fix(a7-auth): address SCRAM auth review findings A-G
- tests: pass CREDENTIAL_KEY_LEN to unhex for the 32-byte KAT proof/sig (sizeof(expect) is 348, over-reading the 65-byte hex literal under ASan) - credentials: close the username-enumeration oracle with a store-wide dummy_key and a deterministic per-username dummy salt; make the store's iteration count uniform (reject intra-file and layered disagreements) and answer a miss with the store-wide count; run the constant-time key compare even when found=false and fold the decision with bitwise AND - credentials_compute_keys: enforce [CREDENTIAL_MIN_ITERS, CREDENTIAL_MAX_ITERS] - tests: recompute the whole KAT independently at CREDENTIAL_DEFAULT_ITERS (600000) and pin the golden store line; add non-uniform-store rejection, bound and deterministic-dummy-salt assertions - server: send exactly one generic STATUS_AUTH_FAILED on every failure path (including credentials_get_verifier failure); route all handshake exits through one burn path - credentials/server: burn the base64 decoders' scratch on error, the hash_store_line base64/line buffers on failure, and all handshake key/proof material - fuzz: guard the auth-offset scan against size_t underflow and use a found flag - docs: drop stale digest wording, use CREDENTIAL_MIN_ITERS as the --iterations bound, document 0600 output for --hash-credentials (plus a stderr warning on a group/other-accessible stdout file), and describe the deterministic dummy salt in the no-oracle claims
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@@ -55,9 +55,11 @@
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typedef struct CredentialStore CredentialStore;
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/* One resolved verifier. `found` is false for an unknown user or a user not on
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* a module's auth list; the remaining fields then hold a fresh random salt, the
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* default iteration count and fixed dummy keys, so the server can run the same
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* challenge/response math with no enumeration/timing oracle. */
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* a module's auth list; the remaining fields then hold a deterministic dummy
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* salt (HMAC of the store-wide dummy key over the username), the store-wide
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* uniform iteration count (default for an empty store) and fixed dummy keys, so
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* the server can run the same challenge/response math with no enumeration or
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* timing oracle. */
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typedef struct {
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uint8_t salt[CREDENTIAL_SALT_LEN];
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uint32_t iters;
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@@ -73,8 +75,10 @@ typedef struct {
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* opened or that fails the strict grammar is a hard error (err filled, NULL
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* returned) -- the daemon fails CLOSED rather than serving an auth-required
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* module with a partial store. Both files may be NULL, which yields an empty
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* store (every auth-required module then refuses connections). When both are
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* given, the --early-input file is layered over --password-file: a duplicate
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* store (every auth-required module then refuses connections). Every entry in
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* the resulting store must agree on the iteration count; entries that disagree
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* (within one file or across the two layered sources) are rejected. When both
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* are given, the --early-input file is layered over --password-file: a duplicate
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* username whose verifier matches is deduplicated; one whose verifier differs
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* is an error (the two sources disagree), never a silent pick.
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*
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@@ -101,9 +105,10 @@ bool credentials_random_bytes(uint8_t* out, size_t n);
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/* Resolve `user` against the store AND the module's auth-user list. The list
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* scan is a constant-time full-length comparison with no early break. On a
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* miss, *out is filled with a dummy verifier (fresh random salt, default
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* iterations, fixed dummy keys, found=false). Returns false only on invalid
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* arguments/allocation failure. */
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* miss, *out is filled with a dummy verifier (a deterministic per-username salt
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* derived from the store's dummy key, the store-wide uniform iteration count,
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* fixed dummy keys, found=false). Returns false on invalid arguments or an
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* HMAC/crypto primitive failure. */
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bool credentials_get_verifier(const CredentialStore* store, const char* user,
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const char* const* module_users, int n, CredentialVerifier* out);
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@@ -111,7 +116,8 @@ bool credentials_get_verifier(const CredentialStore* store, const char* user,
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* K = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256(password, salt, iters, 32)
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* ClientKey = HMAC-SHA256(K, "Client Key"); StoredKey = SHA256(ClientKey)
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* ServerKey = HMAC-SHA256(K, "Server Key")
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* Any of client_key/stored_key/server_key may be NULL when not needed. */
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* Any of client_key/stored_key/server_key may be NULL when not needed.
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* `iters` must lie in [CREDENTIAL_MIN_ITERS, CREDENTIAL_MAX_ITERS]. */
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bool credentials_compute_keys(const char* password, const uint8_t salt[CREDENTIAL_SALT_LEN],
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uint32_t iters, uint8_t client_key[CREDENTIAL_KEY_LEN],
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uint8_t stored_key[CREDENTIAL_KEY_LEN],
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