fix(p7-privilege): harden copy-as/super gates, own dirs/specials

- fake-super owner replay honors --no-super and an active --copy-as
- copy-as/identity ownership now applied to directories and special nodes
- reject copy_as_set && !use_metadata (receiver + client --no-preserve)
- daemon refuses --copy-as; add server-side --no-super operator veto
- implement identity_copy_as_refused/identity_copy_as_active
- reject copy-as ids that overflow int32; escape spec in log errors
- copy-as chown EPERM/EACCES logged at ERROR (still non-fatal)
- identity_wire_valid copy-as bounds; CLI help and RSYNC_COMPAT docs
- add unit tests and root-gated integration coverage

src/shared/config.c

@@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ static bool validate_received_config(const Config* config) {
          valid_wire_bool(config->munge_links) && valid_wire_bool(config->keep_dirlinks) &&
          valid_wire_bool(config->fake_super) &&
          (!config->copy_as_set || (config->copy_as_uid >= 0 && config->copy_as_gid >= 0)) &&
+         /* --copy-as forces ownership through the metadata path; without
+            metadata it would pass the privilege gate but silently chown
+            nothing.  Refuse the frame instead. */
+         (!config->copy_as_set || config->use_metadata) &&
          (!config->use_compression ||
           (config->compression_level >= 1 && config->compression_level <= 22)) &&
          config->chunk_size > 0 && config->chunk_size <= MAX_CHUNK_SIZE &&

src/shared/daemon_conf.h

@@ -23,8 +23,13 @@
  * server's --destination-root: the daemon confines every connection that
  * selects this module to this path (file_open_secure_parent /
  * has_path_traversal / path_is_within all keep the existing confinement, just
- * per-module).  There is never any client-chosen root and no --super /
- * --copy-as: a module path always stays confined.
+ * per-module).  There is never any client-chosen root: a module path always
+ * stays confined.  A daemon also REFUSES a client --copy-as outright, because
+ * there is no per-module opt-in for client-chosen ownership (unlike the
+ * standalone/SSH server, which honors it for its single operator-authorized
+ * root); the operator-level --no-super veto additionally forces super-user
+ * activities off for every daemon connection.  See server_module_gate in
+ * server.c and RSYNC_COMPAT.md.
  *
  * `auth_users` is honored by Wave B daemon authentication: a module that
  * declares auth users accepts a connection only when the presented username is

src/shared/file_receive.c

@@ -456,12 +456,19 @@ static FileSaveResult file_save_special_to_disk(const char* root_directory, cons
     return FILE_SAVE_SKIPPED;
   }
 
-  /* Apply mtime on the fresh node (utimensat, no-follow).  Ownership is not
-     applied -- identity fchown needs an fd and would require opening the node. */
+  /* Apply mtime on the fresh node (utimensat, no-follow). */
   struct timespec times[2] = {
       {.tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT},
       {.tv_sec = file->metadata->mtime_sec, .tv_nsec = file->metadata->mtime_nsec}};
   utimensat(parent_fd, leaf, times, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+  /* P7 Wave E: apply the negotiated ownership to the node ITSELF.  A FIFO is
+     created unprivileged, but --copy-as and explicit identity policies own
+     every entry (a char/block node path is already privilege-gated above).  The
+     no-follow helper changes the node's own ownership without dereferencing it;
+     it is a no-op unless an identity policy is active. */
+  if (identity_active_enabled())
+    identity_apply_ownership_link(parent_fd, leaf, (int32_t)file->metadata->uid,
+                                  (int32_t)file->metadata->gid);
   close(parent_fd);
   free(leaf);
   free(destination);
@@ -597,6 +604,22 @@ FileSaveResult file_save_to_disk_full(const char* root_directory, const File* fi
     if (!dir_path)
       return FILE_SAVE_ERROR;
     bool ok = file_ensure_directory_secure(dir_path);
+    /* P7 Wave E: apply the negotiated ownership to the directory ITSELF (not
+       just the files inside it).  --copy-as and every explicit identity policy
+       own every entry, so a directory must not keep the receiver's owner while
+       its children get the policy owner.  Applied no-follow on the confined
+       parent fd after the mkdir; identity_apply_ownership_link() is itself a
+       no-op unless an identity policy is active. */
+    if (ok && file->metadata && identity_active_enabled()) {
+      char* leaf = NULL;
+      int parent_fd = file_open_secure_parent(dir_path, &leaf, false);
+      if (parent_fd >= 0) {
+        identity_apply_ownership_link(parent_fd, leaf, (int32_t)file->metadata->uid,
+                                      (int32_t)file->metadata->gid);
+        close(parent_fd);
+      }
+      free(leaf);
+    }
     free(dir_path);
     return ok ? FILE_SAVE_WRITTEN : FILE_SAVE_ERROR;
   }

src/shared/identity.c

@@ -148,10 +148,25 @@ bool identity_active_enabled(void) {
      metadata, never reaches identity_apply_ownership, and therefore correctly
      stays inert; combined with -M it activates raw-id application.  --super
      with no explicit identity policy acts like --numeric-ids here. */
-  return g_identity.set && (g_identity.numeric_ids || g_identity.chown_uid_set ||
-                            g_identity.chown_gid_set || g_identity.usermap_count > 0 ||
-                            g_identity.groupmap_count > 0 || g_identity.copy_as_set ||
-                            identity_super_implies_numeric());
+  return g_identity.set &&
+         (g_identity.numeric_ids || g_identity.chown_uid_set || g_identity.chown_gid_set ||
+          g_identity.usermap_count > 0 || g_identity.groupmap_count > 0 || g_identity.copy_as_set ||
+          identity_super_implies_numeric());
+}
+
+bool identity_copy_as_active(void) {
+  return g_identity.set && g_identity.copy_as_set;
+}
+
+bool identity_copy_as_refused(const Config* config) {
+  if (!config || !config->copy_as_set)
+    return false;
+  /* The safe-subset --copy-as needs a privileged (root) receiver, and an
+   * operator/--no-super veto forbids the ownership change even for root.  This
+   * is deliberately a pure function of the config and the current effective uid
+   * (never the active snapshot) because the server evaluates it at the
+   * pre-STATUS_OK config gate, before identity_set_active() has run. */
+  return geteuid() != 0 || config->super_mode == SUPER_MODE_OFF;
 }
 
 bool identity_wire_valid(const Config* config) {
@@ -172,6 +187,12 @@ bool identity_wire_valid(const Config* config) {
     if (config->groupmap[i].from < IDENTITY_MATCH_ANY || config->groupmap[i].to < IDENTITY_CURRENT)
       return false;
   }
+  /* Defense-in-depth: a --copy-as block must never carry a negative (sentinel)
+   * id into the ownership path.  receive_copy_as_options already rejects them,
+   * but identity_wire_valid is the shared validation used by both the receiver
+   * and unit tests, so re-assert it here. */
+  if (config->copy_as_set && (config->copy_as_uid < 0 || config->copy_as_gid < 0))
+    return false;
   return true;
 }
 
@@ -413,6 +434,13 @@ done:
   return ret;
 }
 
+/* uid_t/gid_t are unsigned and may hold a value wider than the signed int32 the
+ * wire (and the identity policy) uses.  Reject such an id instead of truncating
+ * it to an out-of-range (possibly negative sentinel) value. */
+static bool identity_id_fits_int32(unsigned long id) {
+  return id <= (unsigned long)INT32_MAX;
+}
+
 int identity_parse_copy_as(Config* config, const char* value) {
   if (!config || !value || *value == '\0') {
     log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as requires USER[:GROUP]");
@@ -426,7 +454,10 @@ int identity_parse_copy_as(Config* config, const char* value) {
     if (*p == ':')
       colons++;
   if (colons > 1) {
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as must be USER[:GROUP] (got '%s')", value);
+    char* escaped = output_escape(value, false);
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as must be USER[:GROUP] (got '%s')",
+                escaped ? escaped : "<allocation failed>");
+    free(escaped);
     return -1;
   }
 
@@ -443,20 +474,34 @@ int identity_parse_copy_as(Config* config, const char* value) {
     group_token = colon + 1;
   }
 
+  /* The spec is untrusted user input echoed back in error paths: escape it once
+   * (8-bit-safe) so a control byte cannot forge a log line. */
+  char* escaped_spec = output_escape(value, false);
+  const char* shown = escaped_spec ? escaped_spec : "<allocation failed>";
+
   int32_t uid;
   if (*user_token == '\0') {
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as is missing the user (got '%s')", value);
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as is missing the user (got '%s')", shown);
+    free(escaped_spec);
     free(spec);
     return -1;
   }
   if (strcmp(user_token, "*") == 0) {
     /* '*' means the current/root user: the client's euid. */
+    if (!identity_id_fits_int32((unsigned long)geteuid())) {
+      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as: current user id %lu exceeds INT32_MAX",
+                  (unsigned long)geteuid());
+      free(escaped_spec);
+      free(spec);
+      return -1;
+    }
     uid = (int32_t)geteuid();
   } else if (identity_resolve_token(user_token, false, &uid) != 0) {
     log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
-                "--copy-as could not resolve user '%s' (use a name that exists "
-                "on the source, '*', or @N)",
-                value);
+                "--copy-as could not resolve user (use a name that exists on the "
+                "source, '*', or @N): %s",
+                shown);
+    free(escaped_spec);
     free(spec);
     return -1;
   }
@@ -464,15 +509,24 @@ int identity_parse_copy_as(Config* config, const char* value) {
   int32_t gid;
   if (group_token) {
     if (*group_token == '\0') {
-      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as group is empty (got '%s')", value);
+      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as group is empty (got '%s')", shown);
+      free(escaped_spec);
       free(spec);
       return -1;
     }
     if (strcmp(group_token, "*") == 0) {
+      if (!identity_id_fits_int32((unsigned long)getegid())) {
+        log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as: current group id %lu exceeds INT32_MAX",
+                    (unsigned long)getegid());
+        free(escaped_spec);
+        free(spec);
+        return -1;
+      }
       gid = (int32_t)getegid();
     } else if (identity_resolve_token(group_token, true, &gid) != 0) {
-      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as could not resolve group '%s' (got '%s')", group_token,
-                  value);
+      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as could not resolve group (got '%s'): %s", shown,
+                  shown);
+      free(escaped_spec);
       free(spec);
       return -1;
     }
@@ -481,8 +535,30 @@ int identity_parse_copy_as(Config* config, const char* value) {
      * passwd entry has no primary gid to look up, so fall back to gid == uid
      * (the rsync-style numeric convention; documented divergence). */
     struct passwd* pw = getpwuid((uid_t)uid);
-    gid = pw ? (int32_t)pw->pw_gid : uid;
+    if (pw) {
+      if (!identity_id_fits_int32((unsigned long)pw->pw_gid)) {
+        log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+                    "--copy-as: primary group id %lu for the requested user exceeds INT32_MAX",
+                    (unsigned long)pw->pw_gid);
+        free(escaped_spec);
+        free(spec);
+        return -1;
+      }
+      gid = (int32_t)pw->pw_gid;
+    } else {
+      gid = uid;
+    }
   }
+  /* The group-default and gid==uid fallbacks must never store a negative
+   * (sentinel) value; the explicit numeric path is already capped by
+   * identity_resolve_token. */
+  if (uid < 0 || gid < 0) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "--copy-as resolved id does not fit in int32 (got '%s')", shown);
+    free(escaped_spec);
+    free(spec);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  free(escaped_spec);
   free(spec);
 
   config->copy_as_set = true;
@@ -596,13 +672,28 @@ static void identity_log_chown_failure(const char* what, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
   /* EPERM/EACCES are expected when the receiver is not privileged (e.g. the CI
    * `nobody` user): warn and continue, never abort the transfer.  Any other
    * error (EIO/EROFS/ENOSPC/...) is a real failure and must not be silently
-   * downgraded to a warning. */
-  if (errno == EPERM || errno == EACCES)
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "could not apply ownership (uid=%ld gid=%ld): %s; leaving as-is",
-                (long)uid, (long)gid, strerror(errno));
-  else
+   * downgraded to a warning.
+   *
+   * --copy-as is different: the whole point of the flag is that the target
+   * ownership is REQUIRED (the pre-flight gate already refused an unprivileged
+   * receiver).  If the chown still fails with EPERM/EACCES (a capability-
+   * restricted root, root-squash, or a read-only mount) the run is silently
+   * producing the WRONG ownership, so surface it at ERROR.  It stays
+   * non-fatal: never abort the multithreaded receiver mid-transfer. */
+  if (errno == EPERM || errno == EACCES) {
+    if (identity_copy_as_active())
+      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+                  "could not apply --copy-as ownership on %s (uid=%ld gid=%ld): %s; "
+                  "entry was written with the wrong owner",
+                  what, (long)uid, (long)gid, strerror(errno));
+    else
+      log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
+                  "could not apply ownership (uid=%ld gid=%ld): %s; leaving as-is", (long)uid,
+                  (long)gid, strerror(errno));
+  } else {
     log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "failed to apply ownership on %s (uid=%ld gid=%ld): %s", what,
                 (long)uid, (long)gid, strerror(errno));
+  }
 }
 
 void identity_apply_ownership(int fd, int32_t source_uid, int32_t source_gid) {

src/shared/identity.h

@@ -56,6 +56,14 @@ int identity_parse_copy_as(Config* config, const char* value);
  * server-side policy veto. */
 bool identity_copy_as_refused(const Config* config);
 
+/* True when the CURRENT per-connection snapshot has a --copy-as active (i.e.
+ * identity_set_active() has run against a config with copy_as_set).  The
+ * --fake-super owner replay consults this so a copy-as run never lets the
+ * recorded source owner overwrite the forced target owner.  Reads the active
+ * snapshot, so call identity_set_active() first (the receiver does, before any
+ * write). */
+bool identity_copy_as_active(void);
+
 /* Receiver-side snapshot of the negotiated identity config.  The server calls
  * identity_set_active() once per connection (before any file write) using the
  * config received over the wire; the snapshot is a deep copy so the caller may

src/shared/xattr.c

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include "xattr.h"
+#include "identity.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "protocol.h"
 #include "utils.h"
@@ -337,7 +338,16 @@ void fake_super_store_fd(int fd, uint32_t uid, uint32_t gid, uint32_t mode, int6
  * stat fd-relative.  A privileged (root) run can actually change the owner;
  * a non-root run silently skips the fchown on EPERM/EACCES (never fatal,
  * mirroring the normal metadata identity path; other errors are logged) and
- * still applies mode/mtime where permitted. */
+ * still applies mode/mtime where permitted.
+ *
+ * The OWNER leg additionally honors two policies:
+ *   - --no-super (privilege_super_permitted() false) suppresses it even for a
+ *     root receiver, exactly like the normal metadata identity path.
+ *   - an active --copy-as is AUTHORITATIVE: the identity path already forced the
+ *     target owner, so replaying the recorded source owner here would silently
+ *     override it.  The xattr record is still stored/replayed for a later
+ *     privileged restore; only the live chown is skipped.  Mode/mtime remain
+ *     applied either way so unprivileged --fake-super still works. */
 bool fake_super_restore_fd(int fd) {
   if (fd < 0)
     return false;
@@ -357,8 +367,11 @@ bool fake_super_restore_fd(int fd) {
      must not abort the transfer for that reason (FastSync identity philosophy).
      EPERM/EACCES (expected for a non-root receiver) are skipped silently; a
      genuine EINVAL (an impossible stored id) is logged so the corruption is
-     not hidden. */
-  if (fchown(fd, (uid_t)ul_uid, (gid_t)ul_gid) != 0 && errno != EPERM && errno != EACCES)
+     not hidden.  --no-super suppresses the owner leg even for root, and an
+     active --copy-as is authoritative so its forced owner must not be
+     overwritten by the recorded source owner. */
+  if (privilege_super_permitted() && !identity_copy_as_active() &&
+      fchown(fd, (uid_t)ul_uid, (gid_t)ul_gid) != 0 && errno != EPERM && errno != EACCES)
     log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "--fake-super: could not restore owner on destination file: %s",
                 strerror(errno));
   /* Mode is applied through the same sanitization the normal metadata path