mode &= ~(mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX);
if (fchmodat(parent_fd, leaf, link_mode, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0 && errno != EOPNOTSUPP &&
errno != ENOTSUP && errno != ENOSYS) {
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Could not set symlink mode on %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+15
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@@ -332,6 +332,21 @@ class TestDaemonModuleSelection:
assert not missing, f"missing: {missing[:5]}"
assert not mismatches, f"mismatch: {mismatches[:5]}"
def test_daemon_new_dirs_not_world_writable(self, daemon):
"""The daemon must not force umask 0: implied parent directories created
without -p are the source default (0755 under a 022 umask), never
world-writable 0777."""
sub = os.path.join(FILES_MODULE, "umask_check")
shutil.rmtree(sub, ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(sub, exist_ok=True)
result = _push("127.0.0.1::files/umask_check", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr or result.stdout
received = get_dest_received_dir(sub, SOURCE_DIR)
nested = os.path.join(received, "nested")
assert os.path.isdir(nested), f"nested dir missing under {received}"
mode = stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(nested).st_mode)
assert (mode & 0o022) == 0, f"implied directory is group/other writable: {oct(mode)}"
class TestDaemonRejection:
def _tree_files(self):
+49 -25
View File
@@ -2606,35 +2606,30 @@ class TestTimeoutAndAllocLimits:
mismatches, missing = verify_transfer(source, received)
assert not missing and not mismatches
def test_temp_dir_cross_filesystem_fallback(self, shared_server):
"""A confined relative --temp-dir that resolves (via a symlink under the
destination root) to another filesystem must fall back to a non-atomic
copy instead of aborting (rsync parity). Skipped when no second
filesystem is available."""
shm = "/dev/shm"
if not os.path.isdir(shm):
pytest.skip("/dev/shm not available")
if os.stat(shm).st_dev == os.stat(TEST_DATA_DIR).st_dev:
pytest.skip("/dev/shm is on the same filesystem as the test data")
scratch = os.path.join(shm, f"fastsync_tmp_{os.getpid()}")
shutil.rmtree(scratch, ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(scratch)
def test_temp_dir_symlink_escape_rejected(self, shared_server):
"""A symlink planted inside the destination root pointing outside it
must not redirect receiver scratch files: --temp-dir=<that link> is
refused and nothing is written at the link target. An in-root symlink
(e.g. to a mount point that stays inside the authorized root) is still
accepted, preserving the engine's EXDEV cross-filesystem fallback."""
source, dest = self._seed("tempdir_escape_src")
outside = "/tmp/fastsync_tempdir_escape_%d" % os.getpid()
shutil.rmtree(outside, ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(outside)
link = os.path.join(dest, "escape_scratch")
if os.path.lexists(link):
os.unlink(link)
os.symlink(outside, link)
try:
source, dest = self._seed("tempdir_xdev_src")
# The receiver resolves a relative temp dir under the destination
# root; a symlink there points the scratch at the second filesystem.
link = os.path.join(dest, "xdev_scratch")
os.symlink(scratch, link)
result, _ = run_client(source, dest, flags=["--temp-dir", "xdev_scratch"],
result, _ = run_client(source, dest, flags=["--temp-dir", "escape_scratch"],
port=shared_server.port)
assert result.returncode == 0, f"cross-fs temp-dir failed: {result.stderr[:300]}"
assert result.returncode != 0, "an escaping --temp-dir symlink must be refused"
received = get_dest_received_dir(dest, source)
mismatches, missing = verify_transfer(source, received)
assert not missing, f"Missing: {missing}"
assert not mismatches, f"Mismatch: {mismatches}"
assert os.listdir(scratch) == [], "temp files left behind in the cross-fs scratch"
assert not os.path.exists(os.path.join(received, "f.txt")), \
"the receiver must not fall back to writing the file"
assert os.listdir(outside) == [], "receiver wrote outside the authorized root"
finally:
shutil.rmtree(scratch, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(outside, ignore_errors=True)
class TestRemoteOptionTransport:
@@ -5782,6 +5777,35 @@ class TestStandaloneSuperDefault:
"standalone server accepted --copy-as without --allow-super"
)
@pytest.mark.skipif(
os.geteuid() != 0,
reason="root triggers the SUPER_MODE_OFF default and can create setuid sources",
)
def test_special_bits_masked_without_allow_super(self):
"""A root standalone server without --allow-super forces SUPER_MODE_OFF,
so client-supplied setuid/setgid/sticky bits must be stripped even under
-p (they are super-user activities just like device-node creation)."""
source = os.path.join(TEST_DATA_DIR, "super_default_mode_src")
dest = os.path.join(TEST_DATA_DIR, "super_default_mode_dst")
clean_dir(source)
clean_dir(dest)
src_file = os.path.join(source, "priv.sh")
with open(src_file, "wb") as f:
f.write(b"#!/bin/sh\necho hi\n")
os.chmod(src_file, 0o4755)
server = ServerManager()
server.start() # deliberately no --allow-super -> SUPER_MODE_OFF as root
try:
result, _ = run_client(source, dest, flags=["-p"], port=server.port)
finally:
server.stop()
assert result.returncode == 0, f"exit {result.returncode}: {(result.stderr or '')[:200]}"
received = get_dest_received_dir(dest, source)
mode = stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(os.path.join(received, "priv.sh")).st_mode)
assert (mode & (stat.S_ISUID | stat.S_ISGID | stat.S_ISVTX)) == 0, \
f"--no-super receiver kept a privileged bit: {oct(mode)}"
assert (mode & 0o777) == 0o755, f"ordinary permission bits lost: {oct(mode)}"
@pytest.mark.skipif(os.geteuid() != 0, reason="root can create the source device node")
def test_devices_skipped_without_allow_super(self):
"""Root standalone server without --allow-super must skip device-node
+81 -16
View File
@@ -377,6 +377,70 @@ static void test_file_save_to_disk_temp_dir_confined() {
rmdir(outside);
}
/* A client-planted symlink under the receive root must never redirect the
* --temp-dir scratch directory outside the authorized root: the REAL path of
* the opened dir is checked. An in-root symlink (the EXDEV cross-filesystem
* case) must still be accepted. */
static void test_file_open_temp_dir_symlink_confinement() {
const char* root = "test_tempdir_link_root";
const char* outside = "test_tempdir_link_outside";
char root_abs[PATH_MAX];
char outside_abs[PATH_MAX];
unlink("test_tempdir_link_root/escape");
unlink("test_tempdir_link_root/inside_link");
rmdir("test_tempdir_link_root/scratch");
rmdir(root);
rmdir(outside);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(root, 0755), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(outside, 0755), 0);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(realpath(root, root_abs));
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(realpath(outside, outside_abs));
int root_fd = open(root_abs, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC);
EXPECT_TRUE(root_fd >= 0);
// cppcheck-suppress knownConditionTrueFalse
if (root_fd < 0) {
rmdir(root);
rmdir(outside);
return;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(utils_set_authorized_root(root_fd, root_abs));
/* An existing in-root scratch dir opens normally. */
char* scratch = path_cat(root_abs, "scratch");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(scratch);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(scratch, 0755), 0);
int scratch_fd = file_open_temp_dir(scratch);
EXPECT_TRUE(scratch_fd >= 0);
if (scratch_fd >= 0)
close(scratch_fd);
/* A symlink whose target is outside the root is refused. */
char* escape = path_cat(root_abs, "escape");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(escape);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(symlink(outside_abs, escape), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(file_open_temp_dir(escape), -1);
/* A symlink that stays inside the root is accepted (EXDEV fallback path). */
char* inside_link = path_cat(root_abs, "inside_link");
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(inside_link);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(symlink(scratch, inside_link), 0);
int link_fd = file_open_temp_dir(inside_link);
EXPECT_TRUE(link_fd >= 0);
if (link_fd >= 0)
close(link_fd);
free(inside_link);
free(escape);
free(scratch);
utils_set_authorized_root(-1, NULL);
close(root_fd);
unlink("test_tempdir_link_root/escape");
unlink("test_tempdir_link_root/inside_link");
rmdir("test_tempdir_link_root/scratch");
rmdir(root);
rmdir(outside);
}
/* Issue #251: file_save_to_disk_full must distinguish receiver-side skips
(--existing/--ignore-existing/--update) from real writes so the sender can
decide whether --remove-source-files may unlink its source. */
@@ -1040,8 +1104,8 @@ static void test_atomic_no_perms_preserves_destination_mode() {
/* No -p/-E: the pre-existing 0640 survives the atomic overwrite. */
bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, "data", 4, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true}, false,
false, false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -1049,8 +1113,8 @@ static void test_atomic_no_perms_preserves_destination_mode() {
/* -p: the source mode wins. */
ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, "data2", 5, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false}, false, false, false,
NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false, true}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 0777), 0755);
@@ -1060,8 +1124,8 @@ static void test_atomic_no_perms_preserves_destination_mode() {
source 0755 gives 0750, not 0751 and not the scratch 0711. */
EXPECT_EQ_INT(chmod(path, 0640), 0);
ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, "data3", 6, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true}, false, false, false,
NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 0777), 0750);
@@ -1073,8 +1137,8 @@ static void test_atomic_no_perms_preserves_destination_mode() {
const char* fresh = "test_attr_split_fresh.txt";
unlink(fresh);
ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(fresh, "data", 4, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false}, false, false, false,
NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(fresh, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 0777), (int)(m.mode & 0777 & ~(mode_t)file_process_umask()));
@@ -1083,8 +1147,8 @@ static void test_atomic_no_perms_preserves_destination_mode() {
/* Without any metadata the historical fixed 0644 default still applies. */
unlink(fresh);
ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(fresh, "data", 4, false, false, false, NULL,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false}, false, false, false,
NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(fresh, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(st.st_mode & 0777), 0644);
@@ -1104,8 +1168,8 @@ static void test_new_file_mode_honors_source_and_umask() {
m.gid = getegid();
bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, "x", 1, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true}, false,
false, false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -1663,8 +1727,8 @@ static void test_file_write_to_disk_partial_retention() {
m.atime_valid = false;
m.crtime_valid = false;
bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, content, strlen(content), false, false, true, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, true, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false, true}, false,
false, false, NULL, false, true, NULL);
EXPECT_FALSE(ok); /* the write itself succeeded, but metadata restore failed */
/* Retained: the already-written temp now sits at the destination path. */
int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
@@ -1683,8 +1747,8 @@ static void test_file_write_to_disk_partial_retention() {
/* Same failure with keep_partial=false: temp is unlinked, nothing retained. */
ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, content, strlen(content), false, false, true, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false}, false, false, false,
NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false, true}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_FALSE(ok);
EXPECT_TRUE(access(path, F_OK) == -1);
}
@@ -2264,6 +2328,7 @@ void test_file() {
test_file_save_to_disk_ignore_existing_entry_types();
test_file_save_to_disk_partial_install();
test_file_save_to_disk_temp_dir_confined();
test_file_open_temp_dir_symlink_confinement();
test_file_save_to_disk_reports_skips();
test_file_write_to_disk_sparse_preserves_holes();
test_file_write_to_disk_partial_retention();
+66 -32
View File
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void test_file_restore_metadata_applies_atime() {
m.crtime_sec = 0;
m.crtime_nsec = 0;
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){true, true, true, false});
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){true, true, true, false, true});
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static void test_file_restore_metadata() {
.atime_valid = false,
.crtime_valid = false};
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false});
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false, true});
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static void test_file_restore_executability_only() {
FileMetadata m = {
.mode = 0751, .uid = getuid(), .gid = getgid(), .mtime_sec = 0, .mtime_nsec = 0};
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true});
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true});
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static void test_directory_restore_executability_only() {
FileMetadata m = {
.mode = 0755, .uid = getuid(), .gid = getgid(), .mtime_sec = 0, .mtime_nsec = 0};
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true});
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true});
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static void test_file_restore_executability_rsync_rule() {
EXPECT_TRUE(file_write_to_disk(path, "x", 1, false, false));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(chmod(path, cases[i].dest), 0);
FileMetadata m = {.mode = cases[i].src, .uid = getuid(), .gid = getgid()};
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true});
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true});
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(st.st_mode & 0777, cases[i].want);
@@ -453,34 +453,60 @@ static void test_file_restore_executability_rsync_rule() {
* bits from the destination and --perms wins when both are set. */
static void test_metadata_mode_for_policy() {
mode_t out = 0xdead;
EXPECT_FALSE(
metadata_mode_for_policy(0777, 0644, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false}, &out));
EXPECT_FALSE(metadata_mode_for_policy(0777, 0644,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)out, 0xdead); /* untouched when no change is requested */
EXPECT_TRUE(
metadata_mode_for_policy(0777, 0644, (FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false}, &out));
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(0777, 0644,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 0777), 0777); /* group/other write is preserved */
mode_t specials = (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0672);
EXPECT_TRUE(
metadata_mode_for_policy(specials, 0644, (FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false}, &out));
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(specials, 0644,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0777)),
(int)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0672));
/* SUPER_MODE_OFF: the special bits are stripped even under -p (this also
* covers bits introduced by --chmod, whose result is fed in as source_mode),
* while the ordinary permission bits are still copied. */
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(specials, 0644,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false, false}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX)), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 0777), 0672);
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(04755, 0644,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false, false}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 07777), 0755);
/* The same holds for a special bit introduced by --chmod=+s. */
mode_t chmodded = 0;
EXPECT_TRUE(chmod_apply(0755, "u+s", &chmodded));
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(chmodded, 0644,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false, false}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 07777), 0755);
/* -E: a destination's own special bits survive unless super-user activities
* are forbidden, in which case they are stripped from the derived base. */
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(0755, (mode_t)(S_ISUID | 0750),
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & (S_ISUID | 0777)), (int)(S_ISUID | 0750));
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(0755, (mode_t)(S_ISUID | 0750),
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, false}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & (S_ISUID | 0777)), 0750);
/* -E: exec bits derive from the DESTINATION's read bits. */
EXPECT_TRUE(
metadata_mode_for_policy(0755, 0644, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true}, &out));
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(0755, 0644,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 0777), 0755);
EXPECT_TRUE(
metadata_mode_for_policy(0644, 0755, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true}, &out));
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(0644, 0755,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 0777), 0644);
EXPECT_TRUE(
metadata_mode_for_policy(0755, 0600, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true}, &out));
EXPECT_TRUE(metadata_mode_for_policy(0755, 0600,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 0777), 0700);
/* --perms wins over -E when both are set. */
EXPECT_TRUE(
metadata_mode_for_policy(0700, 0644, (FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, true}, &out));
metadata_mode_for_policy(0700, 0644, (FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, true, true}, &out));
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)(out & 0777), 0700);
}
@@ -493,8 +519,8 @@ static void test_new_file_mode_from_source_and_umask() {
mode_t want = (mode_t)(0751 & 0777 & ~(mode_t)file_process_umask());
bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, "x", 1, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true}, false,
false, false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -503,8 +529,8 @@ static void test_new_file_mode_from_source_and_umask() {
/* -E on top of the source&~umask base (src 0751, umask 022 -> 0751). */
ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, "x", 1, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true}, false, false, false,
NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, true, true}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
mode_t want_e =
@@ -529,7 +555,7 @@ static void test_file_restore_attribute_split() {
.crtime_valid = false};
/* times only: mtime changes, mode stays 0640. */
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false});
file_restore_metadata(path, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false, true});
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(st.st_mode & 0777, 0640);
@@ -543,7 +569,7 @@ static void test_file_restore_attribute_split() {
FileMetadata m2 = m;
m2.mode = 0700;
m2.mtime_sec = 1600000000;
file_restore_metadata(path, &m2, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false});
file_restore_metadata(path, &m2, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true});
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(st.st_mode & 0777, 0640);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, 1000000000);
@@ -569,6 +595,11 @@ static void test_file_attr_policy_from_config() {
EXPECT_TRUE(p.times);
EXPECT_TRUE(p.atimes);
EXPECT_TRUE(p.executability);
/* Default super mode (AUTO) permits special bits. */
EXPECT_TRUE(p.super_permitted);
c->super_mode = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
p = file_attr_policy_from_config(c);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.super_permitted);
config_delete(c);
}
@@ -582,8 +613,8 @@ static void test_perms_preserves_special_bits() {
.mode = (mode_t)(S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | 0755), .uid = getuid(), .gid = getgid()};
bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_attrs(path, "x", 1, false, false, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false}, false, false,
false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
(FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false, true}, false,
false, false, NULL, false, false, NULL);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(stat(path, &st), 0);
@@ -670,7 +701,8 @@ static void test_file_restore_symlink_metadata() {
/* Positive path: a non-omitted apply stamps the link's own mtime. */
FileMetadata applied = {.mtime_sec = 1000000000, .mtime_nsec = 0};
file_restore_symlink_metadata(link, &applied, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false}, false);
file_restore_symlink_metadata(link, &applied, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false, true},
false);
struct stat st;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(lstat(link, &st), 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(S_ISLNK(st.st_mode));
@@ -679,7 +711,8 @@ static void test_file_restore_symlink_metadata() {
/* -J: a different time must be left untouched. */
FileMetadata newer = {.mtime_sec = 1234567890, .mtime_nsec = 0};
file_restore_symlink_metadata(link, &newer, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false}, true);
file_restore_symlink_metadata(link, &newer, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false, true},
true);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(lstat(link, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, (int)t1);
if (symlink_times_supported)
@@ -723,14 +756,14 @@ static void test_file_restore_metadata_fd_attribute_split() {
/* perms-only: mode applied, mtime untouched. */
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &before), 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false}));
EXPECT_TRUE(file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){true, false, false, false, true}));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(st.st_mode & 0777, 0755);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, (int)before.st_mtime);
/* times-only: mtime applied, mode untouched. */
EXPECT_EQ_INT(chmod(path, 0600), 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false}));
EXPECT_TRUE(file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, true, false, false, true}));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(st.st_mode & 0777, 0600);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, 1234567890);
@@ -740,7 +773,7 @@ static void test_file_restore_metadata_fd_attribute_split() {
{.tv_sec = 1000000000, .tv_nsec = 0}};
EXPECT_EQ_INT(futimens(fd, reset), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &before), 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, true, false}));
EXPECT_TRUE(file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, true, false, true}));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_atime, 999999999);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, (int)before.st_mtime);
@@ -753,7 +786,8 @@ static void test_file_restore_metadata_fd_attribute_split() {
m2.mode = 0700;
m2.mtime_sec = 1600000000;
m2.atime_sec = 1700000000;
EXPECT_TRUE(file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m2, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false}));
EXPECT_TRUE(
file_restore_metadata_fd(fd, &m2, (FileAttrPolicy){false, false, false, false, true}));
EXPECT_EQ_INT(fstat(fd, &st), 0);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(st.st_mode & 0777, 0640);
EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)st.st_mtime, 1000000000);
+3 -3
View File
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static void test_link_copy_fallback_preserves_xattrs() {
m.crtime_valid = false;
bool ok = file_to_disk_secure_link_attrs(dest, basis_dir, "payload", 7, false, &m,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false}, false,
(FileAttrPolicy){true, true, false, false, true}, false,
xattrs, true, NULL);
xattr_list_free(xattrs);
EXPECT_TRUE(ok);
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static void test_fake_super_restore() {
}
/* No xattr present yet: restore is a silent no-op (returns false, no crash). */
FileAttrPolicy policy = {true, true, false, false};
FileAttrPolicy policy = {true, true, false, false, true};
EXPECT_FALSE(fake_super_restore_fd(fd, policy));
fake_super_store_fd(fd, 1001, 1002, 0751, 1700000000, 123456789);
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static void test_fake_super_no_real_chown() {
fake_super_store_fd(fd, 12345, 12346, 0755, 1700000000, 0);
Config* c = config_create();
FileAttrPolicy policy = {true, true, false, false};
FileAttrPolicy policy = {true, true, false, false, true};
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
/* The strongest ownership request available plus permitted super mode. */
c->preserve_owner = true;