fix(xattr): whitelist path-based symlink apply; strengthen symlink xattr tests
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+15
-5
@@ -383,8 +383,17 @@ bool xattr_apply_fd(int fd, const FileXattrList* list) {
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* referent. fsetxattr cannot be used (no *at xattr syscall exists, and the
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* kernel rejects xattr syscalls on an O_PATH descriptor), so the already-open,
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* confinement-checked parent directory is addressed through /proc/self/fd and
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* the final component is applied with lsetxattr, which does not follow it. */
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bool xattr_apply_path_nofollow(int parent_fd, const char* leaf, const FileXattrList* list) {
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* the final component is applied with lsetxattr, which does not follow it.
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*
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* The list is trusted to come from xattr_receive() (already whitelisted), but
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* every name is re-validated here so this path-based primitive is confined on
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* its own -- this is the only apply primitive that addresses a path, and the
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* header promises a whitelisted apply. The apply is best-effort: if /proc is
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* not mounted (the anchor cannot be formed) or the kernel refuses the set, the
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* failure is skipped and never fails the transfer. See xattr.h for the bounded
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* residual TOCTOU between link creation and lsetxattr. */
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bool xattr_apply_path_nofollow(int parent_fd, const char* leaf, const FileXattrList* list,
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bool preserve_acls) {
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if (parent_fd < 0 || !leaf || leaf[0] == '\0' || strchr(leaf, '/') != NULL || !list)
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return false;
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if (list->count == 0)
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@@ -403,9 +412,10 @@ bool xattr_apply_path_nofollow(int parent_fd, const char* leaf, const FileXattrL
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int first_errno = 0;
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for (int i = 0; i < list->count; i++) {
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const FileXattr* xa = &list->items[i];
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/* Defense in depth: even a hand-crafted list can never apply the reserved
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--fake-super key (only fake_super_store_fd may write it). */
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if (strcmp(xa->name, FAKESUPER_XATTR) == 0)
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/* Defense in depth: re-validate against the receiver's full whitelist, so a
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hand-crafted list can never apply a privileged namespace or the reserved
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--fake-super key through this path-based primitive. */
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if (!xattr_name_appliable(xa->name, preserve_acls))
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continue;
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if (lsetxattr(path, xa->name, xa->value, xa->value_len, 0) != 0) {
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if (!warned) {
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