fix(receiver): confine --temp-dir scratch dir and gate setuid bits

Three receiver security fixes from the audit:

1. --temp-dir symlink escape (High): file_open_temp_dir() opened the
   client-controlled scratch dir with a bare open(), so a symlink planted
   under the receive root let a peer redirect receiver scratch files
   outside the authorized root.  The opened dir is now judged by the REAL
   path of its fd (via /proc/self/fd), and any target outside the
   authorized receive root is refused with a logged error (EACCES).  An
   in-root symlink (the EXDEV cross-filesystem fallback case) still works,
   and the no-root local batch path is unchanged.

2. setuid/setgid/sticky under SUPER_MODE_OFF (High): the special bits were
   applied under --perms (and via --chmod) even when the connection forbade
   super-user activities.  FileAttrPolicy gains super_permitted, set by
   file_attr_policy_from_config() from privilege_super_mode_permitted();
   metadata_mode_for_policy(), the symlink path, the special-node creation
   path, and the deferred directory-mode apply now strip the special bits
   when it is false.  Exact rsync semantics are preserved when permitted.

3. daemon umask (Low): daemonize() forced umask(0), so implied parent
   directories created without -p were world-writable 0777.  Set the
   conventional daemon umask 022 instead (rsync never forces 0); -p/-a mode
   preservation is unaffected because it restores modes via fchmod.

Tests: new unit tests for file_open_temp_dir confinement and the
masked/unmasked special-bit policy (incl. the --chmod path), a daemon
world-writable-dir regression test, an integration escape test, and a
root-only integration test asserting special bits are masked without
--allow-super.  The old cross-filesystem test encoded the vulnerable
behavior (symlink target outside the root) and is replaced by the escape
test; the EXDEV fallback code is retained for in-root links.

src/server/server.c

@@ -1178,13 +1178,19 @@ static bool daemonize(void) {
       close(devnull);
   }
   /* Do not pin the launch CWD (module-relative 'path' entries would resolve
-   * against an unstable working directory) and drop the restrictive host umask
-   * so modules can create files/dirs with the modes the config requests. */
+   * against an unstable working directory).  Set a conservative daemon umask
+   * of 022 (the conventional service default): rsync never forces umask 0 --
+   * it reads and restores the inherited umask and creates new entries as
+   * 0777 & ~umask / source & ~umask without -p.  Forcing 0 here made every
+   * implied parent directory world-writable (0777) whenever -p metadata was not
+   * applied.  022 gives 0755 directories and source&~022 files, matching rsync
+   * under a normal daemon umask; -p/-a still restore the exact source mode via
+   * fchmod, which is unaffected by the umask. */
   if (chdir("/") != 0)
     log_message(LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "daemon: chdir to / failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-  umask(0);
+  umask(022);
   /* Refresh the cached umask: main() captured the launch umask before this
-   * (single-threaded) umask(0), and file_mode_base() must see the daemon's
+   * (single-threaded) umask(022), and file_mode_base() must see the daemon's
    * actual umask. */
   file_umask_capture();
   return true;