Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
TapTap 9da5a0a9ed fix(server): gate --force by --allow-delete and secure root super default
C2: --force is deletion authority (an incoming regular file may remove a
non-empty destination directory tree, and --delete-missing-args may
remove a non-empty directory mirror), but it was not masked by the
operator --allow-delete policy.  The handler now clears
config->force_delete unless --allow-delete was given, exactly like
--delete and --delete-missing-args.

C3: a standalone TCP / --stdio server running as root defaulted to
SUPER_MODE_AUTO, so an untrusted client --devices/--write-devices/
--super could make it create device nodes, write raw devices, or apply
client-chosen ownership.  A privileged standalone receiver now forces
SUPER_MODE_OFF unless the operator opts in with the new server-only
--allow-super flag.  Non-root receivers are unchanged, and the daemon
path keeps its per-module `client owner = yes` gate.  --allow-super is
rejected with --no-super or --daemon.

C6: tls_client_identity_allowed now rejects a CN whose reported length
reached the buffer bound, so a truncated over-long CN cannot be matched
by a required --client-cn prefix.

Tests: an integration regression proving --force cannot replace a
destination directory without --allow-delete; standalone-default tests
for --copy-as refusal and (root-only) skipped device creation; a CLI
unit test for the new flag.  The integration shared_server fixture opts
in with --allow-super so the existing root-only ownership/device/copy-as
tests continue to exercise the opted-in configuration.  README and
RSYNC_COMPAT document the flag and the force/delete gating.
2026-09-14 16:09:44 +02:00
TapTap 8c94ec9886 feat(a7): SCRAM-SHA-256 daemon auth to replace replayable digest
Replace the challenge-less static-SHA-256 daemon bearer credential with a
SCRAM-SHA-256-style challenge/response and a salted PBKDF2 verifier store.
PROTOCOL_VERSION 2.18.0 -> 2.19.0; legacy user:SHA256HEX stores hard-reject.

- credentials: b64/rand/PBKDF2/HMAC primitives, verifier store parser,
  constant-time proof verify + ServerSignature, --hash-credentials helper
- config: auth block is now [present][username]; client runs the challenge
  exchange; config_burn_auth wipes plaintext/derived secrets (A7-4)
- server: gate drives the challenge, dummy verifier for unknown/off-list users
- tests: independent Python KAT, replay + legacy integration tests, fuzz paths
- docs: new store format, --hash-credentials, 2.19.0 bump

TLS verification behavior (A7-3/S1) is intentionally unchanged.
2026-09-12 17:19:33 +02:00
TapTap fdc0f238c9 fix(p7-privilege): harden copy-as/super gates, own dirs/specials
- fake-super owner replay honors --no-super and an active --copy-as
- copy-as/identity ownership now applied to directories and special nodes
- reject copy_as_set && !use_metadata (receiver + client --no-preserve)
- daemon refuses --copy-as; add server-side --no-super operator veto
- implement identity_copy_as_refused/identity_copy_as_active
- reject copy-as ids that overflow int32; escape spec in log errors
- copy-as chown EPERM/EACCES logged at ERROR (still non-fatal)
- identity_wire_valid copy-as bounds; CLI help and RSYNC_COMPAT docs
- add unit tests and root-gated integration coverage
2026-09-12 12:34:43 +02:00
TapTap 6e02a24232 feat(p6-iconv): --iconv charset conversion + PROTOCOL 2.16.0 2026-09-10 17:13:01 +02:00
TapTap dd5ae60459 feat(d5-daemon-auth): password auth, --password-file, --early-input 2026-09-10 12:50:56 +02:00
TapTap b3d7d64347 feat(d5-daemon-core): daemon lifecycle, module config, ::dest, PROTOCOL 2.15.0 2026-09-09 17:48:07 +02:00