Merge Wave 2: thread-safety fixes (signals, fd ownership, handler epilogue, logging, scanner leak)

fix(server,log): non-socket shutdown fallback, drop redundant delay cleanup, unlock logging I/O
Merge branch 'fix/w2-scan' into fix/w2-integration
2026-09-13 02:13:27 +02:00 · 2026-09-13 02:13:22 +02:00 · 2026-09-13 01:49:44 +02:00 · 2026-09-13 01:49:44 +02:00 · 2026-09-13 01:49:27 +02:00 · 2026-09-13 01:44:59 +02:00
27 changed files with 1699 additions and 659 deletions
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ jobs:
    container: gitea.tap-tap.win/taptap/fastsync-ci:v10
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4

      - name: clang-format check
        run: find src/ tests/ -name '*.c' -o -name '*.h' | xargs clang-format --dry-run --Werror
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
    needs: lint
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4

      - name: Configure
        run: cmake -B build -S . -DSTRICT_WARNINGS=ON
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
        sanitizer: [address, undefined]
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4

      - name: Configure
        run: cmake -B build-${{ matrix.sanitizer }} -S . -DSANITIZER=${{ matrix.sanitizer }}
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ jobs:
    if: github.event_name == 'push'
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4

      - name: Configure (clang + fuzz)
        run: CC=clang CXX=clang++ cmake -B build-fuzz -S . -DENABLE_FUZZ=ON
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ jobs:
    if: github.event_name == 'push'
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4

      - name: Configure
        run: cmake -B build -S . -DENABLE_COVERAGE=ON
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ jobs:
    if: github.event_name == 'push'
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4

      - name: Configure
        run: cmake -B build -S . -DSTRICT_WARNINGS=ON
@@ -38,11 +38,24 @@ if(ENABLE_COVERAGE)
 	add_link_options(--coverage)
 endif()

+# --- Build hardening option ---
+# Production hardening is applied to the shipping server/client binaries only,
+# and only when no sanitizer or coverage instrumentation is active: sanitizers
+# carry their own instrumentation, and _FORTIFY_SOURCE requires an optimising
+# build (never the -O0 used for coverage).
+option(ENABLE_HARDENING "Enable compiler/linker hardening for production targets" ON)
+set(HARDENING_ACTIVE OFF)
+if(ENABLE_HARDENING AND SANITIZER STREQUAL "none" AND NOT ENABLE_COVERAGE)
+	set(HARDENING_ACTIVE ON)
+endif()
+
 include(FetchContent)
 FetchContent_Declare(
  xxhash
  GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/Cyan4973/xxHash
-  GIT_TAG v0.8.3
+  # v0.8.3 is a lightweight tag pointing at this exact commit (no ^{} peel
+  # entry); pin the commit SHA instead of the mutable tag.
+  GIT_TAG e626a72bc2321cd320e953a0ccf1584cad60f363 # v0.8.3
  SOURCE_SUBDIR cmake_unofficial
 )
 FetchContent_MakeAvailable(xxhash)
@@ -73,6 +86,33 @@ add_executable(client ${CLIENT_SRCS} ${SHARED_SRCS} ${FILE_STORE_SRCS} ${SERVER_
 target_include_directories(client PRIVATE src/shared src/server src/client)
 target_link_libraries(client PRIVATE Threads::Threads ${ZSTD_LIBRARY} OpenSSL::SSL OpenSSL::Crypto xxhash)

+# --- Production hardening ---
+# Each compile flag is probed so a compiler/architecture that lacks it still
+# configures cleanly.  _FORTIFY_SOURCE is guarded separately because it only
+# works in an optimising build.  xxHash is a static archive built by
+# FetchContent, so it must be position-independent for the -pie link.
+if(HARDENING_ACTIVE)
+	set_target_properties(xxhash PROPERTIES POSITION_INDEPENDENT_CODE ON)
+	include(CheckCCompilerFlag)
+	foreach(flag -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-clash-protection -fPIE)
+		string(MAKE_C_IDENTIFIER "HARDEN_${flag}" _harden_var)
+		check_c_compiler_flag("${flag}" ${_harden_var})
+	endforeach()
+	check_c_compiler_flag("-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" HARDEN_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+	foreach(target server client)
+		foreach(flag -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-clash-protection -fPIE)
+			string(MAKE_C_IDENTIFIER "HARDEN_${flag}" _harden_var)
+			if(${_harden_var})
+				target_compile_options(${target} PRIVATE ${flag})
+			endif()
+		endforeach()
+		if(HARDEN_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+			target_compile_options(${target} PRIVATE -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2)
+		endif()
+		target_link_options(${target} PRIVATE -pie -Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,noexecstack)
+	endforeach()
+endif()
+
 # --- Testing ---
 enable_testing()

@@ -338,9 +338,10 @@ static bool basis_oversize_preflight(const Config* config) {
    return false;
  DirectoryScanner* scanner =
      directory_scanner_create_with_options(config->send_directory, &prepared.options);
+  if (!scanner) {
    prepared_scanner_destroy(&prepared);
-  if (!scanner)
    return false;
+  }
  bool ok = true;
  Chunk* chunk;
  while ((chunk = directory_scanner_next(scanner)) != NULL) {
@@ -364,7 +365,10 @@ static bool basis_oversize_preflight(const Config* config) {
  }
  if (directory_scanner_failed(scanner) || directory_scanner_had_io_error(scanner))
    ok = false;
+  /* The scanner borrows prepared.options' base_filters/hardlinks pointers, so
+     prepared must outlive the scanner. */
  directory_scanner_destroy(scanner);
+  prepared_scanner_destroy(&prepared);
  return ok;
 }

@@ -1886,6 +1890,8 @@ int send_files(Config* config) {
    if (config->transport == TRANSPORT_TCP)
      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "could not connect to server%s",
                  config->use_tls ? " via TLS" : "");
+    if (missing_args)
+      array_list_delete(missing_args);
    return 1;
  }
  ProtocolSession session;
@@ -587,12 +587,16 @@ void directory_scanner_destroy(DirectoryScanner* scanner) {

 static Chunk* chunk_data_to_chunk(ArrayList* chunk_data) {
  void** chunk_items = array_list_to_array(chunk_data);
-  if (!chunk_items)
+  if (!chunk_items) {
+    array_list_delete(chunk_data);
    return NULL;
+  }
  Chunk* chunk = chunk_create((File**)chunk_items, chunk_data->size);
  free(chunk_items);
-  if (!chunk)
+  if (!chunk) {
+    array_list_delete(chunk_data);
    return NULL;
+  }
  chunk_data->item_destroyer = NULL;
  array_list_delete(chunk_data);
  return chunk;
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static bool receiver_save_file(File* file, void* context_pointer) {
     metadata now and apply it at the end.  -O/--omit-dir-times is honored by
     dir_time_list_apply's caller (see receiver_send_success_frame). */
  if (result != FILE_SAVE_ERROR && file->is_dir && file->metadata &&
-      context->config->use_metadata && !context->config->omit_dir_times &&
+      dir_times_should_capture(context->config) &&
      !dir_time_list_add(&context->dir_times, file->path, file->metadata)) {
    file_destroy(file);
    return false;
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>

@@ -251,6 +252,155 @@ static bool configure_authorization(const char* root) {
  return true;
 }

+/* Discriminates the outcome of the A7 auth gate so the dispatcher can map it
+ * back to the config_receive_with_validate contract: accepted (including
+ * "module needs no auth"), a config-level refusal carrying an error string, or
+ * a handshake that already wrote its own terminal status frame. */
+typedef enum {
+  MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED = 0,
+  MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED,
+  MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED,
+} ModuleAuthResult;
+
+/* Looks up the daemon module selected by the client's config frame and rejects
+ * a `read only` one (every FastSync network transfer writes; there is no
+ * read-only wire operation yet).  Returns the module, or NULL with *error set
+ * to the caller-facing rejection message. */
+static const DaemonModule* module_gate_lookup_module(const Config* config, const char** error) {
+  const DaemonModule* module = daemon_conf_find_module(g_daemon_conf, config->module);
+  if (module == NULL) {
+    char* escaped_module = output_escape(config->module, config->eight_bit_output);
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "unknown daemon module '%s' requested",
+                escaped_module ? escaped_module : "<allocation failed>");
+    free(escaped_module);
+    *error = "requested daemon module does not exist";
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  if (module->read_only) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s' is read only; refusing write transfer",
+                config->module);
+    *error = "requested daemon module is read only";
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return module;
+}
+
+/* Per-module client-chosen ownership / super-user policy (P7 Wave E hardening):
+ * a daemon module refuses EVERY ownership-affecting request (--numeric-ids,
+ * --chown, --usermap/--groupmap, --fake-super, --copy-as, explicit --super)
+ * unless the operator opted THIS module in with `client owner = yes`.
+ * Otherwise any client could force arbitrary ownership inside the module root.
+ * The ownership check is evaluated against the ORIGINAL config so an explicit
+ * --super is refused even when an operator --no-super veto already forced the
+ * effective copy to OFF (the veto must not silently convert a refusal into an
+ * accept); when no ownership flag is present, super-user DEVICE activities are
+ * forced off for this connection instead.  Returns an error string on refusal,
+ * NULL on acceptance. */
+static const char* module_gate_check_ownership(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module,
+                                               ModuleGateContext* gate_ctx) {
+  if (module->client_owner)
+    return NULL;
+  /* Ownership: refuse the whole transfer up front (a clear failure). */
+  if (identity_ownership_requested(config)) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+                "daemon module '%s' refuses client-chosen ownership/super-user activities "
+                "(no `client owner = yes` opt-in); refusing",
+                config->module);
+    return "client-chosen ownership is not permitted by this daemon module";
+  }
+  /* Super-user DEVICE activities (char/block mknod and --write-devices) are
+     permitted under the default AUTO mode, so without this override a root
+     daemon would still let a non-opted module create arbitrary device nodes
+     and write raw devices.  Force them off for this connection: those entries
+     are skipped (never mknod'ed) while an ordinary `-a` push still succeeds
+     without device nodes, matching the operator's least-privilege choice.
+     The operator-level --no-super veto is already folded into this. */
+  if (gate_ctx)
+    gate_ctx->super_mode_override = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* A7 auth gate: runs the SCRAM challenge/response for an auth-required module
+ * BEFORE the module root is installed and before any data moves.  Returns
+ * MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED when the module needs no auth or the handshake succeeds,
+ * MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED with *error set on a config-level rejection, or
+ * MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED when the handshake already wrote a terminal status. */
+static ModuleAuthResult module_gate_authenticate(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module,
+                                                 ModuleGateContext* gate_ctx, const char** error) {
+  if (module->auth_user_count == 0)
+    return MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED;
+  /* Fail closed: no store -> refuse (server misconfiguration, STATUS_ERROR). */
+  if (g_credentials == NULL) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+                "daemon module '%s' requires authentication but no credential store is "
+                "configured (--password-file/--early-input); refusing",
+                config->module);
+    *error = "requested daemon module requires authentication and no credential "
+             "store is configured";
+    return MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED;
+  }
+  /* Transport policy (A7-3/S1): an auth-required module only accepts
+   * credentials over (a) an encrypted, verified TLS connection whose client
+   * certificate matches --client-cn, or (b) an actual PLAINTEXT connection
+   * from a loopback peer that the operator explicitly opted into with
+   * --allow-unauthenticated.  A remote plaintext peer, an un-flagged loopback
+   * plaintext peer, and a loopback TLS peer whose certificate does not match
+   * --client-cn are all refused HERE, before the challenge is sent, so an
+   * unverified client never receives a nonce: the loopback allowance requires
+   * !gate_ctx->ssl, so --tls + --allow-unauthenticated can never be used to
+   * bypass the client-CN check.  The operator flag never permits REMOTE
+   * plaintext auth: remote peers still require verified TLS regardless. */
+  bool tls_ok = gate_ctx && gate_ctx->ssl && SSL_get_verify_result(gate_ctx->ssl) == X509_V_OK &&
+                tls_client_identity_allowed(gate_ctx->ssl);
+  bool local_ok = allow_unauthenticated && gate_ctx && !gate_ctx->ssl && gate_ctx->fd >= 0 &&
+                  utils_fd_peer_is_local(gate_ctx->fd);
+  if (!tls_ok && !local_ok) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+                "daemon module '%s' requires authentication over an encrypted, verified TLS "
+                "connection (or an opted-in loopback plaintext transport); refusing",
+                config->module);
+    *error = "daemon module requires authentication over an encrypted, verified TLS "
+             "connection";
+    return MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED;
+  }
+  /* Belt-and-braces: the transport policy above already guarantees a context
+   * with a usable socket (verified TLS implies a live SSL object and loopback
+   * allowance requires gate_ctx->fd >= 0), so this is unreachable today; keep
+   * the guard so the handshake can never be driven over an invalid fd. */
+  if (!gate_ctx || gate_ctx->fd < 0) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s': no auth transport available", config->module);
+    *error = "authentication failed for the requested daemon module";
+    return MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED;
+  }
+  /* The handshake writes exactly one terminal status on failure and signals so
+   * via MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED; the username may be logged (never the password
+   * or any derived proof). */
+  if (!server_auth_handshake(gate_ctx->fd, config, module)) {
+    char* escaped_user =
+        config->auth_user ? output_escape(config->auth_user, config->eight_bit_output) : NULL;
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s': authentication failed for user '%s'",
+                config->module, escaped_user ? escaped_user : "(none)");
+    free(escaped_user);
+    return MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED;
+  }
+  char* escaped_user = output_escape(config->auth_user, config->eight_bit_output);
+  log_message(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "daemon module '%s': user '%s' authenticated", config->module,
+              escaped_user ? escaped_user : "<allocation failed>");
+  free(escaped_user);
+  return MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED;
+}
+
+/* Installs the module's configured path as the connection's authorized root.
+ * Returns an error string when the root is unusable, NULL on success. */
+static const char* module_gate_install_root(const Config* config, const DaemonModule* module) {
+  if (!configure_authorization(module->path)) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s' path '%s' is not usable", config->module,
+                module->path ? module->path : "(null)");
+    return "requested daemon module root is not usable";
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
 /* Config-frame gate (runs inside config_receive_with_validate, BEFORE the
 * STATUS_OK ack, so a rejected connection is refused at the config handshake
 * and no file data is ever exchanged).
@@ -324,115 +474,23 @@ static const char* server_module_gate(const Config* config, void* context) {
    return "daemon connection did not select a module (expected a "
           "host::module/path destination)";

-  const DaemonModule* module = daemon_conf_find_module(g_daemon_conf, config->module);
-  if (module == NULL) {
-    char* escaped_module = output_escape(config->module, config->eight_bit_output);
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "unknown daemon module '%s' requested",
-                escaped_module ? escaped_module : "<allocation failed>");
-    free(escaped_module);
-    return "requested daemon module does not exist";
-  }
-  if (module->read_only) {
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s' is read only; refusing write transfer",
-                config->module);
-    return "requested daemon module is read only";
-  }
-  /* Client-chosen ownership / super-user policy (P7 Wave E hardening): a daemon
-     module refuses EVERY ownership-affecting request (--numeric-ids, --chown,
-     --usermap/--groupmap, --fake-super, --copy-as, explicit --super) unless the
-     operator opted THIS module in with `client owner = yes`.  Otherwise any
-     client could force arbitrary ownership inside the module root.  The
-     standalone/SSH server has a single operator-authorized root and keeps
-     honoring these. */
-  if (!module->client_owner) {
-    /* Ownership: refuse the whole transfer up front (a clear failure).
-       Evaluated against the ORIGINAL config so an explicit --super is refused
-       even when an operator --no-super veto already forced the effective copy
-       to OFF (the veto must not silently convert a refusal into an accept). */
-    if (identity_ownership_requested(config)) {
-      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
-                  "daemon module '%s' refuses client-chosen ownership/super-user activities "
-                  "(no `client owner = yes` opt-in); refusing",
-                  config->module);
-      return "client-chosen ownership is not permitted by this daemon module";
-    }
-    /* Super-user DEVICE activities (char/block mknod and --write-devices) are
-       permitted under the default AUTO mode, so without this override a root
-       daemon would still let a non-opted module create arbitrary device nodes
-       and write raw devices.  Force them off for this connection: those entries
-       are skipped (never mknod'ed) while an ordinary `-a` push still succeeds
-       without device nodes, matching the operator's least-privilege choice.
-       The operator-level --no-super veto is already folded into this. */
-    if (gate_ctx)
-      gate_ctx->super_mode_override = SUPER_MODE_OFF;
-  }
-  if (module->auth_user_count > 0) {
-    /* Auth-required module (A7, protocol 2.19.0): run the SCRAM challenge/
-     * response BEFORE the module root is installed and before any data moves.
-     * Fail closed: no store -> refuse (server misconfiguration, STATUS_ERROR);
-     * a handshake that fails before the success response writes exactly one
-     * STATUS_AUTH_FAILED before signalling ALREADY_TERMINATED (a failure while
-     * writing the success signature instead just drops the broken connection).
-     * The username may be logged (never the password or any derived proof). */
-    if (g_credentials == NULL) {
-      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
-                  "daemon module '%s' requires authentication but no credential store is "
-                  "configured (--password-file/--early-input); refusing",
-                  config->module);
-      return "requested daemon module requires authentication and no credential "
-             "store is configured";
-    }
-    /* Transport policy (A7-3/S1): an auth-required module only accepts
-     * credentials over (a) an encrypted, verified TLS connection whose client
-     * certificate matches --client-cn, or (b) an actual PLAINTEXT connection
-     * from a loopback peer that the operator explicitly opted into with
-     * --allow-unauthenticated.  A remote plaintext peer, an un-flagged loopback
-     * plaintext peer, and a loopback TLS peer whose certificate does not match
-     * --client-cn are all refused HERE, before the challenge is sent, so an
-     * unverified client never receives a nonce: the loopback allowance requires
-     * !gate_ctx->ssl, so --tls + --allow-unauthenticated can never be used to
-     * bypass the client-CN check.  The operator flag never permits REMOTE
-     * plaintext auth: remote peers still require verified TLS regardless. */
-    bool tls_ok = gate_ctx && gate_ctx->ssl && SSL_get_verify_result(gate_ctx->ssl) == X509_V_OK &&
-                  tls_client_identity_allowed(gate_ctx->ssl);
-    bool local_ok = allow_unauthenticated && gate_ctx && !gate_ctx->ssl && gate_ctx->fd >= 0 &&
-                    utils_fd_peer_is_local(gate_ctx->fd);
-    if (!tls_ok && !local_ok) {
-      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
-                  "daemon module '%s' requires authentication over an encrypted, verified TLS "
-                  "connection (or an opted-in loopback plaintext transport); refusing",
-                  config->module);
-      return "daemon module requires authentication over an encrypted, verified TLS "
-             "connection";
-    }
-    /* Belt-and-braces: the transport policy above already guarantees a context
-     * with a usable socket (verified TLS implies a live SSL object and loopback
-     * allowance requires gate_ctx->fd >= 0), so this is unreachable today; keep
-     * the guard so the handshake can never be driven over an invalid fd. */
-    if (!gate_ctx || gate_ctx->fd < 0) {
-      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s': no auth transport available",
-                  config->module);
-      return "authentication failed for the requested daemon module";
-    }
-    if (!server_auth_handshake(gate_ctx->fd, config, module)) {
-      char* escaped_user =
-          config->auth_user ? output_escape(config->auth_user, config->eight_bit_output) : NULL;
-      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s': authentication failed for user '%s'",
-                  config->module, escaped_user ? escaped_user : "(none)");
-      free(escaped_user);
+  const char* error = NULL;
+  const DaemonModule* module = module_gate_lookup_module(config, &error);
+  if (!module)
+    return error;
+  error = module_gate_check_ownership(config, module, gate_ctx);
+  if (error)
+    return error;
+  switch (module_gate_authenticate(config, module, gate_ctx, &error)) {
+  case MODULE_AUTH_REFUSED:
+    return error;
+  case MODULE_AUTH_TERMINATED:
    return CONFIG_VALIDATE_ALREADY_TERMINATED;
+  case MODULE_AUTH_ACCEPTED:
+    break;
  }
-    char* escaped_user = output_escape(config->auth_user, config->eight_bit_output);
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "daemon module '%s': user '%s' authenticated", config->module,
-                escaped_user ? escaped_user : "<allocation failed>");
-    free(escaped_user);
-  }
-  if (!configure_authorization(module->path)) {
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "daemon module '%s' path '%s' is not usable", config->module,
-                module->path ? module->path : "(null)");
-    return "requested daemon module root is not usable";
-  }
-  return NULL; /* accepted; authorized root is now the module's path */
+  /* accepted; the authorized root is now the module's path */
+  return module_gate_install_root(config, module);
 }

 void handler(int file_descriptor) {
@@ -445,12 +503,16 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
  gate_ctx.ssl = ssl;
  gate_ctx.fd = file_descriptor;
  gate_ctx.super_mode_override = -1;
-  Config* config = config_receive_with_validate(file_descriptor, server_module_gate, &gate_ctx);
+  /* All teardown state starts empty so the single `done` epilogue is safe to
+   * reach from any error path (including before the config frame arrives). */
+  Config* config = NULL;
+  PipelineContextReceiver* context = NULL;
+  char* joined_destination = NULL;
+  bool charset_ready = false;
+  config = config_receive_with_validate(file_descriptor, server_module_gate, &gate_ctx);
  if (config == NULL) {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to receive config");
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  /* Apply the super-mode veto the gate decided on (operator --no-super, or a
   * daemon module without the `client owner = yes` opt-in) exactly once, so
@@ -458,27 +520,19 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
   * device-node creation) sees SUPER_MODE_OFF.  The gate never mutated the
   * received config. */
  if (gate_ctx.super_mode_override != -1)
-    config->super_mode = gate_ctx.super_mode_override;
+    config->super_mode = (SuperMode)gate_ctx.super_mode_override;
  protocol_set_8_bit_output(config->eight_bit_output);
  if (!authorized_root) {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "No server-side destination root configured");
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  if (!allow_unauthenticated && ssl == NULL) {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected unauthenticated plaintext connection");
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  if (ssl && required_client_cn && !tls_client_identity_allowed(ssl)) {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected TLS client with unauthorized identity");
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  /* Daemon mode: the module's root is the authorized root (installed by
     server_module_gate), and the client's destination is a MODULE-RELATIVE
@@ -488,13 +542,9 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
  if (g_daemon_conf && config->receive_root_directory && config->receive_root_directory[0] == '/') {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected absolute daemon destination (must be relative to the "
                                 "selected module root)");
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  char* destination = config->receive_root_directory;
-  char* joined_destination = NULL;
  if (destination && destination[0] != '/')
    joined_destination = path_cat(authorized_root, destination);
  if (joined_destination)
@@ -503,19 +553,16 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
      !path_is_within(authorized_root, destination)) {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Rejected destination outside authorized root");
    free(joined_destination);
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    return;
+    joined_destination = NULL;
+    goto done;
  }
  if (joined_destination) {
    free(config->receive_root_directory);
    config->receive_root_directory = joined_destination;
+    joined_destination = NULL;
  }
  if (!config->receive_root_directory) {
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  config->use_delete = config->use_delete && allow_delete;
  /* --iconv (protocol 2.16.0): install the receiver-side wire->local conversion
@@ -524,13 +571,13 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
     any) may override the local charset; a spec the client is known to have
     validated cannot fail here unless the server's override names an
     unsupported charset. */
-  if (config->iconv_spec && !charset_wire_init_receiver(config->iconv_spec, server_iconv_spec)) {
+  if (config->iconv_spec) {
+    if (!charset_wire_init_receiver(config->iconv_spec, server_iconv_spec)) {
      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
                  "--iconv: unsupported charset conversion requested (LOCAL[,REMOTE])");
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+      goto done;
+    }
+    charset_ready = true;
  }
  /* --delete-missing-args deletes destination mirrors receiver-side, so it is
     deletion and stays gated by the same --allow-delete server policy.  When
@@ -545,10 +592,7 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "destination root is not available: %s",
                escaped_root ? escaped_root : "<allocation failed>");
    free(escaped_root);
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  /* A --delay-updates transfer stages under a private 0700 directory inside
     the receive root.  Create it up front (wiping leftovers of any previously
@@ -557,11 +601,7 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
    config->delay_context = delay_updates_context_create(config->receive_root_directory);
    if (!config->delay_context || !delay_updates_prepare(config->delay_context)) {
      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to initialize --delay-updates staging area");
-      delay_updates_cleanup(config->delay_context);
-      config_delete(config);
-      close(file_descriptor);
-      protocol_session_unbind();
-      return;
+      goto done;
    }
  }
  /* Preserve the negotiated identity policy for the fd-relative ownership
@@ -571,10 +611,7 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
     rather than silently applying the wrong ownership policy. */
  if (!identity_set_active(config)) {
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to activate identity policy");
-    config_delete(config);
-    close(file_descriptor);
-    protocol_session_unbind();
-    return;
+    goto done;
  }
  /* Persist the negotiated --keep-dirlinks policy once, here at config-accept,
     before any multithreaded receiver/writer threads are spawned, so the
@@ -605,38 +642,25 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
    if (!motd_send(file_descriptor, motd ? motd : "")) {
      free(motd);
      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Failed to send daemon MOTD");
-      config_delete(config);
-      close(file_descriptor);
-      protocol_session_unbind();
-      identity_clear_active();
-      return;
+      goto done;
    }
    free(motd);
  }
  if (config->use_multithreading) {
    Queue* q = queue_create(100, file_destroy);
-    if (q == NULL) {
-      config_delete(config);
-      close(file_descriptor);
-      protocol_session_unbind();
-      identity_clear_active();
-      return;
-    }
-    PipelineContextReceiver* context =
-        pipeline_context_receiver_create(config, q, file_descriptor, ssl);
+    if (q == NULL)
+      goto done;
+    context = pipeline_context_receiver_create(config, q, file_descriptor, ssl);
    if (context == NULL) {
      queue_destroy(q);
-      config_delete(config);
-      close(file_descriptor);
-      protocol_session_unbind();
-      identity_clear_active();
-      return;
+      goto done;
    }
    protocol_session_set_max_alloc(&context->session, config->max_alloc);
    atomic_store(&context->session.total_allocated_bytes,
                 atomic_load(&session.total_allocated_bytes));
    pipeline_context_receiver_set_queue_byte_limit(context, RECEIVER_QUEUE_MAX_BYTES);
-    thrd_t receiver, writer;
+    thrd_t receiver = {0};
+    thrd_t writer = {0};
    bool receiver_created = thrd_create(&receiver, receive_thread, context) == thrd_success;
    bool writer_created = false;
    if (receiver_created)
@@ -649,17 +673,19 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
        cnd_broadcast(&context->condition_not_full);
        cnd_broadcast(&context->condition_not_empty);
        mtx_unlock(&context->mutex);
-        close(file_descriptor);
+        /* Unblock a worker parked in socket I/O without closing the fd (the
+         * child owns the single close).  shutdown() only affects sockets; for
+         * the --stdio pipe the receiver's per-message poll timeout still
+         * bounds the join, so do nothing there rather than close a descriptor
+         * another thread may still be using. */
+        struct stat fd_stat;
+        if (fstat(file_descriptor, &fd_stat) == 0 && S_ISSOCK(fd_stat.st_mode))
+          shutdown(file_descriptor, SHUT_RDWR);
        thrd_join(receiver, NULL);
-      } else {
-        close(file_descriptor);
      }
      if (writer_created)
        thrd_join(writer, NULL);
-      pipeline_context_receiver_destroy(context);
-      protocol_session_unbind();
-      identity_clear_active();
-      return;
+      goto done;
    }
    int receiver_result;
    int writer_result;
@@ -703,21 +729,36 @@ void handler(int file_descriptor) {
    } else {
      send_status(file_descriptor, STATUS_ERROR);
    }
-    if (!transfer_ok) {
+    if (!transfer_ok)
      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Transfer failed");
-      if (config->delay_updates && config->delay_context)
-        delay_updates_cleanup(config->delay_context);
-    }
-    pipeline_context_receiver_destroy(context);
  } else {
    if (receiver_receive_files(config, file_descriptor) != 0)
      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Transfer failed");
-    config_delete(config);
  }
-  protocol_session_unbind();
-  identity_clear_active();
+
+done:
+  /* Single cleanup epilogue: every error path jumps here, so the iconv
+   * receiver conversion is released, the identity snapshot cleared, the
+   * protocol session unbound and the config freed exactly once.  The
+   * connection fd is deliberately NOT closed here -- the child functions own
+   * its single close (plain_child_fn / tls_child_fn), and the --stdio call
+   * site must leave stdin/stdout open. */
+  if (charset_ready)
    charset_wire_free();
-  close(file_descriptor);
+  /* The delay-updates staging tree is released by config_delete (which the
+     branch below always reaches), so it is cleaned exactly once. */
+  identity_clear_active();
+  protocol_session_unbind();
+  if (context != NULL) {
+    /* context owns both the config and the queue it was created with. */
+    pipeline_context_receiver_destroy(context);
+    context = NULL;
+    config = NULL;
+  } else {
+    config_delete(config);
+    config = NULL;
+  }
+  free(joined_destination);
 }

 #ifndef FASTSYNC_SERVER_AS_LIB
@@ -912,6 +953,9 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
      return 1;
    }
    io_set_fds(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
+    /* handler() does not own the stdio fds: it never closes its descriptor
+     * argument, so STDIN/STDOUT stay open for this (single-shot) SSH session
+     * and are released by process exit. */
    handler(STDIN_FILENO);
    release_authorization();
    server_cli_options_free(&opts);
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "array_list.h"
 #include "protocol.h"
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -39,6 +40,8 @@ void array_list_delete(ArrayList* array_list) {
 static bool array_list_extend(ArrayList* array_list) {
  if (array_list == NULL)
    return false;
+  if (array_list->capacity > INT_MAX / 2)
+    return false;
  int new_capacity = array_list->capacity * 2;
  if (new_capacity == 0)
    new_capacity = INITIAL_ARRAY_SIZE;
@@ -202,6 +202,51 @@ static bool receive_wire_bool(int fd, bool* value) {
  return true;
 }

+/* Cumulative budget for the strings retained by one received Config (see
+ * MAX_CONFIG_STRING_BYTES).  Config strings are received once per connection
+ * before authentication and live for its whole lifetime, so the charge is never
+ * released. */
+typedef struct {
+  unsigned long long used;
+} ConfigStringBudget;
+
+/* Charge `bytes` (the retained allocation: string body plus NUL) against the
+ * aggregate config-string budget.  Returns false when the ceiling would be
+ * exceeded, letting the caller reject the frame with a clear error instead of
+ * retaining unbounded pre-auth memory. */
+static bool config_string_budget_charge(ConfigStringBudget* budget, size_t bytes) {
+  if ((unsigned long long)bytes > MAX_CONFIG_STRING_BYTES ||
+      budget->used > MAX_CONFIG_STRING_BYTES - (unsigned long long)bytes) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Config string budget exceeded (%llu + %zu > %llu bytes)",
+                budget->used, bytes, (unsigned long long)MAX_CONFIG_STRING_BYTES);
+    return false;
+  }
+  budget->used += (unsigned long long)bytes;
+  return true;
+}
+
+static char* config_receive_str(int fd, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
+  char* value = receive_str(fd);
+  if (!value)
+    return NULL;
+  if (!config_string_budget_charge(budget, strlen(value) + 1)) {
+    free(value);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+static char* config_receive_str_redacted(int fd, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
+  char* value = receive_str_redacted(fd);
+  if (!value)
+    return NULL;
+  if (!config_string_budget_charge(budget, strlen(value) + 1)) {
+    free(value);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
 static bool validate_received_config(const Config* config) {
  return valid_wire_bool(config->save_to_disk) && valid_wire_bool(config->use_multithreading) &&
         valid_wire_bool(config->use_chunk_serialization) &&
@@ -257,7 +302,7 @@ static bool validate_received_config(const Config* config) {
         config->delta_block_size <= DELTA_BLOCK_SIZE_MAX &&
         config->delta_max_file_size <= DELTA_MAX_FILE_SIZE && config->modify_window >= 0 &&
         config->max_delete >= -1 && config->skip_compress_count >= 0 &&
-         config->skip_compress_count <= 10000 && config->max_alloc > 0 &&
+         config->skip_compress_count <= MAX_SKIP_COMPRESS_SUFFIXES && config->max_alloc > 0 &&
         (!config->chmod_spec || !*config->chmod_spec ||
          chmod_apply(0, config->chmod_spec, &(mode_t){0})) &&
         /* The received --iconv CONVERT_SPEC is untrusted input that drives
@@ -648,6 +693,9 @@ void config_delete(Config* config) {
  if (config == NULL)
    return;
  if (config->log_file) {
+    /* The logging subsystem borrows this FILE*; detach it before closing so a
+     * concurrent log call can never touch the freed handle. */
+    log_set_file(NULL);
    fclose(config->log_file);
    config->log_file = NULL;
  }
@@ -819,7 +867,7 @@ static bool send_checksum_options(int fd, const Config* c) {
         send_n_data(fd, &c->checksum_seed, sizeof(c->checksum_seed));
 }

-static bool receive_core_fields(int fd, Config* c) {
+static bool receive_core_fields(int fd, Config* c, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
  int value;
  if (!receive_wire_bool(fd, &c->eight_bit_output))
    return false;
@@ -829,8 +877,8 @@ static bool receive_core_fields(int fd, Config* c) {
  if (c->max_alloc > MAX_SERVER_ALLOC)
    c->max_alloc = MAX_SERVER_ALLOC;
  protocol_session_set_max_alloc(NULL, c->max_alloc);
-  c->send_directory = receive_str(fd);
-  c->receive_root_directory = receive_str(fd);
+  c->send_directory = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
+  c->receive_root_directory = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!c->send_directory || !c->receive_root_directory)
    return false;
  if (!receive_wire_bool(fd, &c->save_to_disk) || !receive_wire_bool(fd, &c->use_multithreading) ||
@@ -863,10 +911,10 @@ static bool receive_delta_fields(int fd, Config* c) {
         receive_n_data(fd, &c->delta_max_file_size, sizeof(unsigned long long));
 }

-static bool receive_file_options(int fd, Config* c) {
+static bool receive_file_options(int fd, Config* c, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
  if (!receive_wire_bool(fd, &c->backup))
    return false;
-  char* backup_dir = receive_str(fd);
+  char* backup_dir = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!backup_dir)
    return false;
  if (*backup_dir != '\0') {
@@ -920,8 +968,8 @@ static bool receive_selection_options(int fd, Config* c) {
  return receive_wire_bool(fd, &c->delete_delay);
 }

-static bool receive_resume_options(int fd, Config* c) {
-  char* temp_dir = receive_str(fd);
+static bool receive_resume_options(int fd, Config* c, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
+  char* temp_dir = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!temp_dir)
    return false;
  if (*temp_dir != '\0') {
@@ -935,7 +983,7 @@ static bool receive_resume_options(int fd, Config* c) {
     string for "unset".  Canonicalize the empty wire value back to NULL so
     receivers observe exactly what the client configured (plain --backup, for
     example, must not look like --backup-dir ""). */
-  char* partial_dir = receive_str(fd);
+  char* partial_dir = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!partial_dir)
    return false;
  if (*partial_dir != '\0') {
@@ -943,7 +991,7 @@ static bool receive_resume_options(int fd, Config* c) {
  } else {
    free(partial_dir);
  }
-  char* suffix = receive_str(fd);
+  char* suffix = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!suffix)
    return false;
  if (*suffix != '\0') {
@@ -957,20 +1005,20 @@ static bool receive_resume_options(int fd, Config* c) {
    return false;
  if (!receive_n_data(fd, &c->modify_window, sizeof(c->modify_window)))
    return false;
-  c->compress_choice = receive_str(fd);
+  c->compress_choice = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!c->compress_choice)
    return false;
-  c->chmod_spec = receive_str(fd);
+  c->chmod_spec = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!c->chmod_spec || !receive_wire_bool(fd, &c->skip_compress_set) ||
      !receive_int(fd, &c->skip_compress_count) || c->skip_compress_count < 0 ||
-      c->skip_compress_count > 10000)
+      c->skip_compress_count > MAX_SKIP_COMPRESS_SUFFIXES)
    return false;
  if (c->skip_compress_count > 0) {
    c->skip_compress_suffixes = calloc((size_t)c->skip_compress_count, sizeof(char*));
    if (!c->skip_compress_suffixes)
      return false;
    for (int i = 0; i < c->skip_compress_count; i++) {
-      c->skip_compress_suffixes[i] = receive_str(fd);
+      c->skip_compress_suffixes[i] = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
      if (!c->skip_compress_suffixes[i])
        return false;
    }
@@ -978,7 +1026,7 @@ static bool receive_resume_options(int fd, Config* c) {
  return true;
 }

-static bool receive_basis_options(int fd, Config* c) {
+static bool receive_basis_options(int fd, Config* c, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
  int count;
  if (!receive_int(fd, &count))
    return false;
@@ -988,7 +1036,7 @@ static bool receive_basis_options(int fd, Config* c) {
    int type;
    if (!receive_int(fd, &type) || type <= BASIS_DEST_NONE || type > BASIS_DEST_LINK)
      return false;
-    char* path = receive_str(fd);
+    char* path = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
    if (!path)
      return false;
    /* config_basis_append validates and canonicalizes the path; a rejected
@@ -1119,8 +1167,8 @@ static bool send_daemon_module(int fd, const Config* c) {
  return send_str(fd, c->module ? c->module : "");
 }

-static bool receive_daemon_module(int fd, Config* c) {
-  char* module = receive_str(fd);
+static bool receive_daemon_module(int fd, Config* c, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
+  char* module = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!module)
    return false;
  /* Guard against a hostile client flooding the log with an over-long module
@@ -1155,14 +1203,14 @@ static bool send_daemon_auth(int fd, const Config* c) {
  return send_str_redacted(fd, c->auth_user);
 }

-static bool receive_daemon_auth(int fd, Config* c) {
+static bool receive_daemon_auth(int fd, Config* c, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
  int present;
  if (!receive_int(fd, &present) || !valid_wire_bool(present))
    return false;
  if (!present)
    return true;
  /* Redacted receive: never log the incoming username body. */
-  char* user = receive_str_redacted(fd);
+  char* user = config_receive_str_redacted(fd, budget);
  if (!user)
    return false;
  if (!credentials_username_valid(user)) {
@@ -1272,8 +1320,8 @@ static bool send_iconv_spec(int fd, const Config* c) {
  return send_str(fd, c->iconv_spec ? c->iconv_spec : "");
 }

-static bool receive_iconv_spec(int fd, Config* c) {
-  char* spec = receive_str(fd);
+static bool receive_iconv_spec(int fd, Config* c, ConfigStringBudget* budget) {
+  char* spec = config_receive_str(fd, budget);
  if (!spec)
    return false;
  if (*spec == '\0') {
@@ -1293,14 +1341,14 @@ static bool receive_iconv_spec(int fd, Config* c) {
 * validated to the SUPER_MODE_AUTO..SUPER_MODE_OFF range (also re-checked by
 * validate_received_config). */
 static bool send_privilege_options(int fd, const Config* c) {
-  return send_int(fd, c->super_mode);
+  return send_int(fd, (int)c->super_mode);
 }

 static bool receive_privilege_options(int fd, Config* c) {
  int mode;
  if (!receive_int(fd, &mode) || mode < SUPER_MODE_AUTO || mode > SUPER_MODE_OFF)
    return false;
-  c->super_mode = mode;
+  c->super_mode = (SuperMode)mode;
  return true;
 }

@@ -1376,47 +1424,48 @@ Config* config_receive_with_validate(int file_descriptor, ConfigValidateFunc val
  Config* config = config_create();
  if (!config)
    return NULL;
+  ConfigStringBudget budget = {0};
  free(config->version);
-  config->version = receive_str(file_descriptor);
+  config->version = config_receive_str(file_descriptor, &budget);
  if (!config->version)
    goto error;
  if (strcmp(config->version, PROTOCOL_VERSION) != 0) {
    char* escaped_version = output_escape(config->version, false);
-    fprintf(stderr, "Protocol version mismatch: client=%s, server=%s\n",
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Protocol version mismatch: client=%s, server=%s",
                escaped_version ? escaped_version : "<allocation failed>", PROTOCOL_VERSION);
    free(escaped_version);
    send_status(file_descriptor, STATUS_ERROR);
    goto error;
  }
-  if (!receive_core_fields(file_descriptor, config) ||
+  if (!receive_core_fields(file_descriptor, config, &budget) ||
      !receive_delta_fields(file_descriptor, config) ||
-      !receive_file_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
+      !receive_file_options(file_descriptor, config, &budget) ||
      !receive_selection_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
-      !receive_resume_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
-      !receive_basis_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
+      !receive_resume_options(file_descriptor, config, &budget) ||
+      !receive_basis_options(file_descriptor, config, &budget) ||
      !receive_fuzzy_option(file_descriptor, config) ||
      !receive_checksum_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
      !receive_identity_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
      !receive_metadata_times_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
      !receive_symlink_trust_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
      !receive_phase4_xattr_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
-      !receive_daemon_module(file_descriptor, config) ||
-      !receive_daemon_auth(file_descriptor, config) ||
-      !receive_iconv_spec(file_descriptor, config) ||
+      !receive_daemon_module(file_descriptor, config, &budget) ||
+      !receive_daemon_auth(file_descriptor, config, &budget) ||
+      !receive_iconv_spec(file_descriptor, config, &budget) ||
      !receive_privilege_options(file_descriptor, config) ||
      !receive_copy_as_options(file_descriptor, config))
    goto error;
  if (config->compress_choice[0] != '\0' && strcmp(config->compress_choice, "zstd") != 0 &&
      strcmp(config->compress_choice, "none") != 0) {
    char* escaped_choice = output_escape(config->compress_choice, config->eight_bit_output);
-    fprintf(stderr, "Unsupported compression choice: %s\n",
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Unsupported compression choice: %s",
                escaped_choice ? escaped_choice : "<allocation failed>");
    free(escaped_choice);
    send_status(file_descriptor, STATUS_ERROR);
    goto error;
  }
  if (!validate_received_config(config)) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "Invalid configuration received from client\n");
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid configuration received from client");
    send_status(file_descriptor, STATUS_ERROR);
    goto error;
  }
@@ -1430,7 +1479,7 @@ Config* config_receive_with_validate(int file_descriptor, ConfigValidateFunc val
       * the CONFIG_VALIDATE_ALREADY_TERMINATED sentinel, so no second status is
       * written. */
      if (rejection != CONFIG_VALIDATE_ALREADY_TERMINATED) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", rejection);
+        log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s", rejection);
        send_status(file_descriptor, STATUS_ERROR);
      }
      goto error;
@@ -68,6 +68,13 @@ typedef struct {
  int value;    /* 0/1 for booleans, byte count for SO_RCVBUF/SO_SNDBUF */
 } SockOptEntry;

+/* --super / --no-super tri-state (Config->super_mode).  AUTO (default) and ON
+ * both permit a confined super-user attempt (AUTO preserves FastSync's
+ * historical best-effort behavior; an unprivileged attempt is refused by the
+ * kernel and skipped per entry); OFF forbids the attempt even for root.  See
+ * privilege_super_mode_permitted() in identity.h. */
+typedef enum SuperMode { SUPER_MODE_AUTO = 0, SUPER_MODE_ON = 1, SUPER_MODE_OFF = 2 } SuperMode;
+
 typedef struct Config {
  char* version;
  char* send_directory;
@@ -416,7 +423,7 @@ typedef struct Config {
   * as a trailing int so the receiver can enforce the policy.  See
   * privilege_super_permitted() and identity_ownership_requested() in
   * identity.h. */
-  int super_mode;
+  SuperMode super_mode;

  // Receiver-side runtime staging registry for --delay-updates.  Never sent
  // over the wire and never set on the sender side.
@@ -636,6 +643,24 @@ typedef struct Config {
 /* Upper bound on total basis-dir entries (rsync caps --link-dest at 20). */
 #define MAX_BASIS_DIRS 64

+/* Upper bound on the number of --skip-compress suffixes accepted from the wire.
+ * Each suffix is an independent wire string (up to MAX_STRING_SIZE = 64 KiB), so
+ * without this a hostile pre-auth client could otherwise retain
+ * skip_count * MAX_STRING_SIZE bytes on the server before authentication; 256
+ * covers any realistic suffix list while keeping the worst case small. */
+#define MAX_SKIP_COMPRESS_SUFFIXES 256
+
+/* Aggregate ceiling on the bytes retained by ALL strings in one received config
+ * frame (version, send/receive roots, backup/temp/partial/suffix, compression
+ * choice, chmod spec, skip-compress suffixes, basis paths, module, auth user,
+ * iconv spec, ...).  The config frame is parsed BEFORE authentication and every
+ * one of these strings lives for the whole connection, so this cumulative
+ * (never released) budget bounds the pre-auth memory a single connection can
+ * pin.  MAX_SKIP_COMPRESS_SUFFIXES / MAX_BASIS_DIRS bound the individual
+ * repeatable counts; this budget bounds their product and any single oversized
+ * field. */
+#define MAX_CONFIG_STRING_BYTES (1ULL * 1024 * 1024)
+
 /* Identity-mapping sentinels and bounds (see identity.h for semantics).
 * IDENTITY_MATCH_ANY is a usermap/groupmap FROM '*' (matches any id);
 * IDENTITY_CURRENT is a chown / map TO '*' (resolve to the receiver's current
@@ -644,15 +669,6 @@ typedef struct Config {
 #define IDENTITY_CURRENT (-1)
 #define MAX_IDENTITY_MAP 128

-/* --super / --no-super tri-state (Config->super_mode).  AUTO (default) and ON
- * both permit a confined super-user attempt (AUTO preserves FastSync's
- * historical best-effort behavior; an unprivileged attempt is refused by the
- * kernel and skipped per entry); OFF forbids the attempt even for root.  See
- * privilege_super_mode_permitted() in identity.h. */
-#define SUPER_MODE_AUTO 0
-#define SUPER_MODE_ON 1
-#define SUPER_MODE_OFF 2
-
 Config* config_create(void);
 void config_delete(Config* config);

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #include "daemon_conf.h"
+#include "credentials.h"
 #include "utils.h"
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -192,6 +193,12 @@ static bool apply_module_key(DaemonModule* module, char* key, char* value, char*
      const char* user = trim_ws(token);
      if (*user == '\0')
        continue;
+      if (!credentials_username_valid(user)) {
+        set_error(err, err_size, "module '%s': invalid 'auth users' entry '%s'", module->name,
+                  user);
+        free(list);
+        return false;
+      }
      char** grown =
          realloc(module->auth_users, (size_t)(module->auth_user_count + 1) * sizeof(char*));
      if (!grown) {
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "utils.h"
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -51,7 +52,8 @@ static int normalize_entry(const char* raw, size_t len, bool strip_line_endings,
  if (len == 0)
    return 0;
  if (raw[0] == '/') {
-    snprintf(err, err_size, "absolute path entries are not allowed: '%.*s'", (int)len, raw);
+    int print_len = len > (size_t)INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
+    snprintf(err, err_size, "absolute path entries are not allowed: '%.*s'", print_len, raw);
    return -1;
  }
  /* Reject NUL bytes inside a token defensively (NUL-delimited mode splits on
@@ -1696,9 +1696,9 @@ File* receive_incremental_check(int fd, const Config* config, bool* skipped) {
    return NULL;
  }

-  if (has_path_traversal(check_path)) {
+  if (check_path[0] == '\0' || has_path_traversal(check_path)) {
    char* escaped_path = output_escape(check_path, log_get_8_bit_output());
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Path traversal detected: %s",
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid received check path: %s",
                escaped_path ? escaped_path : "<allocation failed>");
    free(escaped_path);
    free(check_path);
@@ -1832,6 +1832,7 @@ File* receive_incremental_check(int fd, const Config* config, bool* skipped) {
           existing/ignore-existing/update/backup/delay-updates policy. */
        File* materialized = file_create(check_path);
        if (materialized && basis.content) {
+          data_destroy(materialized->data);
          materialized->data = basis.content;
          basis.content = NULL;
          materialized->metadata = file_metadata_create(NULL, &basis.st, false, false);
@@ -2095,6 +2096,7 @@ File* receive_incremental_check(int fd, const Config* config, bool* skipped) {
      file->metadata = meta;
      file->xattrs = append_xattrs;
      append_xattrs = NULL;
+      data_destroy(file->data);
      file->data = data_create(full, full_size);
      if (!file->data) { /* data_create already freed full on failure */
        file_destroy(file);
@@ -2236,6 +2238,10 @@ File* file_receive(const Config* config, int file_descriptor) {

 /* ---- P7 Wave D: deferred directory times ---- */

+bool dir_times_should_capture(const Config* config) {
+  return config->use_metadata && !config->omit_dir_times;
+}
+
 void dir_time_list_init(DirTimeList* list) {
  if (!list)
    return;
@@ -2243,6 +2249,7 @@ void dir_time_list_init(DirTimeList* list) {
  list->entries = NULL;
  list->count = 0;
  list->capacity = 0;
+  list->bytes = 0;
 }

 void dir_time_list_free(DirTimeList* list) {
@@ -2256,11 +2263,23 @@ void dir_time_list_free(DirTimeList* list) {
  list->entries = NULL;
  list->count = 0;
  list->capacity = 0;
+  list->bytes = 0;
 }

 bool dir_time_list_add(DirTimeList* list, const char* wire_path, const FileMetadata* metadata) {
  if (!list || !wire_path || !metadata)
    return true; /* nothing to remember; never a hard error */
+  /* Cumulative, not per-frame: the sender may stream a tree across unbounded
+     STATUS_DIR_TIMES frames, so bound the TOTAL retained here.  Reject before
+     touching the list, leaving it exactly as it was (the caller fails the
+     transfer, which becomes a clean protocol error). */
+  size_t path_len = strlen(wire_path);
+  /* Charge the whole per-entry cost (path copy + pointer slot + metadata
+     struct), not just the path, so the array growth is bounded by the same
+     cumulative budget. */
+  size_t entry_cost = path_len + sizeof(FileMetadata) + sizeof(char*);
+  if (list->count >= MAX_DIR_TIME_ENTRIES || entry_cost > MAX_DIR_TIME_BYTES - list->bytes)
+    return false;
  if (list->count == list->capacity) {
    size_t new_capacity = list->capacity == 0 ? 16 : list->capacity * 2;
    if (new_capacity < list->capacity)
@@ -2287,6 +2306,7 @@ bool dir_time_list_add(DirTimeList* list, const char* wire_path, const FileMetad
  list->paths[list->count] = copy;
  list->entries[list->count] = *metadata;
  list->count++;
+  list->bytes += entry_cost;
  return true;
 }

@@ -7,6 +7,15 @@

 /* Server-side file receive/save path. */

+/* Cumulative caps for the deferred directory-time accumulator.  The sender may
+ * legitimately split a large tree across repeated STATUS_DIR_TIMES frames, so a
+ * per-frame bound is not enough: the receiver must bound the TOTAL it retains
+ * against a hostile sender.  Mirror the delete-manifest limits
+ * (MAX_MANIFEST_ENTRIES / MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES): the entry count bounds the
+ * metadata array and the byte budget bounds the concatenated path strings. */
+#define MAX_DIR_TIME_ENTRIES (1024 * 1024)
+#define MAX_DIR_TIME_BYTES (16ULL * 1024 * 1024)
+
 File* file_receive(const Config* config, int file_descriptor);
 File* file_receive_directory(int file_descriptor, const Config* config);
 File* file_receive_dir_time(int file_descriptor, const Config* config);
@@ -28,12 +37,20 @@ typedef struct {
  FileMetadata* entries; /* owned, parallel to paths */
  size_t count;
  size_t capacity;
+  size_t bytes; /* cumulative strlen of every retained path */
 } DirTimeList;

+/* Capture gate shared by the sender-side and receiver-side sinks: directory
+ * metadata is accumulated only when --times/--metadata is in effect and
+ * -O/--omit-dir-times does not suppress it.  Kept here, next to the accumulator
+ * it guards, so both call sites express the same condition. */
+bool dir_times_should_capture(const Config* config);
+
 void dir_time_list_init(DirTimeList* list);
 void dir_time_list_free(DirTimeList* list);
 /* Deep-copy one directory's path + metadata into the list.  Returns false on
- * allocation failure (the caller fails the transfer). */
+ * allocation failure OR when the cumulative entry/byte caps would be exceeded
+ * (the caller fails the transfer). */
 bool dir_time_list_add(DirTimeList* list, const char* wire_path, const FileMetadata* metadata);
 /* Apply every accumulated directory's mtime (and atime when captured) beneath
 * `root_directory`, confined fd-relative.  Best-effort per entry: an absent
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ typedef struct {
  /* --super / --no-super tri-state (SUPER_MODE_AUTO when unset).  Snapshotted
   * per connection so privilege_super_permitted() can gate super-user
   * activities without a Config argument. */
-  int super_mode;
+  SuperMode super_mode;
  /* --copy-as=USER[:GROUP]: snapshotted so the ownership resolver can force the
   * target ids without a Config argument. */
  bool copy_as_set;
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ bool privilege_super_permitted(void) {
  return privilege_super_mode_permitted(g_identity.super_mode);
 }

-bool privilege_super_mode_permitted(int mode) {
+bool privilege_super_mode_permitted(SuperMode mode) {
  /* AUTO and ON both attempt the confined operation; OFF forbids it even for a
   * root receiver.  AUTO is the historical FastSync behavior (always attempt
   * and let the kernel refuse an unprivileged call, which the caller skips), so
@@ -128,6 +128,6 @@ bool identity_wire_valid(const Config* config);
 * best-effort behavior where an unprivileged attempt is refused by the kernel
 * and skipped.  Neither EVER elevates privileges. */
 bool privilege_super_permitted(void);
-bool privilege_super_mode_permitted(int mode);
+bool privilege_super_mode_permitted(SuperMode mode);

 #endif
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <threads.h>
 #include <time.h>

 static const char* log_level_strings[] = {"DEBUG", "INFO", "WARN", "ERROR"};
@@ -15,6 +17,18 @@ static FILE* log_fp = NULL;
 static _Thread_local bool eight_bit_output;
 static LogStderrMode stderr_mode = LOG_STDERR_ERRORS;

+/* Serializes access to log_fp and makes each emitted line atomic: the
+ * timestamp prefix, formatted body, and trailing newline are written as one
+ * critical section so concurrent threads cannot interleave partial lines.
+ * Initialized lazily (matching the protocol.c bw_mutex idiom) because logging
+ * can happen before main() installs any synchronization. */
+static mtx_t log_mutex;
+static once_flag log_mutex_once = ONCE_FLAG_INIT;
+
+static void log_mutex_init(void) {
+  mtx_init(&log_mutex, mtx_plain);
+}
+
 void set_log_level(LogLevel level) {
  current_log_level = level;
 }
@@ -41,7 +55,10 @@ uint32_t get_log_info_flags(void) {
 }

 void log_set_file(FILE* fp) {
+  call_once(&log_mutex_once, log_mutex_init);
+  mtx_lock(&log_mutex);
  log_fp = fp;
+  mtx_unlock(&log_mutex);
 }

 void log_set_8_bit_output(bool enabled) {
@@ -60,13 +77,48 @@ LogStderrMode log_get_stderr_mode(void) {
  return stderr_mode;
 }

-static inline void write_message(FILE* dest_io, LogLevel log_level, struct tm t, const char* format,
+/* Format one complete log line (timestamp prefix + body + newline) into a
+ * freshly allocated buffer.  This is pure CPU/malloc work and must happen
+ * OUTSIDE the log mutex: the mutex only guards the log_fp pointer, so a
+ * stalled stderr/stdout pipe cannot block every logging thread.  Returns NULL
+ * on allocation/formatting failure. */
+static char* format_log_line(LogLevel log_level, const struct tm* t, const char* format,
                             va_list args) {
-  fprintf(dest_io, "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d [%s]: ", t.tm_year + 1900, t.tm_mon + 1,
-          t.tm_mday, t.tm_hour, t.tm_min, t.tm_sec, log_level_strings[log_level]);
+  char prefix[64];
+  int prefix_len = snprintf(
+      prefix, sizeof(prefix), "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d [%s]: ", t->tm_year + 1900,
+      t->tm_mon + 1, t->tm_mday, t->tm_hour, t->tm_min, t->tm_sec, log_level_strings[log_level]);
+  if (prefix_len < 0 || prefix_len >= (int)sizeof(prefix))
+    return NULL;
+  va_list copy;
+  va_copy(copy, args);
+  int body_len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, format, copy);
+  va_end(copy);
+  if (body_len < 0)
+    return NULL;
+  size_t total = (size_t)prefix_len + (size_t)body_len;
+  char* line = malloc(total + 2); /* body bytes + '\n' + NUL */
+  if (!line)
+    return NULL;
+  memcpy(line, prefix, (size_t)prefix_len);
+  vsnprintf(line + prefix_len, (size_t)body_len + 1, format, args);
+  line[total] = '\n';
+  line[total + 1] = '\0';
+  return line;
+}

-  vfprintf(dest_io, format, args);
-  fprintf(dest_io, "\n");
+/* Write an already-formatted line to the console and, if configured, the log
+ * file.  Only the log_fp pointer is read under the mutex (so log_set_file /
+ * config_delete cannot free it while it is in use); the single console fputs
+ * runs unlocked but is internally atomic per stdio stream. */
+static void emit_log_line(FILE* console, const char* line) {
+  fputs(line, console);
+  call_once(&log_mutex_once, log_mutex_init);
+  mtx_lock(&log_mutex);
+  FILE* file = log_fp;
+  if (file)
+    fputs(line, file);
+  mtx_unlock(&log_mutex);
 }

 void log_message(LogLevel log_level, const char* format, ...) {
@@ -86,14 +138,12 @@ void log_message(LogLevel log_level, const char* format, ...) {

  va_list args;
  va_start(args, format);
-  write_message(dest_io, log_level, t, format, args);
+  char* line = format_log_line(log_level, &t, format, args);
  va_end(args);
-
-  if (log_fp) {
-    va_start(args, format);
-    write_message(log_fp, log_level, t, format, args);
-    va_end(args);
-  }
+  if (!line)
+    return;
+  emit_log_line(dest_io, line);
+  free(line);
 }

 void log_debug_message(LogDebugFlag flag, const char* format, ...) {
@@ -107,14 +157,12 @@ void log_debug_message(LogDebugFlag flag, const char* format, ...) {

  va_list args;
  va_start(args, format);
-  write_message(stdout, LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, t, format, args);
+  char* line = format_log_line(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, &t, format, args);
  va_end(args);
-
-  if (log_fp) {
-    va_start(args, format);
-    write_message(log_fp, LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, t, format, args);
-    va_end(args);
-  }
+  if (!line)
+    return;
+  emit_log_line(stdout, line);
+  free(line);
 }

 void log_info_message(LogInfoFlag flag, const char* format, ...) {
@@ -129,14 +177,12 @@ void log_info_message(LogInfoFlag flag, const char* format, ...) {

  va_list args;
  va_start(args, format);
-  write_message(stdout, LOG_LEVEL_INFO, t, format, args);
+  char* line = format_log_line(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, &t, format, args);
  va_end(args);
-
-  if (log_fp) {
-    va_start(args, format);
-    write_message(log_fp, LOG_LEVEL_INFO, t, format, args);
-    va_end(args);
-  }
+  if (!line)
+    return;
+  emit_log_line(stdout, line);
+  free(line);
 }

 void log_perror(const char* context) {
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include "config.h"
 #include "data.h"
 #include "file.h"
+#include "file_receive.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "protocol.h"
 #include "queue.h"
@@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ int write_thread(void* pipeline_context) {
       write would clobber them); accumulate the metadata here and let the
       caller apply it once every writer has drained. */
    if (result != FILE_SAVE_ERROR && file->is_dir && file->metadata &&
-        context->config->use_metadata && !context->config->omit_dir_times &&
+        dir_times_should_capture(context->config) &&
        !dir_time_list_add(&context->dir_times, file->path, file->metadata)) {
      file_destroy(file);
      pipeline_context_receiver_note_bytes_released(context, file_bytes);
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ char* ssh_build_remote_command(const char* server_path, bool old_args, char* con
        q++;
      len++;
    }
-    if (len > SIZE_MAX - q * 3 || len + q * 3 + 3 > SIZE_MAX - command_len)
+    if (q > (SIZE_MAX - len) / 3 || len + q * 3 + 3 > SIZE_MAX - command_len)
      return NULL;
    command_len += len + q * 3 + 3;
  }
@@ -152,9 +152,18 @@ static void accept_loop(Server* server, void (*child_fn)(int, void*), void* chil
    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "%s", log_fmt);
    pid_t pid = fork();
    if (pid == 0) {
+      /* Connection children must not run the parent's global cleanup(): it
+       * frees state (credentials / daemon conf) that the child's worker
+       * threads may still be reading and closes fd numbers the child could
+       * already have reused.  Reset the inherited handlers so a signal
+       * terminates the child directly; SIGCHLD is reset too since a child
+       * must never reap the parent's children.  This runs before the child
+       * spawns any thread, so it cannot race one. */
+      signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+      signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+      signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
      close(server->file_descriptor);
      child_fn(fd, child_ctx);
-      close(fd);
      _exit(0);
    } else if (pid > 0) {
      g_active_connections++;
@@ -169,6 +178,9 @@ struct plain_ctx {

 static void plain_child_fn(int fd, void* ctx) {
  ((struct plain_ctx*)ctx)->handler(fd);
+  /* handler() never closes the connection fd; the child owns its single
+   * close here after the handler has fully torn down. */
+  close(fd);
 }

 bool server_listen(Server* server, void (*handler)(int file_descriptor)) {
@@ -65,6 +65,18 @@ static SSL_CTX* create_ssl_ctx(bool is_server, const char* cert, const char* key
    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
    return NULL;
  }
+  /* TLS 1.3 ciphersuites are configured separately from the TLS 1.2 and below
+   * cipher list above.  Pin the three AEAD suites OpenSSL offers, dropping
+   * TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 and the CCM_8 variant, and fail closed if the
+   * library rejects the policy.  SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites needs OpenSSL 1.1.1;
+   * earlier versions have no TLS 1.3, so the call is compile-guarded. */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L
+  if (SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(
+          ctx, "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256") != 1) {
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+#endif

  if (cert && key) {
    struct stat key_stat;
@@ -180,13 +192,18 @@ static void tls_child_fn(int fd, void* arg) {
  SSL* ssl = wrap_fd_with_ssl(fd, ctx->ssl_ctx, true, NULL);
  if (!ssl) {
    io_set_ssl(NULL);
+    close(fd);
    return;
  }
  io_set_ssl(ssl);
  ctx->handler(fd);
+  /* Shut the TLS layer down before releasing the fd: handler() no longer
+   * closes it, so SSL_shutdown still has a valid socket.  The child owns the
+   * single fd close, performed last. */
  SSL_shutdown(ssl);
  SSL_free(ssl);
  io_set_ssl(NULL);
+  close(fd);
 }

 bool server_listen_tls(Server* server, void (*handler)(int file_descriptor)) {
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include "test_array_list.h"
 #include "array_list.h"
 #include "test_utils.h"
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>

 static int destroyer_calls = 0;
@@ -9,7 +10,7 @@ static void test_destroyer(void* item) {
  free(item);
 }

-void test_array_list() {
+static void test_array_list_basic() {
  ArrayList* list = array_list_create(free);
  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
  EXPECT_EQ_INT(list->size, 0);
@@ -54,3 +55,20 @@ void test_array_list() {
  array_list_delete(list);
  EXPECT_EQ_INT(destroyer_calls, 106);
 }
+
+/* A capacity that would overflow `capacity * 2` must be refused instead of
+ * wrapping into signed-overflow UB; array_list_add surfaces the failure. */
+static void test_array_list_extend_overflow_guard() {
+  ArrayList* list = array_list_create(NULL);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
+  list->capacity = INT_MAX / 2 + 1;
+  list->size = list->capacity;
+  EXPECT_FALSE(array_list_add(list, NULL));
+  list->size = 0;
+  array_list_delete(list);
+}
+
+void test_array_list() {
+  test_array_list_basic();
+  test_array_list_extend_overflow_guard();
+}
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include "queue.h"
 #include "test_utils.h"
 #include "utils.h"
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -1672,7 +1673,7 @@ static void test_config_receive_rejects_invalid_iconv_spec() {
 static void test_config_super_mode_wire_roundtrip() {
  if (is_running_under_valgrind())
    return;
-  int modes[] = {SUPER_MODE_AUTO, SUPER_MODE_ON, SUPER_MODE_OFF};
+  SuperMode modes[] = {SUPER_MODE_AUTO, SUPER_MODE_ON, SUPER_MODE_OFF};
  for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(modes) / sizeof(modes[0]); i++) {
    int p[2];
    EXPECT_EQ_INT(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, p), 0);
@@ -1846,6 +1847,89 @@ static void test_config_receive_rejects_copy_as_without_metadata() {
  config_delete(c);
 }

+/* Like roundtrip_config_ok, but the parent is the RECEIVER so the frame can be
+   rejected MID-way, before the sender finishes writing it.  The sender child
+   ignores SIGPIPE so the receiver closing early cannot kill it; the parent
+   waits for the child to exit after observing the rejection. */
+static bool roundtrip_config_rejected(const Config* send_cfg) {
+  int p[2];
+  if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, p) != 0)
+    return false;
+  pid_t pid = fork();
+  if (pid == 0) {
+    (void)signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+    close(p[0]);
+    io_set_fds(p[1], p[1]);
+    config_send(p[1], send_cfg);
+    close(p[1]);
+    _exit(0);
+  }
+  close(p[1]);
+  io_set_fds(p[0], p[0]);
+  Config* recv = config_receive(p[0]);
+  bool rejected = recv == NULL;
+  config_delete(recv);
+  close(p[0]);
+  int status;
+  waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+  return rejected;
+}
+
+/* Build a Config with `count` --skip-compress suffixes, each `suffix_len` bytes
+   long, for the pre-auth config-string budget tests. */
+static Config* make_skip_compress_config(int count, size_t suffix_len) {
+  Config* c = config_create();
+  if (!c)
+    return NULL;
+  c->send_directory = str_dup("/src");
+  c->receive_root_directory = str_dup("/dst");
+  c->skip_compress_set = true;
+  c->skip_compress_count = count;
+  c->skip_compress_suffixes = calloc((size_t)count, sizeof(char*));
+  if (!c->skip_compress_suffixes) {
+    config_delete(c);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  char* suffix = malloc(suffix_len + 1);
+  if (!suffix) {
+    config_delete(c);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  memset(suffix, 'x', suffix_len);
+  suffix[suffix_len] = '\0';
+  for (int i = 0; i < count; i++)
+    c->skip_compress_suffixes[i] = str_dup(suffix);
+  free(suffix);
+  return c;
+}
+
+/* Pre-auth memory bound: one connection must not retain unbounded config
+   strings.  An over-limit --skip-compress count is refused, and even an
+   in-range count cannot exceed the aggregate per-connection string budget. */
+static void test_config_receive_rejects_oversized_string_budget() {
+  if (is_running_under_valgrind())
+    return;
+
+  /* Exactly MAX_SKIP_COMPRESS_SUFFIXES tiny suffixes are accepted. */
+  Config* ok = make_skip_compress_config(MAX_SKIP_COMPRESS_SUFFIXES, 1);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(ok);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(roundtrip_config_ok(ok));
+  config_delete(ok);
+
+  /* One suffix over the count cap is rejected before any suffix is read. */
+  Config* over_count = make_skip_compress_config(MAX_SKIP_COMPRESS_SUFFIXES + 1, 1);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(over_count);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(roundtrip_config_rejected(over_count));
+  config_delete(over_count);
+
+  /* In-range count, but the strings together exceed MAX_CONFIG_STRING_BYTES
+     (64 suffixes * ~64 KiB > 1 MiB), so the aggregate budget rejects it. */
+  Config* over_bytes = make_skip_compress_config(64, MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(over_bytes);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(roundtrip_config_rejected(over_bytes));
+  config_delete(over_bytes);
+}
+
 /* identity_copy_as_refused() is the pure, pre-snapshot refusal predicate: a
   --copy-as is refused when the receiver is not root OR the effective super
   mode is OFF (an operator veto), and never when --copy-as is unset. */
@@ -2009,6 +2093,7 @@ void test_config() {
    test_config_copy_as_wire_roundtrip();
    test_config_receive_rejects_negative_copy_as();
    test_config_receive_rejects_copy_as_without_metadata();
+    test_config_receive_rejects_oversized_string_budget();
    test_config_receive_with_validate_rejects();
  }
  test_identity_copy_as_refused();
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #include "test_daemon_conf.h"
+#include "credentials.h"
 #include "daemon_conf.h"
 #include "test_utils.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -320,6 +321,51 @@ static void test_daemon_conf_dparam_override() {
  daemon_conf_free(conf);
 }

+/* Each `auth users` entry is validated with the same username rule as the
+ * credential store, so invisible whitespace/control characters can never make
+ * an exact strcmp match ambiguous. */
+static void test_daemon_conf_auth_users_validated() {
+  char* path;
+  char err[256];
+  const DaemonConf* conf;
+
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = alice, bad user\n", &path), 0);
+  conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
+  free(path);
+  EXPECT_NULL(conf);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "invalid 'auth users' entry") != NULL);
+
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = good\tbad\n", &path), 0);
+  conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
+  free(path);
+  EXPECT_NULL(conf);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "invalid 'auth users' entry") != NULL);
+
+  /* An over-long name exceeds CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN and is rejected. */
+  {
+    char body[CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 128];
+    int n = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), "[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = ");
+    memset(body + n, 'a', CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 1);
+    body[n + CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 1] = '\n';
+    body[n + CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 2] = '\0';
+    EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf(body, &path), 0);
+    conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
+    free(path);
+    EXPECT_NULL(conf);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "invalid 'auth users' entry") != NULL);
+  }
+
+  /* Empty entries between commas are skipped, not treated as invalid. */
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = alice,, bob\n", &path), 0);
+  DaemonConf* ok_conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
+  free(path);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(ok_conf);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(ok_conf->modules[0].auth_user_count, 2);
+  EXPECT_EQ_STR(ok_conf->modules[0].auth_users[0], "alice");
+  EXPECT_EQ_STR(ok_conf->modules[0].auth_users[1], "bob");
+  daemon_conf_free(ok_conf);
+}
+
 static void test_daemon_module_name_valid() {
  EXPECT_TRUE(daemon_module_name_valid("backup"));
  EXPECT_TRUE(daemon_module_name_valid("Backup_2"));
@@ -351,5 +397,6 @@ void test_daemon_conf() {
  test_daemon_conf_missing_file_rejected();
  test_daemon_conf_find_module();
  test_daemon_conf_dparam_override();
+  test_daemon_conf_auth_users_validated();
  test_daemon_module_name_valid();
 }
@@ -1370,6 +1370,76 @@ static void test_dir_time_list() {
  rmdir(root);
 }

+/* A hostile sender can stream unbounded STATUS_DIR_TIMES frames; the
+ * accumulator must bound the CUMULATIVE path bytes (not just one frame) and
+ * reject the add that would cross the cap, leaving the list untouched. */
+static void test_dir_time_list_cap() {
+  DirTimeList list;
+  dir_time_list_init(&list);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)list.bytes, 0);
+  FileMetadata metadata = {.mtime_sec = 1, .mtime_nsec = 0};
+
+  size_t path_len = MAX_STRING_SIZE - 1;
+  char* path = malloc(path_len + 1);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(path);
+  memset(path, 'a', path_len);
+  path[path_len] = '\0';
+
+  bool rejected = false;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < MAX_DIR_TIME_ENTRIES + 1 && !rejected; i++) {
+    size_t before_count = list.count;
+    size_t before_bytes = list.bytes;
+    if (!dir_time_list_add(&list, path, &metadata)) {
+      rejected = true;
+      /* The rejected add must not have partially mutated the list. */
+      EXPECT_TRUE(list.count == before_count);
+      EXPECT_TRUE(list.bytes == before_bytes);
+    } else {
+      EXPECT_TRUE(list.count == before_count + 1);
+      EXPECT_TRUE(list.bytes == before_bytes + path_len + sizeof(FileMetadata) + sizeof(char*));
+    }
+  }
+  EXPECT_TRUE(rejected);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(list.count <= MAX_DIR_TIME_ENTRIES);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(list.bytes <= MAX_DIR_TIME_BYTES);
+
+  /* The retained entries are still intact and freeable after the rejection. */
+  EXPECT_TRUE(list.count > 0);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(strcmp(list.paths[0], path) == 0);
+  dir_time_list_free(&list);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)list.bytes, 0);
+  free(path);
+}
+
+/* receive_incremental_check must reject an empty check_path; every other
+ * receive path rejects path[0]=='\0'.  Feed the check header (empty wire path
+ * + size/mtime/nsec) and assert the check is refused without being skipped. */
+static void test_receive_incremental_check_empty_path() {
+  Config* cfg = config_create();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(cfg);
+  cfg->checksum = false;
+
+  int p[2];
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(pipe(p), 0);
+  size_t wire_len = 0;
+  unsigned long long check_size = 0;
+  long long check_mtime = 0;
+  long long check_mtime_nsec = 0;
+  EXPECT_TRUE(send_n_data(p[1], &wire_len, sizeof(wire_len)));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(send_n_data(p[1], &check_size, sizeof(check_size)));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(send_n_data(p[1], &check_mtime, sizeof(check_mtime)));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(send_n_data(p[1], &check_mtime_nsec, sizeof(check_mtime_nsec)));
+
+  bool skipped = true;
+  const File* file = receive_incremental_check(p[0], cfg, &skipped);
+  EXPECT_NULL(file);
+  EXPECT_FALSE(skipped);
+
+  close(p[0]);
+  close(p[1]);
+  config_delete(cfg);
+}
+
 /* -K/--keep-dirlinks secure open: with an authorized root, a destination path
 * component that is a symlink to an IN-ROOT directory is used as that directory
 * (its referent is opened through a relative O_NOFOLLOW walk from the root fd,
@@ -1531,6 +1601,8 @@ void test_file() {
  }
  test_file_metadata_create();
  test_dir_time_list();
+  test_dir_time_list_cap();
+  test_receive_incremental_check_empty_path();
  test_keep_dirlinks_secure_open();
  test_inplace_overwrite_clears_special_mode_bits();
  test_inplace_overwrite_metadata_strips_special_bits();
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 #include "test_log.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "test_utils.h"
+#include <fcntl.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <threads.h>
 #include <unistd.h>

 /* Test default log level: WARNING and ERROR should print, DEBUG and INFO should not.
@@ -147,6 +149,118 @@ static void test_log_debug_enabled_matches_gate() {
  set_log_debug_flags(LOG_DEBUG_ALL);
 }

+#define LOG_CONCURRENCY_THREADS 8
+#define LOG_CONCURRENCY_LINES 250
+
+typedef struct {
+  int id;
+} LogConcurrencyArg;
+
+static int log_concurrency_worker(void* context) {
+  LogConcurrencyArg* arg = context;
+  for (int i = 0; i < LOG_CONCURRENCY_LINES; i++) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "worker %d line %d", arg->id, i);
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int count_substring(const char* haystack, const char* needle) {
+  int count = 0;
+  size_t needle_length = strlen(needle);
+  const char* cursor = haystack;
+  while ((cursor = strstr(cursor, needle)) != NULL) {
+    count++;
+    cursor += needle_length;
+  }
+  return count;
+}
+
+/* Concurrent log_message() calls from many threads must never interleave a
+ * single line: every emitted line has exactly one timestamp prefix and one
+ * body.  Before write_message() was serialized, the three separate fprintf
+ * calls (prefix, body, newline) let lines tear. */
+static void test_log_concurrent_no_torn_lines(void) {
+  FILE* fp = tmpfile();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(fp);
+
+  /* Mute the console mirror so the workers don't flood the test output. */
+  fflush(stdout);
+  fflush(stderr);
+  int saved_stdout = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+  int saved_stderr = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
+  int null_fd = open("/dev/null", O_WRONLY);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(saved_stdout >= 0);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(saved_stderr >= 0);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(null_fd >= 0);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(dup2(null_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) >= 0);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(dup2(null_fd, STDERR_FILENO) >= 0);
+  close(null_fd);
+
+  set_log_level(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING);
+  log_set_stderr_mode(LOG_STDERR_ERRORS);
+  log_set_file(fp);
+
+  thrd_t threads[LOG_CONCURRENCY_THREADS];
+  LogConcurrencyArg args[LOG_CONCURRENCY_THREADS];
+  int created = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < LOG_CONCURRENCY_THREADS; i++) {
+    args[i].id = i;
+    if (thrd_create(&threads[i], log_concurrency_worker, &args[i]) != thrd_success)
+      break;
+    created++;
+  }
+  for (int i = 0; i < created; i++) {
+    thrd_join(threads[i], NULL);
+  }
+
+  log_set_file(NULL);
+  fflush(fp);
+
+  fflush(stdout);
+  fflush(stderr);
+  dup2(saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO);
+  dup2(saved_stderr, STDERR_FILENO);
+  close(saved_stdout);
+  close(saved_stderr);
+
+  rewind(fp);
+  char line[512];
+  int total_lines = 0;
+  int malformed_lines = 0;
+  bool saw_missing_newline = false;
+  while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != NULL) {
+    size_t length = strlen(line);
+    if (length == 0 || line[length - 1] != '\n')
+      saw_missing_newline = true;
+    if (strncmp(line, "20", 2) != 0 || count_substring(line, "[WARN]: worker ") != 1)
+      malformed_lines++;
+    total_lines++;
+  }
+  fclose(fp);
+
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(created, LOG_CONCURRENCY_THREADS);
+  EXPECT_FALSE(saw_missing_newline);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(malformed_lines, 0);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(total_lines, LOG_CONCURRENCY_THREADS * LOG_CONCURRENCY_LINES);
+  log_set_stderr_mode(LOG_STDERR_ERRORS);
+}
+
+/* Detaching the logger from a FILE* before it is closed must leave the logging
+ * subsystem safe: later calls must not touch the freed handle. */
+static void test_log_set_file_null_before_fclose(void) {
+  FILE* fp = tmpfile();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(fp);
+
+  set_log_level(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR);
+  log_set_file(fp);
+  log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "line before detach");
+  log_set_file(NULL);
+  fclose(fp);
+
+  log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "line after close");
+  EXPECT_TRUE(true);
+}
+
 void test_log() {
  test_log_message_debug();
  test_log_message_info();
@@ -159,4 +273,6 @@ void test_log() {
  test_log_stderr_mode_all();
  test_log_message_formats();
  test_log_debug_enabled_matches_gate();
+  test_log_concurrent_no_torn_lines();
+  test_log_set_file_null_before_fclose();
 }
@@ -1317,6 +1317,58 @@ static void test_scanner_captures_directory_times() {
  rmdir(root);
 }

+/* Ownership guard for chunk_data_to_chunk(): a returned Chunk owns its File
+ * objects, so destroying the chunk must free them exactly once and the scanner
+ * must never free them again.  chunk_size = 1 forces the mid-directory
+ * conversion branch (chunk_data_size > chunk_size) for every file, and the
+ * chunk is destroyed immediately, catching a double free / use-after-free under
+ * ASan if ownership transfer regressed.
+ *
+ * The failure path (array_list_to_array() or chunk_create() returning NULL) is
+ * not reachable from a unit test: both allocate through protocol_alloc(), and
+ * each allocation they perform is no larger than the array_list allocations
+ * that already succeeded while building the list (array_list_to_array() copies
+ * exactly `size` pointers, which never exceeds the capacity just grown, and
+ * sizeof(Chunk) is far below the initial 100-entry item array).  Binding a
+ * small --max-alloc session therefore always fails *before* this function, not
+ * inside it, so fault injection cannot isolate these paths. */
+static void test_scanner_chunk_ownership() {
+  const char* dir = "test_scan_ownership";
+  const char* file1 = "test_scan_ownership/a.txt";
+  const char* file2 = "test_scan_ownership/b.txt";
+  const char* file3 = "test_scan_ownership/c.txt";
+
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(mkdir(dir, 0755), 0);
+  create_test_file(file1, "aaaa");
+  create_test_file(file2, "bbbb");
+  create_test_file(file3, "cccc");
+
+  ScannerOptions options = {0};
+  options.chunk_size = 1;
+  DirectoryScanner* scanner = directory_scanner_create_with_options(dir, &options);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(scanner);
+
+  int chunks = 0;
+  int files = 0;
+  Chunk* chunk;
+  while ((chunk = directory_scanner_next(scanner)) != NULL) {
+    chunks++;
+    files += chunk->element_count;
+    EXPECT_EQ_INT(chunk->element_count, 1);
+    chunk_destroy(chunk);
+    EXPECT_FALSE(directory_scanner_failed(scanner));
+  }
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(files, 3);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(chunks, 3);
+  EXPECT_FALSE(directory_scanner_failed(scanner));
+
+  directory_scanner_destroy(scanner);
+  unlink(file1);
+  unlink(file2);
+  unlink(file3);
+  rmdir(dir);
+}
+
 void test_scanner() {
  test_scanner_single_file();
  test_scanner_multiple_files();
@@ -1353,4 +1405,5 @@ void test_scanner() {
  test_dirs_files_from();
  test_files_from_relative_send_path();
  test_scanner_captures_directory_times();
+  test_scanner_chunk_ownership();
 }
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
TapTap	1acb66628d	Merge Wave 2: thread-safety fixes (signals, fd ownership, handler epilogue, logging, scanner leak) CI / lint (push) Successful in 1m30s Details CI / sanitizers (undefined) (push) Successful in 59s Details CI / sanitizers (address) (push) Successful in 1m6s Details CI / fuzz-build (push) Successful in 28s Details CI / coverage (push) Successful in 49s Details CI / build-and-test (push) Successful in 4m31s Details CI / valgrind (push) Successful in 3m10s Details	2026-09-13 02:13:27 +02:00
TapTap	ba1c7a369f	fix(server,log): non-socket shutdown fallback, drop redundant delay cleanup, unlock logging I/O	2026-09-13 02:13:22 +02:00
TapTap	d28489d83c	Merge branch 'fix/w2-scan' into fix/w2-integration	2026-09-13 01:49:44 +02:00
TapTap	312ed05170	Merge branch 'fix/w2-log' into fix/w2-integration	2026-09-13 01:49:44 +02:00
TapTap	fecbe2c90c	fix(server): child-safe signals, single fd owner, handler cleanup epilogue	2026-09-13 01:49:27 +02:00
TapTap	c8f5d80fcb	fix(log): serialize message emission; clear log_fp before close; use logger	2026-09-13 01:44:59 +02:00
TapTap	8147ff7b50	fix(scanner): free chunk_data on chunk-create failure	2026-09-13 01:36:51 +02:00
TapTap	b7fbb56289	test(file): silence cppcheck constVariablePointer in empty-path test CI / lint (push) Successful in 1m32s Details CI / sanitizers (undefined) (push) Successful in 57s Details CI / sanitizers (address) (push) Successful in 1m4s Details CI / fuzz-build (push) Successful in 30s Details CI / coverage (push) Successful in 49s Details CI / build-and-test (push) Successful in 4m28s Details CI / valgrind (push) Successful in 3m10s Details	2026-09-13 01:25:29 +02:00
TapTap	08063b6d73	Merge Wave 1: critical/High fixes (UAF, DoS caps, leaks, hardening) CI / lint (push) Failing after 1m32s Details CI / build-and-test (push) Skipped Details CI / sanitizers (address) (push) Skipped Details CI / sanitizers (undefined) (push) Skipped Details CI / fuzz-build (push) Skipped Details CI / coverage (push) Skipped Details CI / valgrind (push) Skipped Details	2026-09-13 01:18:58 +02:00
TapTap	ea2f76cd7a	fix(receiver): charge per-entry DirTimeList cost; cap client --skip-compress	2026-09-13 01:18:54 +02:00
TapTap	76eeba1773	Merge branch 'fix/w1d-hardening' into fix/w1-integration	2026-09-13 00:59:35 +02:00
TapTap	b72ab298ab	Merge branch 'fix/w1c-wire' into fix/w1-integration	2026-09-13 00:59:35 +02:00
TapTap	446a714ef8	Merge branch 'fix/w1b-receiver' into fix/w1-integration	2026-09-13 00:59:35 +02:00
TapTap	a90e234eb3	harden: overflow guards, auth-user validation, TLS1.3 policy, build hardening	2026-09-13 00:59:21 +02:00
TapTap	f8252cf3e7	fix(protocol): bound pre-auth config string memory	2026-09-13 00:57:32 +02:00
TapTap	4557924972	fix(receiver): cap DirTimeList growth and fix placeholder Data leaks	2026-09-13 00:57:32 +02:00
TapTap	59ce174d22	fix(client-send): UAF in basis preflight and missing_args leak	2026-09-13 00:57:09 +02:00
TapTap	2a8941ee5c	Merge feat/ref-integration: SuperMode enum, dir-time gate dedup, parse_args/server_module_gate splits CI / lint (push) Successful in 1m30s Details CI / sanitizers (undefined) (push) Successful in 59s Details CI / sanitizers (address) (push) Successful in 1m6s Details CI / fuzz-build (push) Successful in 29s Details CI / coverage (push) Successful in 49s Details CI / valgrind (push) Successful in 2m9s Details CI / build-and-test (push) Successful in 4m31s Details	2026-09-12 21:11:03 +02:00
TapTap	37037a6ee7	refactor(client-cli): drop unused CliParseCtx positional fields (cppcheck)	2026-09-12 21:07:14 +02:00
TapTap	061e9ad43f	Merge feat/ref-modulegate: split server_module_gate into helpers	2026-09-12 20:56:43 +02:00
TapTap	f928879755	Merge feat/ref-parseargs: split parse_args into focused helpers	2026-09-12 20:56:43 +02:00
TapTap	84b7cb0de3	refactor(server): split server_module_gate into ordered helper stages	2026-09-12 20:56:33 +02:00
TapTap	921472b8b3	refactor(client-cli): split parse_args into focused option handlers Break the ~700-line parse_args god function into cohesive static helpers grouped by concern: output controls, pre-negation, range/time options, the OPTION_TABLE dispatcher, flag/meta handlers, IO/network options, filter and logging options, checksum/socket options, remote/basis/identity options, positional handling, and a final lowering step. A file-local CliParseCtx carries the config, cursor, positional buffers and the mutable parse flags, so each handler stays focused. The dispatcher calls the handlers in the original recognition order and preserves the exact return contract (0/1/negative), error messages, log levels and control flow. Behavior preserved; no functional changes.	2026-09-12 20:55:04 +02:00
TapTap	082ac2645d	Merge feat/ref-dirtime: dir-time capture gate dedup	2026-09-12 20:43:42 +02:00
TapTap	eefbd1e849	Merge feat/ref-supermode: SuperMode enum	2026-09-12 20:43:42 +02:00
TapTap	1fd462cca8	refactor(config): replace SUPER_MODE_* macros with SuperMode enum Type Config.super_mode as SuperMode (a proper C enum) instead of a bare int. The wire boundary still carries the mode as an int: send casts the enum explicitly and receive reads a temporary int, validates the AUTO..OFF range, then casts. Emitted bytes and accepted values are unchanged. ModuleGateContext.super_mode_override keeps its -1 sentinel as int with an explicit cast at the apply site. Behavior preserved.	2026-09-12 20:43:24 +02:00
TapTap	4ac37c4d8a	refactor(dir-times): extract dir_times_should_capture predicate Deduplicate the repeated directory-time capture gate (`config->use_metadata && !config->omit_dir_times`) used by the sender-side (multiprocessing.c) and receiver-side (receiver.c) sinks into a single predicate declared next to the DirTimeList machinery in file_receive.h and defined in file_receive.c. Behavior preserved: identical short-circuit condition and semantics, no signature or protocol changes.	2026-09-12 20:42:47 +02:00
TapTap	08af945bd6	Merge main back into dev after v2.19.0 release CI / lint (push) Successful in 1m32s Details CI / sanitizers (address) (push) Successful in 55s Details CI / fuzz-build (push) Successful in 30s Details CI / sanitizers (undefined) (push) Successful in 53s Details CI / coverage (push) Successful in 47s Details CI / build-and-test (push) Successful in 4m28s Details CI / valgrind (push) Successful in 2m11s Details	2026-09-12 20:22:54 +02:00