Merge branch 'fix/issues-a3' into fix/issues-triage

src/shared/identity.c

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include "utils.h"
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <fnmatch.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
@@ -12,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
+static bool identity_id_fits_int32(unsigned long id);
+
 /* The active identity snapshot lives in a per-process global.  The TCP server
  * forks one child process per connection, so a connection never shares this
  * with another; within a connection the multithreaded receiver reads it without
@@ -419,17 +422,10 @@ static int identity_parse_from(const char* token, bool is_group, int32_t* out_fr
     /* Not a numeric LOW-HIGH range: fall through and treat as a name (a
      * hyphenated account name like "wayne-smith" must still resolve). */
   }
-  /* A sender-side name.  A wildcard other than the bare '*' is matched by rsync
-   * against the sender's names; because FastSync transmits numeric ids only, the
-   * receiver cannot evaluate it, so reject rather than silently mis-match. */
-  if (identity_token_has_glob(token)) {
-    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
-                "%smap FROM '%s': name wildcards other than '*' are not supported "
-                "(FastSync transmits numeric ids, so sender names are unavailable on the "
-                "receiver)",
-                is_group ? "--group" : "--user", token);
-    return -1;
-  }
+  /* A sender-side name.  A FROM name wildcard other than the bare '*' is handled
+   * by identity_expand_from_glob() in the caller (it expands against the
+   * sender's account database at CLI-parse time), so this function only sees the
+   * bare '*' or a literal name here. */
   int32_t id;
   if (identity_resolve_token(token, is_group, &id) != 0)
     return -1;
@@ -486,6 +482,138 @@ static int identity_append_rule(IdentityMap** map, int* count, const IdentityMap
   return 0;
 }
 
+/* True when `lo` and `hi` are adjacent ids (no overflow at INT32_MAX). */
+static bool identity_ids_adjacent(int32_t lo, int32_t hi) {
+  return lo < INT32_MAX && hi == lo + 1;
+}
+
+static int identity_id_cmp(const void* a, const void* b) {
+  int32_t x = *(const int32_t*)a;
+  int32_t y = *(const int32_t*)b;
+  return (x > y) - (x < y);
+}
+
+static bool identity_ids_push(int32_t** ids, size_t* count, size_t* cap, int32_t id) {
+  if (*count == *cap) {
+    size_t grown_cap = *cap ? *cap * 2 : 16;
+    int32_t* grown = realloc(*ids, grown_cap * sizeof(int32_t));
+    if (!grown)
+      return false;
+    *ids = grown;
+    *cap = grown_cap;
+  }
+  (*ids)[(*count)++] = id;
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* Expand a FROM name wildcard (rsync's match against sender-side account names)
+ * into one rule per contiguous run of matching numeric ids, all sharing the same
+ * TO side.  FastSync transmits numeric ids only, so the wildcard must be
+ * resolved here -- at CLI-parse time -- against the SENDER's passwd/group
+ * database; the receiver has no sender names to match.  Contiguous matched ids
+ * are collapsed into a single LOW-HIGH range (a range of adjacent ids contains
+ * exactly the ids it spans, so this is semantically exact).  Returns 0 on
+ * success, -1 on an allocation failure, a wildcard that matches no sender
+ * account, or an expansion that would push the map past MAX_IDENTITY_MAP. */
+static int identity_expand_from_glob(Config* config, const char* glob, bool is_group,
+                                     const IdentityMap* to_rule) {
+  const char* optname = is_group ? "--groupmap" : "--usermap";
+  size_t cap = 0;
+  size_t n = 0;
+  int32_t* ids = NULL;
+  bool alloc_failed = false;
+
+  if (is_group) {
+    setgrent();
+    struct group* gr;
+    while ((gr = getgrent()) != NULL) {
+      if (fnmatch(glob, gr->gr_name, 0) != 0)
+        continue;
+      if (!identity_id_fits_int32((unsigned long)gr->gr_gid))
+        continue;
+      if (!identity_ids_push(&ids, &n, &cap, (int32_t)gr->gr_gid)) {
+        alloc_failed = true;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    endgrent();
+  } else {
+    setpwent();
+    struct passwd* pw;
+    while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
+      if (fnmatch(glob, pw->pw_name, 0) != 0)
+        continue;
+      if (!identity_id_fits_int32((unsigned long)pw->pw_uid))
+        continue;
+      if (!identity_ids_push(&ids, &n, &cap, (int32_t)pw->pw_uid)) {
+        alloc_failed = true;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    endpwent();
+  }
+
+  if (alloc_failed) {
+    free(ids);
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s: memory allocation failed expanding FROM '%s'", optname, glob);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (n == 0) {
+    free(ids);
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s FROM '%s': no source account name matches the wildcard",
+                optname, glob);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  qsort(ids, n, sizeof(int32_t), identity_id_cmp);
+  size_t unique = 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    if (unique == 0 || ids[unique - 1] != ids[i])
+      ids[unique++] = ids[i];
+  }
+  n = unique;
+
+  int runs = 0;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    if (i == 0 || !identity_ids_adjacent(ids[i - 1], ids[i]))
+      runs++;
+  }
+
+  IdentityMap** map = is_group ? &config->groupmap : &config->usermap;
+  int* count = is_group ? &config->groupmap_count : &config->usermap_count;
+  if (*count > MAX_IDENTITY_MAP - runs) {
+    log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+                "%s FROM '%s': the name wildcard expands to %d rule(s), which would exceed "
+                "the maximum of %d map rules",
+                optname, glob, runs, MAX_IDENTITY_MAP);
+    free(ids);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < n;) {
+    size_t j = i;
+    while (j + 1 < n && identity_ids_adjacent(ids[j], ids[j + 1]))
+      j++;
+    IdentityMap rule;
+    rule.from = ids[i];
+    rule.from_hi = ids[j];
+    rule.to = to_rule->to;
+    rule.to_name = to_rule->to_name ? str_dup(to_rule->to_name) : NULL;
+    if (to_rule->to_name && !rule.to_name) {
+      free(ids);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    if (identity_append_rule(map, count, &rule) != 0) {
+      free(rule.to_name);
+      free(ids);
+      return -1;
+    }
+    i = j + 1;
+  }
+  free(ids);
+  return 0;
+}
+
 int identity_parse_map(Config* config, const char* value, bool is_group) {
   if (!config || !value || *value == '\0') {
     log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%smap requires a value", is_group ? "--group" : "--user");
@@ -509,6 +637,25 @@ int identity_parse_map(Config* config, const char* value, bool is_group) {
     char* to_token = colon + 1;
     IdentityMap parsed;
     memset(&parsed, 0, sizeof(parsed));
+    /* A FROM name wildcard (anything with a glob metacharacter other than the
+     * bare '*') is expanded against the sender's account database here, while
+     * the sender's passwd/group DB is still available; the resulting numeric
+     * rules travel on the wire like an explicit list.  The TO side is parsed
+     * first so every expanded rule shares it. */
+    if (strcmp(from_token, "*") != 0 && identity_token_has_glob(from_token)) {
+      if (identity_parse_to(to_token, is_group, &parsed.to, &parsed.to_name) != 0) {
+        log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "%s could not parse TO '%s' in '%s'", optname, to_token,
+                    value);
+        free(list);
+        return -1;
+      }
+      if (identity_expand_from_glob(config, from_token, is_group, &parsed) != 0) {
+        free(parsed.to_name);
+        free(list);
+        return -1;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
     if (identity_parse_from(from_token, is_group, &parsed.from, &parsed.from_hi) != 0) {
       log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
                   "%s could not resolve FROM '%s' in '%s' (a name must exist on the "

src/shared/identity.h

@@ -25,8 +25,14 @@
 
 /* Parse one --usermap= / --groupmap= value (comma-separated FROM:TO rules,
  * first match wins) into config->usermap / config->groupmap.  is_group selects
- * the group tables and name databases.  Returns 0 on success, -1 on a
- * malformed spec or an unresolvable name (never a silent no-op). */
+ * the group tables and name databases.  A FROM name wildcard (containing `*`,
+ * `?` or `[...]`, but not the bare `*`) is expanded against the SENDER's
+ * account database at parse time into one or more numeric id/range rules
+ * (contiguous ids collapse to a range) sharing the same TO, because only
+ * numeric ids cross the wire; the expansion is capped at MAX_IDENTITY_MAP and a
+ * wildcard matching no account is an error.  Returns 0 on success, -1 on a
+ * malformed spec, an unresolvable name, an unmatched wildcard, or a map that
+ * would exceed MAX_IDENTITY_MAP (never a silent no-op). */
 int identity_parse_map(Config* config, const char* value, bool is_group);
 
 /* Parse --chown=USER:GROUP.  Supports USER:GROUP, USER (owner only), :GROUP

tests/test_client_cli.c

@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 #include "protocol.h"
 #include "test_utils.h"
 #include "utils.h"
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#include <grp.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
@@ -3537,6 +3539,172 @@ static void test_parse_args_usermap_rsync_forms() {
   config_delete(cfg);
 }
 
+/* Independent oracle for the FROM name-glob tests: enumerate the sender's
+ * account database and fill `ids` with the DISTINCT ids whose name matches
+ * `glob`, sorted ascending.  Returns the count (bounded by `max`). */
+static int cli_collect_glob_ids(const char* glob, bool is_group, int32_t* ids, int max) {
+  int n = 0;
+  if (is_group) {
+    setgrent();
+    struct group* gr;
+    while ((gr = getgrent()) != NULL) {
+      if (fnmatch(glob, gr->gr_name, 0) != 0)
+        continue;
+      if ((unsigned long)gr->gr_gid > (unsigned long)INT32_MAX)
+        continue;
+      int32_t id = (int32_t)gr->gr_gid;
+      bool dup = false;
+      for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        if (ids[i] == id)
+          dup = true;
+      if (!dup && n < max)
+        ids[n++] = id;
+    }
+    endgrent();
+  } else {
+    setpwent();
+    struct passwd* pw;
+    while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
+      if (fnmatch(glob, pw->pw_name, 0) != 0)
+        continue;
+      if ((unsigned long)pw->pw_uid > (unsigned long)INT32_MAX)
+        continue;
+      int32_t id = (int32_t)pw->pw_uid;
+      bool dup = false;
+      for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        if (ids[i] == id)
+          dup = true;
+      if (!dup && n < max)
+        ids[n++] = id;
+    }
+    endpwent();
+  }
+  for (int i = 1; i < n; i++) {
+    int32_t key = ids[i];
+    int j = i - 1;
+    while (j >= 0 && ids[j] > key) {
+      ids[j + 1] = ids[j];
+      j--;
+    }
+    ids[j + 1] = key;
+  }
+  return n;
+}
+
+static int cli_count_runs(const int32_t* ids, int n) {
+  int runs = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    if (i == 0 || ids[i - 1] == INT32_MAX || ids[i] != ids[i - 1] + 1)
+      runs++;
+  }
+  return runs;
+}
+
+/* #294: a FROM name wildcard must expand, at CLI-parse time, against the
+ * sender's account database into numeric id/range rules.  Prefer a prefix that
+ * matches >=2 DISTINCT NON-contiguous ids (exercising multi-rule expansion); if
+ * no such prefix exists on this host, fall back to one whose ids are contiguous
+ * (exercising range collapse).  The expected rules are derived independently by
+ * enumerating the same database. */
+static void test_parse_args_identity_map_from_name_glob(bool is_group) {
+  int32_t ids[512];
+  int chosen_n = 0;
+  int chosen_runs = 0;
+  char chosen_c = 0;
+  for (char c = 'a'; c <= 'z'; c++) {
+    const char glob[3] = {c, '*', '\0'};
+    int n = cli_collect_glob_ids(glob, is_group, ids, (int)(sizeof(ids) / sizeof(ids[0])));
+    if (n < 2)
+      continue;
+    int runs = cli_count_runs(ids, n);
+    if (runs >= 2 || chosen_c == 0) {
+      chosen_c = c;
+      chosen_n = n;
+      chosen_runs = runs;
+    }
+    if (runs >= 2)
+      break;
+  }
+  if (chosen_c == 0)
+    return; /* no multi-match prefix on this host (skipped, not failed) */
+
+  const char glob[3] = {chosen_c, '*', '\0'};
+  chosen_n = cli_collect_glob_ids(glob, is_group, ids, (int)(sizeof(ids) / sizeof(ids[0])));
+  chosen_runs = cli_count_runs(ids, chosen_n);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(chosen_n >= 2);
+
+  char map_value[16];
+  snprintf(map_value, sizeof(map_value), "%s:@0", glob);
+  Config* cfg = config_create();
+  char* argv[] = {"fastsync", is_group ? "--groupmap" : "--usermap", map_value, "/src", "/dst"};
+  int positional_args[2];
+  int positional_count = 0;
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(parse_args(cfg, 5, argv, positional_args, &positional_count), 0);
+
+  int got = is_group ? cfg->groupmap_count : cfg->usermap_count;
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(got, chosen_runs);
+  const IdentityMap* map = is_group ? cfg->groupmap : cfg->usermap;
+  /* Every matched id is covered by some expanded rule. */
+  for (int i = 0; i < chosen_n; i++) {
+    bool covered = false;
+    for (int r = 0; r < got; r++)
+      if (ids[i] >= map[r].from && ids[i] <= map[r].from_hi)
+        covered = true;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(covered);
+  }
+  /* Every id inside every expanded range is one the glob actually matched, so
+   * the range collapse cannot over-match a name that does not fit the glob. */
+  for (int r = 0; r < got; r++) {
+    EXPECT_EQ_INT(map[r].to, 0);
+    for (int32_t v = map[r].from; v <= map[r].from_hi; v++) {
+      bool expected = false;
+      for (int i = 0; i < chosen_n; i++)
+        if (ids[i] == v)
+          expected = true;
+      EXPECT_TRUE(expected);
+      if (v == INT32_MAX)
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+  config_delete(cfg);
+}
+
+static void test_parse_args_usermap_from_name_glob() {
+  test_parse_args_identity_map_from_name_glob(false);
+}
+
+static void test_parse_args_groupmap_from_name_glob() {
+  test_parse_args_identity_map_from_name_glob(true);
+}
+
+/* #294: an expansion that would push the map past MAX_IDENTITY_MAP must fail
+ * with a clear error rather than silently truncating.  Prefill the map to the
+ * cap and then add a wildcard guaranteed to match at least the current user. */
+static void test_parse_args_identity_map_from_name_glob_over_cap() {
+  const struct passwd* self = getpwuid(geteuid());
+  if (!self || self->pw_name[0] == '\0')
+    return;
+  char glob[8];
+  snprintf(glob, sizeof(glob), "%c*", self->pw_name[0]);
+
+  size_t need = (size_t)MAX_IDENTITY_MAP * 6 + strlen(glob) + 4 + 1;
+  char* value = malloc(need);
+  if (!value)
+    return;
+  size_t off = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < MAX_IDENTITY_MAP; i++)
+    off += (size_t)snprintf(value + off, need - off, "@0:@0,");
+  snprintf(value + off, need - off, "%s:@0", glob);
+
+  Config* cfg = config_create();
+  char* argv[] = {"fastsync", "--usermap", value, "/src", "/dst"};
+  int positional_args[2];
+  int positional_count = 0;
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(parse_args(cfg, 5, argv, positional_args, &positional_count), -1);
+  config_delete(cfg);
+  free(value);
+}
+
 /* #294: rsync refuses to mix --chown with --usermap/--groupmap on the same
  * side (either order).  --chown=USER conflicts with a prior --usermap;
  * --chown=:GROUP conflicts with a prior --groupmap; the opposite side is fine. */
@@ -3716,7 +3884,8 @@ static void test_parse_args_rejects_malformed_identity() {
       {"--usermap", "definitely_not_a_real_user_zzz:@1"},
       {"--usermap", "0-"},
       {"--usermap", "5-2:@1"},
-      {"--usermap", "roo*:@1"},
+      {"--usermap", "zzz_definitely_no_such_user_glob_zzz*:@1"},
+      {"--groupmap", "zzz_definitely_no_such_group_glob_zzz*:@1"},
       {"--groupmap", "@1"},
       {"--groupmap", "no_such_group_qqq:x"},
       {"--chown", "a:b:c"},
@@ -4882,6 +5051,9 @@ void test_client_cli() {
   test_parse_args_groupmap();
   test_parse_args_usermap_name_resolution();
   test_parse_args_usermap_rsync_forms();
+  test_parse_args_usermap_from_name_glob();
+  test_parse_args_groupmap_from_name_glob();
+  test_parse_args_identity_map_from_name_glob_over_cap();
   test_parse_args_identity_map_chown_conflict();
   test_parse_args_chown();
   test_parse_args_copy_as();

tests/test_transport_tcp.c

@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@
 #include "test_utils.h"
 #include "transport_tcp.h"
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 
 /* -4/-6 map to a getaddrinfo ai_family hint: -4 -> AF_INET, -6 -> AF_INET6,
  * and neither -> AF_UNSPEC.  Both flags together are rejected earlier (in
@@ -246,6 +248,180 @@ static void test_tcp_nodelay_default_and_override() {
   server_delete(&s);
 }
 
+/* Count the process's open descriptors via /proc/self/fd.  The opendir
+ * descriptor is itself counted and closed before returning, so repeated calls
+ * are consistent and a before/after delta reflects only the code under test. */
+static int count_open_fds(void) {
+  DIR* dir = opendir("/proc/self/fd");
+  if (!dir)
+    return -1;
+  int count = 0;
+  const struct dirent* ent;
+  while ((ent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
+    if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") == 0)
+      continue;
+    count++;
+  }
+  closedir(dir);
+  return count;
+}
+
+/* Bind + listen on the SECOND address getaddrinfo returns for "localhost", so
+ * the first candidate is connection-refused and the shared connect loop must
+ * fall back to a later one.  Returns the listener fd and its port, or -1 when
+ * this host does not resolve localhost to at least two addresses (the test then
+ * skips rather than claiming coverage it does not have). */
+static int bind_second_localhost_address(int* out_port) {
+  struct addrinfo hints;
+  memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+  hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+  hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+  struct addrinfo* res = NULL;
+  if (getaddrinfo("localhost", "0", &hints, &res) != 0 || !res)
+    return -1;
+  const struct addrinfo* chosen = res->ai_next;
+  if (!chosen) {
+    freeaddrinfo(res);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  int fd = socket(chosen->ai_family, chosen->ai_socktype, chosen->ai_protocol);
+  if (fd < 0) {
+    freeaddrinfo(res);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  int opt = 1;
+  setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &opt, sizeof(opt));
+  if (bind(fd, chosen->ai_addr, chosen->ai_addrlen) != 0 || listen(fd, 1) != 0) {
+    close(fd);
+    freeaddrinfo(res);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  struct sockaddr_storage bound;
+  socklen_t bound_len = sizeof(bound);
+  if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&bound, &bound_len) != 0) {
+    close(fd);
+    freeaddrinfo(res);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (bound.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+    *out_port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in6*)&bound)->sin6_port);
+  else
+    *out_port = ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in*)&bound)->sin_port);
+  freeaddrinfo(res);
+  return fd;
+}
+
+/* #219 AC3: when the first getaddrinfo candidate is refused, the connect loop
+ * must fall back to the next address and end with exactly ONE open descriptor
+ * (proving the failed attempt's fd was closed before the retry). */
+static void test_tcp_connect_falls_back_to_next_address() {
+  int port = 0;
+  int listener = bind_second_localhost_address(&port);
+  if (listener < 0)
+    return; /* localhost is single-address on this host: cannot exercise fallback */
+  int before = count_open_fds();
+  Client* c = client_create();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(client_connect(c, "localhost", port));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(c->file_descriptor >= 0);
+  if (before >= 0)
+    EXPECT_EQ_INT(count_open_fds(), before + 1);
+  client_disconnect(c);
+  if (before >= 0)
+    EXPECT_EQ_INT(count_open_fds(), before);
+  client_delete(c);
+  close(listener);
+}
+
+/* #219 AC3: a connect that fails on every candidate leaves at most one
+ * descriptor (the last failed attempt) and none after client_disconnect. */
+static void test_tcp_connect_failed_attempts_do_not_leak_fds() {
+  /* Reserve an ephemeral port, then close it: connecting to it must fail. */
+  int probe = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(probe >= 0);
+  struct sockaddr_in addr;
+  memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+  addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+  addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+  addr.sin_port = 0;
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(bind(probe, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)), 0);
+  socklen_t addr_len = sizeof(addr);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockname(probe, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addr_len), 0);
+  int port = ntohs(addr.sin_port);
+  close(probe);
+
+  int before = count_open_fds();
+  Client* c = client_create();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
+  EXPECT_FALSE(client_connect(c, "localhost", port));
+  if (before >= 0)
+    EXPECT_TRUE(count_open_fds() <= before + 1);
+  client_disconnect(c);
+  if (before >= 0)
+    EXPECT_EQ_INT(count_open_fds(), before);
+  client_delete(c);
+}
+
+/* #219 AC3: the shared tcp_connect_socket_ex() (used by both the plain and TLS
+ * entry points) must install the --contimeout as SO_RCVTIMEO/SO_SNDTIMEO before
+ * connecting.  Calling it directly lets us observe the pre-connect state (the
+ * plain wrapper later overrides the receive timeout with the IO --timeout). */
+static void test_tcp_connect_socket_ex_applies_contimeout() {
+  Server* s = server_create(0);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(s);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(listen(s->file_descriptor, 1), 0);
+  struct sockaddr_in bound;
+  socklen_t bound_len = sizeof(bound);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockname(s->file_descriptor, (struct sockaddr*)&bound, &bound_len), 0);
+  int port = ntohs(bound.sin_port);
+
+  tcp_set_timeouts(30, 7);
+  Client* c = client_create();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
+  TcpConnectOptions opts;
+  memset(&opts, 0, sizeof(opts));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(tcp_connect_socket_ex(c, "127.0.0.1", port, &opts));
+  struct timeval tv;
+  socklen_t tv_len = sizeof(tv);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockopt(c->file_descriptor, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, &tv_len), 0);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)tv.tv_sec, 7);
+  tv_len = sizeof(tv);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockopt(c->file_descriptor, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, &tv_len), 0);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)tv.tv_sec, 7);
+  client_disconnect(c);
+  client_delete(c);
+  tcp_set_timeouts(30, 10);
+  server_delete(&s);
+}
+
+/* The plain wrapper applies the post-connect IO --timeout, which supersedes the
+ * contimeout installed during connect. */
+static void test_tcp_connect_post_timeout_applied() {
+  Server* s = server_create(0);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(s);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(listen(s->file_descriptor, 1), 0);
+  struct sockaddr_in bound;
+  socklen_t bound_len = sizeof(bound);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockname(s->file_descriptor, (struct sockaddr*)&bound, &bound_len), 0);
+  int port = ntohs(bound.sin_port);
+
+  tcp_set_timeouts(5, 7);
+  Client* c = client_create();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(client_connect(c, "127.0.0.1", port));
+  struct timeval tv;
+  socklen_t tv_len = sizeof(tv);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockopt(c->file_descriptor, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, &tv_len), 0);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)tv.tv_sec, 5);
+  tv_len = sizeof(tv);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockopt(c->file_descriptor, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, &tv_len), 0);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT((int)tv.tv_sec, 5);
+  client_disconnect(c);
+  client_delete(c);
+  tcp_set_timeouts(30, 10);
+  server_delete(&s);
+}
+
 void test_transport_tcp() {
   test_server_create_ephemeral();
   test_server_delete_null();
@@ -263,4 +439,8 @@ void test_transport_tcp() {
   test_server_create_bind_address();
   test_server_create_bind_ipv6();
   test_tcp_nodelay_default_and_override();
+  test_tcp_connect_falls_back_to_next_address();
+  test_tcp_connect_failed_attempts_do_not_leak_fds();
+  test_tcp_connect_socket_ex_applies_contimeout();
+  test_tcp_connect_post_timeout_applied();
 }

tests/test_transport_tls.c

@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@
 #include "test_utils.h"
 #include "transport_tcp.h"
 #include "transport_tls.h"
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 static void test_tls_global_init() {
@@ -71,9 +74,53 @@ static void test_server_create_tls_empty_certs() {
   EXPECT_NULL(s);
 }
 
+/* Count the process's open descriptors via /proc/self/fd (see the TCP tests). */
+static int tls_count_open_fds(void) {
+  DIR* dir = opendir("/proc/self/fd");
+  if (!dir)
+    return -1;
+  int count = 0;
+  const struct dirent* ent;
+  while ((ent = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
+    if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") == 0)
+      continue;
+    count++;
+  }
+  closedir(dir);
+  return count;
+}
+
+/* #219 AC3: client_connect_tls_ex() reuses the shared tcp_connect_socket_ex()
+ * for the TCP connect, and a later TLS-setup failure must release that
+ * descriptor.  Passing no CA path makes create_ssl_ctx() fail deterministically
+ * AFTER a successful TCP connect, so the cleanup path is exercised without a
+ * TLS handshake or a certificate.  (The multi-address fallback itself is covered
+ * by the shared tcp_connect_socket_ex() tests in test_transport_tcp.c, which the
+ * TLS entry point calls.) */
+static void test_client_connect_tls_releases_fd_on_setup_failure() {
+  Server* s = server_create(0);
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(s);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(listen(s->file_descriptor, 1), 0);
+  struct sockaddr_in bound;
+  socklen_t bound_len = sizeof(bound);
+  EXPECT_EQ_INT(getsockname(s->file_descriptor, (struct sockaddr*)&bound, &bound_len), 0);
+  int port = ntohs(bound.sin_port);
+
+  int before = tls_count_open_fds();
+  Client* c = client_create();
+  EXPECT_NOT_NULL(c);
+  EXPECT_FALSE(client_connect_tls(c, "127.0.0.1", port, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+  EXPECT_TRUE(c->file_descriptor == -1);
+  if (before >= 0)
+    EXPECT_EQ_INT(tls_count_open_fds(), before);
+  client_delete(c);
+  server_delete(&s);
+}
+
 void test_transport_tls() {
   test_tls_global_init();
   test_server_create_tls_without_certs();
   test_client_connect_tls_fail();
+  test_client_connect_tls_releases_fd_on_setup_failure();
   test_server_create_tls_empty_certs();
 }