Merge branch 'fix/w1d-hardening' into fix/w1-integration

This commit is contained in:
2026-09-13 00:59:35 +02:00
9 changed files with 139 additions and 10 deletions
+19 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#include "test_array_list.h"
#include "array_list.h"
#include "test_utils.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
static int destroyer_calls = 0;
@@ -9,7 +10,7 @@ static void test_destroyer(void* item) {
free(item);
}
void test_array_list() {
static void test_array_list_basic() {
ArrayList* list = array_list_create(free);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(list->size, 0);
@@ -54,3 +55,20 @@ void test_array_list() {
array_list_delete(list);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(destroyer_calls, 106);
}
/* A capacity that would overflow `capacity * 2` must be refused instead of
* wrapping into signed-overflow UB; array_list_add surfaces the failure. */
static void test_array_list_extend_overflow_guard() {
ArrayList* list = array_list_create(NULL);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(list);
list->capacity = INT_MAX / 2 + 1;
list->size = list->capacity;
EXPECT_FALSE(array_list_add(list, NULL));
list->size = 0;
array_list_delete(list);
}
void test_array_list() {
test_array_list_basic();
test_array_list_extend_overflow_guard();
}
+47
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
#include "test_daemon_conf.h"
#include "credentials.h"
#include "daemon_conf.h"
#include "test_utils.h"
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -320,6 +321,51 @@ static void test_daemon_conf_dparam_override() {
daemon_conf_free(conf);
}
/* Each `auth users` entry is validated with the same username rule as the
* credential store, so invisible whitespace/control characters can never make
* an exact strcmp match ambiguous. */
static void test_daemon_conf_auth_users_validated() {
char* path;
char err[256];
const DaemonConf* conf;
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = alice, bad user\n", &path), 0);
conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
free(path);
EXPECT_NULL(conf);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "invalid 'auth users' entry") != NULL);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = good\tbad\n", &path), 0);
conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
free(path);
EXPECT_NULL(conf);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "invalid 'auth users' entry") != NULL);
/* An over-long name exceeds CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN and is rejected. */
{
char body[CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 128];
int n = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), "[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = ");
memset(body + n, 'a', CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 1);
body[n + CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 1] = '\n';
body[n + CREDENTIAL_MAX_USER_LEN + 2] = '\0';
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf(body, &path), 0);
conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
free(path);
EXPECT_NULL(conf);
EXPECT_TRUE(strstr(err, "invalid 'auth users' entry") != NULL);
}
/* Empty entries between commas are skipped, not treated as invalid. */
EXPECT_EQ_INT(write_conf("[m]\npath = /x\nauth users = alice,, bob\n", &path), 0);
DaemonConf* ok_conf = daemon_conf_load(path, err, sizeof(err));
free(path);
EXPECT_NOT_NULL(ok_conf);
EXPECT_EQ_INT(ok_conf->modules[0].auth_user_count, 2);
EXPECT_EQ_STR(ok_conf->modules[0].auth_users[0], "alice");
EXPECT_EQ_STR(ok_conf->modules[0].auth_users[1], "bob");
daemon_conf_free(ok_conf);
}
static void test_daemon_module_name_valid() {
EXPECT_TRUE(daemon_module_name_valid("backup"));
EXPECT_TRUE(daemon_module_name_valid("Backup_2"));
@@ -351,5 +397,6 @@ void test_daemon_conf() {
test_daemon_conf_missing_file_rejected();
test_daemon_conf_find_module();
test_daemon_conf_dparam_override();
test_daemon_conf_auth_users_validated();
test_daemon_module_name_valid();
}