fix: address update option review findings
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This commit is contained in:
2026-09-03 21:59:55 +02:00
parent 5e67a721a4
commit 68aaf89da7
4 changed files with 96 additions and 29 deletions
+6
View File
@@ -27,10 +27,16 @@ bool file_set_authorized_root(int fd, const char* canonical_path);
/* Secure path/filesystem primitives (symlink-safe, O_NOFOLLOW, root-confined). */
bool file_path_exists_secure(const char* path);
bool file_stat_secure(const char* path, struct stat* st);
bool file_destination_is_newer_secure(const char* path, const FileMetadata* metadata);
int file_open_secure_parent(const char* path, char** leaf_out, bool create_dirs);
bool file_ensure_directory_secure(const char* path);
bool file_rename_secure(const char* old_path, const char* new_path);
bool file_to_disk_secure(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
bool inplace, bool sparse, const FileMetadata* metadata);
/* With update enabled, an existing newer destination is left untouched. The
check is descriptor-based for inplace writes; atomic replacement still has
an unavoidable final rename race without filesystem locking. */
bool file_to_disk_secure_update(const char* path, const void* data, unsigned long long data_size,
bool inplace, bool sparse, const FileMetadata* metadata);
#endif