fix(utils): bound glob matching and line reads
Replace the recursive glob matcher with an iterative O(pattern*string) dynamic program. The old recursion explored exponentially many paths for overlapping '*'/'**' wildcards (e.g. '*a*a*...*b' against a long run of 'a'), a CPU DoS reachable from --exclude/--include patterns and .rsync-filter. A differential fuzz against the original matcher confirms identical results. Doc: has_path_traversal() is a lexical '..' check only. Add utils_getdelim_bounded(): a getdelim-style reader that never allocates beyond UTILS_MAX_LINE_LEN, used to cap untrusted list/filter line reads. Tests: pathological glob completes quickly; bounded reader returns EFBIG on an over-long record.
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@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
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#include "array_list.h"
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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/* Small open-addressing string hash set used to turn quadratic membership
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* scans into O(path length) exact-match lookups (the --delete keep-set and the
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@@ -79,6 +81,17 @@ bool path_index_has_descendant(const PathIndex* index, const char* path);
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char* str_dup(const char* string);
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char* output_escape(const char* string, bool eight_bit_output);
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/* Upper bound on one line/token read from a local list file (--files-from,
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* --exclude-from/--include-from, .rsync-filter). Mirrors MAX_STRING_SIZE and
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* stops a hostile multi-gigabyte line from forcing unbounded allocation. */
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#define UTILS_MAX_LINE_LEN (64 * 1024)
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/* Read one `delim`-terminated record from `stream` into *line (grown as needed
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* and NUL-terminated), refusing to consume/allocate more than `max_len` bytes
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* of content. Returns the number of bytes stored (delimiter included, matching
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* getdelim), 0 at end of file, or -1 on error (errno is EFBIG when the record
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* exceeds `max_len`, ENOMEM on allocation failure). *line and *cap are updated
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* as the buffer grows and the caller owns *line. */
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ssize_t utils_getdelim_bounded(FILE* stream, char** line, size_t* cap, int delim, size_t max_len);
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char* path_cat(const char* path1, const char* path2);
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bool glob_match(const char* pattern, const char* str);
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/* Result of a bounded extra-file deletion run. */
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@@ -148,6 +161,12 @@ const char* utils_get_authorized_root_path(void);
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* callers guarantee this); this is containment by string, not by resolved
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* symlinks. Shared by the utils and file secure-walk root confinement. */
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bool path_is_within_root(const char* root, const char* path);
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/* True when `path` contains a ".." component. This is a purely lexical
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* dot-dot check: an absolute path is NOT rejected here, because default
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* (non-relative) transfers legitimately put the sender's absolute source path
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* on the wire and the receiver re-roots it under the destination with
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* path_cat(). Callers that accept a strictly relative path (e.g. batch paths)
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* must reject a leading '/' themselves (see utils_valid_batch_path). */
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bool has_path_traversal(const char* path);
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bool utils_valid_batch_path(const char* path);
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bool format_human_bytes(unsigned long long bytes, char* buffer, size_t buffer_size);
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