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feat(p5-remote-option): --remote-option (probe 2.14.0), --trust-sender

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TapTap
2026-09-09 13:41:28 +02:00
parent 90ccf297d7
commit 5e79d7d76b
18 changed files with 547 additions and 50 deletions
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src/shared/file_receive.c
+12 -8
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@@ -595,8 +595,12 @@ FileSaveResult file_save_to_disk_full(const char* root_directory, const File* fi
could escape the receive root (absolute, or relative-with-"..") is never
materialized. It is contained (the entry is skipped) rather than failing
the whole transfer, so a hostile sender can inject a broken symlink but
can never redirect it outside the root. */
if (ok && !file_symlink_target_contained(target))
can never redirect it outside the root. --trust-sender deliberately
relaxes this receiver-side re-validation: a trusted sender's escaping
symlink target is copied verbatim (rsync -l parity). The low-level
leaf/destination confinement in file_symlink_at_secure still ensures the
link itself is placed inside the authorized root. */
if (ok && !file_get_trust_sender() && !file_symlink_target_contained(target))
ok = false;
if (!ok) {
/* Skip the escaping/empty target (contained) rather than abort. */
@@ -2076,7 +2080,7 @@ File* file_receive(const Config* config, int file_descriptor) {
char* path = receive_str(file_descriptor);
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (path[0] == '\0' || has_path_traversal(path)) {
if (path[0] == '\0' || (!file_get_trust_sender() && has_path_traversal(path))) {
char* escaped_path = output_escape(path, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid received file path: %s",
escaped_path ? escaped_path : "<allocation failed>");
@@ -2136,7 +2140,7 @@ File* file_receive_directory(int file_descriptor) {
char* path = receive_str(file_descriptor);
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (path[0] == '\0' || has_path_traversal(path)) {
if (path[0] == '\0' || (!file_get_trust_sender() && has_path_traversal(path))) {
char* escaped_path = output_escape(path, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid received directory path: %s",
escaped_path ? escaped_path : "<allocation failed>");
@@ -2163,7 +2167,7 @@ File* file_receive_hardlink(int file_descriptor) {
char* path = receive_str(file_descriptor);
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (path[0] == '\0' || has_path_traversal(path)) {
if (path[0] == '\0' || (!file_get_trust_sender() && has_path_traversal(path))) {
char* escaped_path = output_escape(path, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid received hard-link path: %s",
escaped_path ? escaped_path : "<allocation failed>");
@@ -2182,7 +2186,7 @@ File* file_receive_hardlink(int file_descriptor) {
free(path);
return NULL;
}
if (target[0] == '\0' || has_path_traversal(target)) {
if (target[0] == '\0' || (!file_get_trust_sender() && has_path_traversal(target))) {
char* escaped = output_escape(target, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid hard-link target path: %s",
escaped ? escaped : "<allocation failed>");
@@ -2213,7 +2217,7 @@ File* file_receive_symlink(int file_descriptor, const Config* config) {
char* path = receive_str(file_descriptor);
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (path[0] == '\0' || has_path_traversal(path)) {
if (path[0] == '\0' || (!file_get_trust_sender() && has_path_traversal(path))) {
char* escaped_path = output_escape(path, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid received symlink path: %s",
escaped_path ? escaped_path : "<allocation failed>");
@@ -2268,7 +2272,7 @@ File* file_receive_special(int file_descriptor) {
char* path = receive_str(file_descriptor);
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (path[0] == '\0' || has_path_traversal(path)) {
if (path[0] == '\0' || (!file_get_trust_sender() && has_path_traversal(path))) {
char* escaped_path = output_escape(path, log_get_8_bit_output());
log_message(LOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Invalid received special path: %s",
escaped_path ? escaped_path : "<allocation failed>");