Commit Graph
17 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
TapTap 1b90ee2449 fix(review): close loopback TLS auth bypass; align docs and wrong-CN test
- server gate: the --allow-unauthenticated loopback allowance now requires
  an actual plaintext connection (!gate_ctx->ssl), so a loopback TLS client
  whose cert fails the --client-cn check is refused before any SCRAM
  challenge instead of falling through the plaintext opt-in.  Keep the
  invalid-fd guard as belt-and-braces (unreachable after the policy check).
- test: rewrote test_wrong_client_cn_refused_before_auth_challenge to run
  deterministically over 127.0.0.1 with --tls + --allow-unauthenticated and
  a CA-valid wrong-CN client cert, asserting the gate refusal log and an
  unchanged module tree (no skip).
- docs: --client-cn is mandatory with --tls; dummykey sidecar is secret
  material; document all transient-fallback reasons; qualify
  --allow-unauthenticated in README and --help so it cannot read as
  permitting remote plaintext auth.
- credentials.h: drop stale restrictive-umask claim (fchmod forces exact
  0600; only create/write/fsync/link/fchmod failure degrades to ephemeral).
2026-09-12 19:50:52 +02:00
TapTap d53614d06b fix(a7-3/s1): fail closed on non-loopback peers; require plaintext opt-in before challenge
utils_fd_peer_is_local now returns true only when getpeername SUCCEEDS and the
peer address classifies as loopback. A non-socket descriptor (pipe/socketpair)
or any getpeername error is NOT local, so the daemon auth gate fails closed
instead of treating an untestable --stdio pipe as trusted (daemon auth modules
are --daemon-only and the stdio path never loads a daemon config).

server_module_gate now requires --allow-unauthenticated for the loopback
plaintext auth path: a plaintext loopback connection without the operator
opt-in is refused at the config gate BEFORE server_auth_handshake, so no SCRAM
challenge is sent. Remote peers still require verified TLS regardless of the
flag; the handler keeps its defense-in-depth checks.

Docs state the exact policy (verified TLS with matching --client-cn, or
operator-opted-in loopback plaintext), drop the SSH/stdio auth-transport claim
(they are daemon-only), and add the loopback trust-boundary relay caveat and
the CN-only (no SAN) residual. Adds a unit-test negative for pipe/socketpair
and an integration test where a relay observes no challenge when the flag is
absent.
2026-09-12 19:18:29 +02:00
TapTap a7a1930e88 fix(a7-3/s1): require TLS or local transport for daemon auth
Daemon modules that declare 'auth users' no longer accept credentials over a
remote plaintext connection: server_module_gate refuses at the config gate,
before any SCRAM challenge is sent, unless the connection is verified TLS with
a client certificate matching --client-cn, or a local/SSH transport (loopback
TCP peer or the --stdio pipe). --allow-unauthenticated does not relax this.

The TLS client-CN comparison now uses credentials_secure_equal (S2). Clients
sending --password-file to a non-loopback daemon must use --tls; validate_config
rejects the plaintext case before any network I/O.

Adds utils_sockaddr_is_loopback / utils_fd_peer_is_local / utils_host_is_loopback
helpers with unit tests, a client validation unit test, and integration tests
for the client-side plaintext rejection and the wrong-CN gate refusal.
2026-09-12 19:02:05 +02:00
TapTap 8c94ec9886 feat(a7): SCRAM-SHA-256 daemon auth to replace replayable digest
Replace the challenge-less static-SHA-256 daemon bearer credential with a
SCRAM-SHA-256-style challenge/response and a salted PBKDF2 verifier store.
PROTOCOL_VERSION 2.18.0 -> 2.19.0; legacy user:SHA256HEX stores hard-reject.

- credentials: b64/rand/PBKDF2/HMAC primitives, verifier store parser,
  constant-time proof verify + ServerSignature, --hash-credentials helper
- config: auth block is now [present][username]; client runs the challenge
  exchange; config_burn_auth wipes plaintext/derived secrets (A7-4)
- server: gate drives the challenge, dummy verifier for unknown/off-list users
- tests: independent Python KAT, replay + legacy integration tests, fuzz paths
- docs: new store format, --hash-credentials, 2.19.0 bump

TLS verification behavior (A7-3/S1) is intentionally unchanged.
2026-09-12 17:19:33 +02:00
TapTap 9f74b21c64 test(p8h): assert a --no-super daemon still refuses client --super 2026-09-12 15:55:44 +02:00
TapTap abad1664ba security(shared): fix -K TOCTOU, ssh old-args quoting, TLS opts, secret-file perms, sparse dedup
- file: open -K dirlink referents via a race-safe relative O_NOFOLLOW walk
  from the authorized-root fd instead of re-opening an absolute realpath()
  result (removes the intermediate-symlink swap TOCTOU).
- transport_ssh: always single-quote the server path, including --old-args,
  so no mode can inject shell metacharacters.
- transport_tls: set SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION and (guarded) SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION.
- credentials: reject --password-file/--early-input with any group/other
  permission bit; chmod 0600 the affected test fixtures.
- file_store: export file_store_write_sparse() and remove the verbatim
  file.c duplicate.
2026-09-12 15:01:48 +02:00
TapTap ea0a0e2eaf fix(p8-security): make --copy-as directory ownership airtight; harden tests/logs
- file_ensure_directory_secure() now chowns a final directory it creates under
  --copy-as and fails on error; the symlink parent-creation call site propagates
  it.  The is_dir branch fails when the confined parent cannot be opened under
  --copy-as.  Closes the residual wrong-owner gap for synthesized/symlink
  parent directories.
- file_restore_symlink_metadata() early NULL return is copy-as-aware.
- Preserve errno across the implicit-parent failure cleanup.
- Neutral skip messages (the clamp, not --no-super, may be responsible).
- Daemon copy-as test tolerates the non-root privilege refusal; usage text lists
  --copy-as.
2026-09-12 14:33:42 +02:00
TapTap b216ed31fb fix(p8-security): close review gaps in the ownership gate and copy-as failure propagation
- H3: a daemon module without 'client owner = yes' now also has super-user
  device activity forced off (char/block mknod, --write-devices), so a root
  daemon can no longer be made to create/write raw devices under AUTO.  The
  entries are skipped, preserving ordinary -a pushes.
- H1/H2: propagate a failed required --copy-as chown from symlink metadata
  restore and implicitly-created parent directories, so the entry (and run)
  reports failure instead of a wrong-owner success.
- Docs/help/headers updated for A2/A3 and the device clamp; startup warning
  spells out the client-owner risk.
- Tests: daemon device clamp (skipped without opt-in, created with opt-in),
  updated --super/--fake-super expectations.
2026-09-12 14:18:03 +02:00
TapTap e3840c8326 fix(p8-security): enforce daemon ownership policy, gate fake-super replay, drop implicit numeric-ids, make copy-as failures per-entry
A1: daemon refuses every client-chosen ownership/super-user request
(--numeric-ids/--chown/--usermap/--groupmap/--fake-super/--copy-as/--super)
unless the selected module opts in with 'client owner = yes'.
A2: fake-super owner replay requires an explicit ownership identity policy.
A3: --super no longer implies --numeric-ids (ownership stays opt-in).
A5: a failed --copy-as chown marks the entry failed instead of reporting
success with the wrong owner.
2026-09-12 14:00:55 +02:00
TapTap 938886829e fix(p7-privilege): close re-review gaps (implicit dir ownership, daemon --super, write-devices gate) 2026-09-12 12:54:45 +02:00
TapTap fdc0f238c9 fix(p7-privilege): harden copy-as/super gates, own dirs/specials
- fake-super owner replay honors --no-super and an active --copy-as
- copy-as/identity ownership now applied to directories and special nodes
- reject copy_as_set && !use_metadata (receiver + client --no-preserve)
- daemon refuses --copy-as; add server-side --no-super operator veto
- implement identity_copy_as_refused/identity_copy_as_active
- reject copy-as ids that overflow int32; escape spec in log errors
- copy-as chown EPERM/EACCES logged at ERROR (still non-fatal)
- identity_wire_valid copy-as bounds; CLI help and RSYNC_COMPAT docs
- add unit tests and root-gated integration coverage
2026-09-12 12:34:43 +02:00
TapTap 0c35cf2b82 test(d5-daemon-motd): assert no banner when no config key 2026-09-10 13:58:21 +02:00
TapTap cf5f730940 feat(d5-daemon-motd): daemon MOTD display + --no-motd 2026-09-10 13:52:24 +02:00
TapTap accd34ad60 fix(d5-daemon-auth): address auth review findings (Wave B)
- test_credentials.c: NUL-terminate the overlong-line stack buffer before
  make_tmp_file's strlen() (was a stack-buffer-overflow READ under ASan);
  still exercises the overlong-rejection path.
- Add redacted protocol string variants (protocol_send_str_redacted /
  receive + fd send_str_redacted/receive_str_redacted) and use them for the
  daemon auth username/digest so --verbose / LOG_DEBUG_ALL never logs a
  replayable credential while other protocol strings keep their debug trace.
- credentials_verify/gate: replace byte-wise-short-circuiting strcmp with a
  fixed-length constant-time username compare (closes user-enumeration oracle);
  update doc comment to match.
- read_secret_file: preserve password exact bytes (only strip trailing CR/LF)
  and burn the stack line buffer; document the whitespace behavior.
- test_server_cli.c: note the parser zero-inits opts on failure.
- Add debug-level daemon test asserting the digest never appears under --verbose.

PROTOCOL_VERSION stays 2.15.0.
2026-09-10 13:20:42 +02:00
TapTap dd5ae60459 feat(d5-daemon-auth): password auth, --password-file, --early-input 2026-09-10 12:50:56 +02:00
TapTap 7c55409a6b fix(d5-daemon-core): cppcheck const-correctness, wire module length cap, daemonize chdir/umask, daemon confinement tests
- daemon_conf.c/server.c/test_daemon_conf.c: const-qualify parse/loop pointers;
  scope user_path static inside its block (clears the 9-wave-A cppcheck findings)
- config.c receive_daemon_module: reject invalid/over-long wire module names
  (> DAEMON_MAX_MODULE_NAME) with a clean STATUS_ERROR; client side already
  enforced via daemon_module_name_valid in config_parse_daemon_dest
- server.c daemonize: chdir(/) and umask(0) so module paths resolve from /
  and config-requested file modes are honored; PROTOCOL_VERSION stays 2.15.0
- test_daemon.py: confinement (read-only/unknown no-write anywhere), module-less
  and dot-dot destination refusal, real daemon_detach double-fork path
2026-09-09 18:30:52 +02:00
TapTap b3d7d64347 feat(d5-daemon-core): daemon lifecycle, module config, ::dest, PROTOCOL 2.15.0 2026-09-09 17:48:07 +02:00