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fix(d5-daemon-core): cppcheck const-correctness, wire module length cap, daemonize chdir/umask, daemon confinement tests

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- daemon_conf.c/server.c/test_daemon_conf.c: const-qualify parse/loop pointers;
  scope user_path static inside its block (clears the 9-wave-A cppcheck findings)
- config.c receive_daemon_module: reject invalid/over-long wire module names
  (> DAEMON_MAX_MODULE_NAME) with a clean STATUS_ERROR; client side already
  enforced via daemon_module_name_valid in config_parse_daemon_dest
- server.c daemonize: chdir(/) and umask(0) so module paths resolve from /
  and config-requested file modes are honored; PROTOCOL_VERSION stays 2.15.0
- test_daemon.py: confinement (read-only/unknown no-write anywhere), module-less
  and dot-dot destination refusal, real daemon_detach double-fork path
This commit is contained in:
TapTap
2026-09-09 18:30:52 +02:00
parent b3d7d64347
commit 7c55409a6b
6 changed files with 127 additions and 11 deletions
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tests/integration/test_daemon.py
+94 -1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ asks for a module with a host::module/path destination, and the transfer lands
in the configured module root only. Read-only modules, unknown modules, and
auth-required modules are all refused cleanly before any data moves.
"""
import glob
import os
import shutil
import signal
@@ -34,6 +35,28 @@ FILES_MODULE = os.path.join(MODULE_ROOT, "files")
READONLY_MODULE = os.path.join(MODULE_ROOT, "readonly")
AUTH_MODULE = os.path.join(MODULE_ROOT, "auth")
CONF_FILE = os.path.join(TEST_DATA_DIR, "fastsyncd.conf")
DETACH_MODULE = os.path.join(MODULE_ROOT, "detach")
DETACH_CONF = os.path.join(TEST_DATA_DIR, "fastsyncd_detach.conf")
DETACH_PORT = None
def _kill_by_cmdline_marker(marker):
"""Send SIGTERM to every running process whose cmdline contains `marker`
(used to clean up the double-forked --daemon, which is orphaned to init and
no longer a child of the test's own process). Portable over /proc so the
tests do not depend on pgrep being present."""
for proc_path in glob.glob("/proc/[0-9]*/cmdline"):
try:
with open(proc_path, "rb") as f:
data = f.read()
except OSError:
continue
if marker.encode() in data:
try:
os.kill(int(proc_path.split("/")[2]), signal.SIGTERM)
except (ProcessLookupError, ValueError):
pass
time.sleep(0.5)
class DaemonManager:
@@ -98,7 +121,7 @@ def _config_port(config_path):
@pytest.fixture(scope="module", autouse=True)
def daemon_env():
for d in (MODULE_ROOT, FILES_MODULE, READONLY_MODULE, AUTH_MODULE):
for d in (MODULE_ROOT, FILES_MODULE, READONLY_MODULE, AUTH_MODULE, DETACH_MODULE):
shutil.rmtree(d, ignore_errors=True)
os.makedirs(d, exist_ok=True)
generate_test_files(SOURCE_DIR, full=False)
@@ -123,7 +146,16 @@ def daemon_env():
"path = %s\n"
"auth users = alice\n"
% (config_port, FILES_MODULE, READONLY_MODULE, AUTH_MODULE))
# A dedicated config for the real (double-fork) detach test: an unique path
# lets cleanup identify and kill the orphaned background daemon by cmdline.
global DETACH_PORT
DETACH_PORT = _find_free_port()
with open(DETACH_CONF, "w") as f:
f.write("port = %d\n\n[detach]\npath = %s\n" % (DETACH_PORT, DETACH_MODULE))
yield
_kill_by_cmdline_marker(DETACH_CONF)
shutil.rmtree(MODULE_ROOT, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(SOURCE_DIR, ignore_errors=True)
@@ -165,22 +197,83 @@ class TestDaemonModuleSelection:
class TestDaemonRejection:
def _tree_files(self):
"""Snapshot every file path (module-relative) currently under the module
root tree, so confinement can be asserted by diff rather than by an
absolute 'empty' check (other tests legitimately populate modules)."""
files = set()
for root, _, names in os.walk(MODULE_ROOT):
for name in names:
full = os.path.join(root, name)
files.add(os.path.relpath(full, MODULE_ROOT))
return files
def test_read_only_module_blocked(self, daemon):
result = _push("127.0.0.1::readonly", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
file_count = sum(len(files) for _, _, files in os.walk(READONLY_MODULE))
assert file_count == 0, "read-only module must not receive any file"
def test_read_only_no_write_anywhere(self, daemon):
"""A refused read-only transfer must not add a single file anywhere under
the module root tree (negative confinement, not just the target)."""
before = self._tree_files()
result = _push("127.0.0.1::readonly", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert self._tree_files() == before, "read-only rejection wrote under the module root"
def test_unknown_module_rejected(self, daemon):
result = _push("127.0.0.1::no-such-module", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
def test_unknown_module_no_write_anywhere(self, daemon):
"""An unknown module must be refused cleanly before any file lands
anywhere beneath the module root tree."""
before = self._tree_files()
result = _push("127.0.0.1::no-such-module", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert self._tree_files() == before, "unknown-module rejection wrote under the module root"
def test_module_less_destination_rejected(self, daemon):
"""A daemon destination with no module name (host::/path) is refused at
parse time, before any connection payload is sent."""
result = _push("127.0.0.1::", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
result = _push("127.0.0.1::/sub", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
def test_dotdot_destination_rejected(self, daemon):
"""A '..' path expansion in the module-relative path is refused at parse
time so a client cannot escape the module root while it is still on the
client side of the wire."""
result = _push("127.0.0.1::files/../..", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
def test_auth_required_module_rejected(self, daemon):
result = _push("127.0.0.1::locked", daemon.port)
assert result.returncode != 0
file_count = sum(len(files) for _, _, files in os.walk(AUTH_MODULE))
assert file_count == 0
@pytest.mark.daemon_detach
def test_real_detach_path(self):
"""--daemon WITHOUT --no-detach double-forks a real background daemon;
a client can still transfer into the module root, and the orphaned
process is terminated cleanly (via SIGTERM after polling the port)."""
log_path = os.path.join(TEST_DATA_DIR, "fastsyncd_detach.log")
log = open(log_path, "w")
cmd = SERVER_CMD + ["--daemon", "--config", DETACH_CONF, "--allow-unauthenticated"]
proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=log, stderr=log, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL)
try:
_wait_for_port(DETACH_PORT, timeout=15)
result = _push("127.0.0.1::detach", DETACH_PORT)
assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr or result.stdout
received = get_dest_received_dir(DETACH_MODULE, SOURCE_DIR)
_, missing = verify_transfer(SOURCE_DIR, received)
assert not missing, f"missing: {missing[:5]}"
finally:
_kill_by_cmdline_marker(DETACH_CONF)
def test_plaintext_requires_allow_unauthenticated(self):
"""Secure default: a daemon started WITHOUT --allow-unauthenticated must
refuse a plaintext client (same posture as the standalone server)."""
tests/test_daemon_conf.c
+6 -5
View File
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static void test_daemon_conf_unknown_key_rejected() {
char* path;
char err[256];
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("bogus_key = 1\n", &path), 0);
DaemonConf* conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
const DaemonConf* conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
free(path);
EXPECT_NULL(conf);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "unknown global key") != NULL);
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void test_daemon_conf_unknown_key_rejected() {
static void test_daemon_conf_malformed_rejected() {
char* path;
char err[256];
DaemonConf* conf;
const DaemonConf* conf;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("port 8734\n", &path), 0);
conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static void test_daemon_conf_duplicate_module_rejected() {
char* path;
char err[256];
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("[m]\npath = /a\n[m]\npath = /b\n", &path), 0);
DaemonConf* conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
const DaemonConf* conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
free(path);
EXPECT_NULL(conf);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "duplicate module") != NULL);
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static void test_daemon_conf_long_line_rejected() {
memcpy(body, "[m]\npath = /x\nport = ", 21);
body[sizeof(body) - 1] = '\0';
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf(body, &path), 0);
DaemonConf* conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
const DaemonConf* conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
free(path);
EXPECT_NULL(conf);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "exceeds the") != NULL);
@@ -257,7 +257,8 @@ static void test_daemon_conf_long_line_rejected() {
static void test_daemon_conf_missing_file_rejected() {
char err[256];
DaemonConf* conf = daemon_conf_load("/nonexistent/fastsync_daemon_conf_zzz", err, sizeof(err));
const DaemonConf* conf =
daemon_conf_load("/nonexistent/fastsync_daemon_conf_zzz", err, sizeof(err));
EXPECT_NULL(conf);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "cannot open") != NULL);
}